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This dissertation examines arguments within religion and ecology, particularly within the 
ecospiritual movement and methodology called the new cosmology, that humans should cultivate 
and sustain emotional relationships with nature by caring for nonhuman others as our 
evolutionary kin. Focusing on the U.S. Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, and 
the British Petroleum oil spill, I argue that new cosmology affords few opportunities to think 
about intimacies with severely damaged and toxic environments. I consider how to rethink 
common themes in religion and ecology, like sacrality, kinship, and hope, within the context of 
encounters with toxic creatures and damaged ecosystems. I argue that cultivating affinity and 
attachment with/in ecological destruction requires thinking through how so-called “negative” 
affects like fear, disgust, revulsion, melancholy, shame, and despair can be an important part of 
ecological theory and activism. Furthermore, I contend there are other avenues for theorizing 
desire and kinship at the theoretical intersections of social marginalization and environmental 
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Late April 2010, another “storm” is brewing in the Gulf of Mexico. Still in recovery from 
the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Gulf residents painfully returned to the national 
spotlight as reports slowly revealed that a British Petroleum (BP) drilling rig, Deepwater 
Horizon, exploded killing eleven workers and leaving a sea-floor oil gusher. BP’s public 
relations quickly jumped on the offensive claiming they had the plans and resources to stop the 
spill. But, as days passed, it became frustratingly evident that no such plans and protections were 
in place. Live feed cameras placed near the destroyed wellhead depicted in real time what looked 
like a volcanic eruption spewing clouds of ash. This eruption was an estimated 53,000 barrels of 
crude oil per day gushing from the well. Despite numerous attempts to cap the wellhead, and 
mounting anger and frustration at the seeming inability of anyone to stop the spill, it was not 
until July 15th, 2010 that the wellhead was capped. Media reports depicted tar ball littered 
beaches, rainbow-slick seas, gasping wildlife, struggling residents, and transnational 
corporations juggling the blame in an endless loop. The nearly five million barrels of crude oil 
spilling into the waters, plus the approximately 1.07 million gallons of toxic Corexit dispersants 
used to sink the oil, continues to result in extensive damage to marine habitats, marine industries, 
and the health of Gulf-residents, human and non-human. 
At the time of the spill my days were spent in a neonatal intensive care unit in southeast 
Texas. I'd given birth to a "micro preemie," a child so small and underdeveloped he looked more 
like a piece of overripe fruit than a human. He could not breathe or eat on his own. Some 
surgeries removed pieces of his anatomy and others added synthetic solutions. He was sustained 




backdrop for the crisis unfolding in our NICU room with its incessant alarms, dry air, and 
pressing panic. While the unstoppable gush of oil garnered palpable local anxiety, it remained as 
background to the hourly pressures of the NICU. The spill seemed too close and too far— an 
overwhelming disaster that fashioned a certain lingering sourness. My partner and I were just 
beginning to learn all that could harm our son in that hospital and glimpses into the risks outside 
its protective walls seemed cruel. Two years later, feeling more confident in mothering my 
remarkable son and starting my graduate research, I came across the Aljazeera anniversary 
special report on sea life impacted by the BP disaster. In these interviews marine scientists 
Darryl Felder, Jim Cowan, and Andrew Whitehead detailed a list of disturbing after-effects 
including: crabs lacking claws and dying from within, fish with oozing sores and without eye 
sockets, and shrimp without eyes, with large tumors, and with their dead young still attached to 
their bodies.1 Even now, seeing the accompanying images of these mutations I feel an unsettling 
mix of what I can best describe as horror, revulsion, dread, and grief. I feel empathy for these 
tiny creatures that is difficult to articulate. They haunt me.  
It is risky to begin a project with personal experience. As a feminist, I recognize that 
while the personal may be political it is also easily dismissed as irrational, arbitrary, unscholarly, 
confessional. Nevertheless, this project originated from and is shaped by unexpected personal 
encounters—namely my evolving relationships with the daily entanglements of living on an 
environmentally precarious coastline while mothering a disabled child. My response to the 
images of ill and disabled sea life is, in part, a desire for conversations that do not yet exist on the 
intersections of social difference, particularly race, sexuality, illness, and disability, within the 
field of religion and ecology. Religion and ecology affords few resources for thinking about our 
                                                        





relationships with and to gravely damaged environments and their inhabitants. Exploring our 
attraction and attachment to nonhuman others is the core of not only much of religious ecotheory 
but also other trajectories of environmental theory. But damaged environments and their ill, 
wounded, deformed, dispossessed, and exiled inhabitants are rarely granted presence except, 
perhaps, as distant warnings or apocalyptic tropes. What kinds of futures are we hoping for and 
which creatures, human and nonhuman, have access to these futures? In response to their 
weighty absence, the labor of this dissertation is cultivating vital intellectual and political 
resources at the intersections of social marginalization and environmental decline. 
The Gulf Coast region, that these creatures and I call home, is a devastated landscape— 
an area marked by ecological destruction and the anticipation of rapid environmental decline.  
While “devastated landscape” can arguably be applied to much of the planet, I use it in this 
project to illuminate places experiencing significant crisis fatigue, with the expectation of 
persistently perilous futures, and where environmental conditions also wring traumatic emotional 
and material costs. Following the BP spill and the destruction of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and 
Harvey, for many the Gulf landscape is unclean, disturbingly damaged, a bad investment, 
beyond repair. This region, particularly the Louisiana coast, is what geographer and urban 
ecologist Joshua Lewis calls an “ecological chokepoint;” or sites “where human intervention 
inhibits or eliminates critical forms of ecological connectivity.”2 Coastal ecosystems “like those 
of the Mississippi River Delta,” Lewis writes, “depend on the river’s capacity to transport and 
circulate fresh water, millions of tons of sediment and sand, seeds, and billions of animal eggs 
and larvae. A sustainable delta requires multiple pathways to distribute water, nutrients, and 
sediments into its alluvial plain. When these circulation patterns break down, ecosystems 
                                                        





undergo dramatic changes and the delta’s landmass itself rapidly erodes. This catastrophe is 
currently unfolding in coastal Louisiana, placing its communities, its infrastructure, and its 
ecological bounty at risk.”3  
Louisiana’s environmental precarity is not merely geological or topographical, however. 
This dissertation forwards the conviction that we cannot examine environmental injustice 
separate from social injustice and argues not only that the Gulf region should be read both as an 
ecological choke point and a racial one, but also that these concerns are fundamentally 
intertwined. By weaving environmental decline into the historical and present social exclusions, 
erosions, deprivations, and abandonments that make the Gulf region particularly precarious for 
marginalized humans, I will demonstrate how histories of environmental racism and its political 
and economic implications set the scene for disaster and degradation along the coast by pressing 
social exclusions into the very landscape of this region. “Devastation” not only describes the 
environmental destruction itself but also the traumatic emotional and material tolls exacted on 
the bodies that call this coast home by histories of environmental racism and the uneven impacts 
of toxicity. The argument that to address environmental problems we have to take-on social 
injustice is in no way new. It is the long standing and ongoing reminder from powerful 
environmental justice movements, but this dissertation emphasizes how the field of religion and 
ecology, which I will define shortly, still sidelines or completely ignores these concerns and, in 
response, demonstrates what we might accomplish by investing in efforts to resist white 
supremacy, compulsory heterosexuality, able-bodied, and able-mindedness, and by heeding both 
the material and affective circuits that complexly prevent and promise environmental and social 
healing.  
                                                        




 At its core, this project considers how “best to love” after ecological collapse. In 1989 
Donna Haraway asked:  
how are love, power, and science intertwined in the constructions of nature in the late 
twentieth century? What may count as nature for late industrial people? What forms does 
love of nature take in particular historical contexts? For whom and at what cost? In what 
specific places, out of which social and intellectual histories, and with what tools is 
nature constructed as an object of erotic and intellectual desire? How do the terrible 
marks of gender and race enable and constrain love and knowledge in particular cultural 
traditions, including the modern natural sciences? Who may contest for what the body of 
nature will be?4 
 
These questions have only grown in power as “how should we love in a time of extinction,” 
Matthew Chrulew rightfully contends, is now “one of the central ethical questions of our time.”5 
Frustratingly, Haraway’s attention to the intersections of nature with social exclusions also 
remains salient particularly for religion and ecology that still tends to ignore how nature is 
shaped by conceptions of race, gender, sexuality, and ability. This dissertation takes up the 
problematic absence of social/environmental degradation within religion and ecology by asking: 
what does it mean to love life in devastated landscapes? When so much has been lost, when 
critical damage has already been done, is the love gone as well? When places we call(ed) home 
are no longer places of desire, what kind of love is required for sustaining affinities in precarious 
environments? First, I look at current trajectories of affinity and attachment charted by religion 
and ecology and then suggest different avenues, what I will call queer detours, which might 
better prepare us for the future. Reading devastated landscapes as affective landscapes, for 
example, opens inquiry to the range of emotional bonds with these environments that could be 
love, but also constellations of shame, fear, melancholy, and apathy. I argue that cultivating 
                                                        
4 Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern 
Science (New York: Routledge, 1989), 1. 
 
5 Matthew Chrulew, “Managing Love and Death at the Zoo: The Biopolitics of 




affinity and attachment within ecological destruction will require thinking through the often 
unsettling, possibly terrifying, quotidian intimacies in areas of ecological collapse. Furthermore, 
taking on long histories of racial and environmental injustice in America as an occasion to speak 
to the larger part they must play in religious ecotheory, I contend we must better understand the 
so-called “negative” affects like disgust, revulsion, melancholy, shame, and despair that stick to 
communities shouldering the uneven burdens of toxicity by demonstrating that they must 
become a critical part of how we do ecological theory and activism. Finally, I argue that 
reevaluating our conceptions of “nature,” “human,” “intimacy,” and “futurity” from the 
perspectives and encounters of bodies (human and nonhuman) in degrading environments 
fundamentally unsettles common themes in religion and ecology, like sacrality, kinship, and 
hope, that are implicitly drawn upon but in need of further reflection. 
 
Religion and Ecology 
The field of religion and ecology includes multi-disciplinary methods from anthropology, 
theology, philosophy, ethics, and the sciences to consider human interactions with the “natural 
world” as well as examine how religion and culture shape conceptions of “nature.” I use 
“religion and ecology” here as a broad umbrella of inquiry that could include work that dwells in 
the overlap of ecological/environmental and religious studies concerns. Various iterations of this 
umbrella are “religious environmental ethics,” “religion and nature,” and “religious 
environmentalism.” These projects could include: spiritual/religious dimensions of 
environmental thought/practice, environmental practices established by particular religious 




environmental problems “so complex, terrifying, and significant that they require a religious 
register for understanding and responding to them.”6  
In 1989 and 1991 professor of Buddhism and Environmental Studies David Barnhill, 
theologians Eugene Bianchi and Jay McDaniel, and Buddhist scholar and deep ecologist 
Stephanie Kaza proposed an initiative at the American Academy of Religion to form a group to 
“focus scholarly attention on the religion variable in human/ecosystem interactions.”7 Religion 
and Ecology has remained a group at AAR since 1993. While some scholars consider any 
material working on ecological and religious questions within the big umbrella of religion and 
ecology, others make distinctions between “Religion and Ecology” (associated with the Yale 
Forum on Religion and the publications/conferences hosted by the Center for the Study of World 
Religions at Harvard University) and “Religion and Nature” (associated with the graduate 
program at the University of Florida and the International Society for the Study of Religion, 
Nature, and Culture.)8 Those who identify with the category “religion and nature” argue “the 
religion and ecology framework excludes a good deal of nature-related religiosity not associated 
with established religions,” is “sometimes more sanguine about the environmental potential of 
the world’s predominate religions than is warranted,” and that religion and ecology too easily 
assumes without genuine critique that our environmental crisis “is the result of defective 
religious worldviews.”9 While I find these to be reasonable critiques, I intentionally resist 
                                                        
6 Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New 
York: Oxford, 2008), 8. 
 
7 Bron Taylor, “Religious Studies and Environmental Concern,” in Encyclopedia of 
Religion and Nature Vol. II, ed. Bron Taylor (New York: Continuum, 2005), 1373. 
 
8 Lisa Sideris, “On Letting a Thousand Flowers Bloom: Religious Scholarship in a Time 
of Crisis,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 83, no. 2 (2015): 366. 
 





advocating for one approach as remedy for the sins of another. I see merits as well as limitations 
within their various approaches. Many of the challenges to common themes in religion and 
ecology that I believe devastated landscapes stimulate span this literature regardless of internal 
tensions. This project is primarily concerned with arguments about/for cultivating emotional 
connections with nonhuman others and scholars in both camps articulate investment in these 
attachments. I am compelled, however, by arguments from Tim Morton, Whitney Bauman, and 
others that conceptions of nature (particularly those that nostalgically conceptualize “nature” as 
pristine10) can actually inhibit generative ecological thought. I also remain sensitive to 
ecofeminist critiques of anthropocentricism and androcentrism within many western 
environmental activist and philosophical frameworks. Consequently, my terminological 
preference (however imperfect) is “religion and ecology.”  
Keeping in mind these internal tensions, religion and ecology as a broad academic field 
demonstrates three tendencies that readers should anticipate. One, the element that binds all this 
diversity together is a commitment to contending that religion, in its many definitions, 
expressions, and practices, is an important part of ecological theory/activism. Whether taking an 
apologetic, reparative, or analytic stance, most of this scholarship insists that the “broad 
intellectual traditions of religions” and the “everyday reality of religion on the ground” are 
complementary and are relevant to concerns about environmental degradation.11 Thus, 
methodologies in religion and ecology frustrate attempts to conceptualize intellectual traditions 
and lived religions as separate enterprises. Two, religion and ecology as a multidisciplinary and 
                                                        
10 Whitney A. Bauman, Richard R. Bohannon II, and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Introduction” in 
Grounding Religion: A Field Guide to the Study of Religion and Ecology (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 6. 
 





constantly evolving conversation includes activists and theorists (many of whom consider 
themselves to be both/and), theologians and laity, so speaking into this conversation requires 
openness toward challenging differences in training and investment. Scholars who approach 
religious studies from the argument that “the task of the discipline is properly to analyze religion 
rather than to defend or engage in it” find much of this work inappropriate at best, leading some 
to argue that the Religion and Ecology AAR group is “more engaged in green religion and 
‘missionary’ work than in scholarly analysis."12 Finally, as Whitney Bauman, Richard 
Bohannon, and Kevin O’Brien suggest, scholarship in the field of religion and ecology helps 
“people to think critically about how religion has been shaped by the natural world and can be 
shaped by environmental degradation, and to imaginatively consider how religion and/or the 
study of religion might positively impact the future of our species and our planet.”13 
Consequently, the third tendency to keep in mind is that in most cases work in religion and 
ecology is ethically prescriptive even if only in the broadest sense of contending that humans 
ought to change their behaviors/conceptions, whatever the highlighted issues might be, for more 
sustainable futures.  
While not an unimportant conversation, I tend to find definitions of the field are not as 
compelling as the gaps and limitations within the field. Religion and ecology’s tendencies, while 
frustrating at times, resonate in some ways with feminist epistemologies that contend that 
“objectivity”, or separating oneself from one’s “study,” is impossible. Recognizing the diversity 
within the field, I intend to make my connections and generalizations as fair as possible 
accepting that consolidating this diversity inevitably leads to discomfort and acknowledging that 
tensions remain amongst and within different approaches. I imagine this project less as a critique 
                                                        
12 Taylor, 1374. 
 




of religion and ecology and more a writhing within the field, pushing at its limitations/horizons 
by considering how roily evolutions in the Gulf challenge our theory. By highlighting aversion to 
non-ideal lands/creatures and through advocating for a (re)investment in these 
spaces/relationships, this project is both practical and speculative. On one level, I want to open a 
practical conversation about developing language that ecological theorists and activists can 
access to talk about the truly complex material and affective investments necessitated by 
cultivating relationships with gravely damaged environments. On another level, this project is 
inescapably speculative as it aims at the definitively unanswerable questions of: what does it 
mean to be human and how should we humans live, love, and hope in the midst of ecological 
destruction? 
 
Dark Green Religions 
In his helpful framing of the past few decades of work in religion and ecology broadly 
defined, Bron Taylor organizes the bulk of scholarship into four trajectories. One path is to 
illuminate various obstacles within the world’s religions that prove to be stumbling blocks for 
ecological projects. The second is the extraction of resources within religious traditions/practices 
that may prove to be generative for ecological thinking and ecoethical action. The third includes 
practical projects in which religious, spiritual, and theological work is deployed to hopefully 
promulgate ecologically ethical behaviors. The fourth, perhaps more experimental course, is the 
constructive cultivation of “green religions/religion of nature/dark green religions” whether 
through encouraging mainstream religions to “go green,” by rekindling/inventing nature 
spiritualties, or suggesting contemporary ways of reading the earth itself as “sacred text” that 
may not easily fall into the borders of normative religions.14 All of these trajectories, 
                                                        




understandably, bleed into one another but, Taylor suggests, they all seem to work from an 
agreement that “nature is sacred (in some way); and this conviction appears to be tethered to 
ethical concern about the environmental decline.”15 It is this fourth avenue’s emphasis on reading 
the sacrality of the earth itself and interest in ecoreligiosity on the horizons of normative 
religious practice that is most relevant to this project’s search for ethical trajectories more 
conducive to loving devastated landscapes.  
The conversations I engage here, including exchanges between well-known religion 
scholars like Thomas Berry and Mary Evelyn Tucker and scholars in the sciences like E. O. 
Wilson and Ursula Goodenough, fall under what Taylor has come to term “dark green religion.” 
While green religions posit that “environmentally friendly behavior is a religious obligation” 
dark green religions, Taylor argues, are “deeply ecological, biocentric, or ecocentric, considering 
all species to be intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable apart from their usefulness to human 
beings.”16 This approach to religion and ecology is based on a “felt kinship with the rest of life, 
often derived from a Darwinian understanding that all forms of life have evolved from a 
common ancestor and are therefore related.”17 As a value system rooted in affective kinship, 
Taylor contends that dark green religion is “accompanied by feelings of humility and a 
corresponding critique of human moral superiority, often inspired or reinforced by a science-
based cosmology that reveals how tiny human beings are in the universe.”18 Taylor gestures 
                                                        
 
15 Taylor, “A Green Future for Religion?” 995.  
 
16 Bron Taylor, Dark Green Religions: Nature Spirituality and the Planetary Future 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 10-13. 
 
17 Taylor, Dark Green Religions, 13. 
 





toward sacred natures and kinship ethics as important orientations in paganism and indigenous 
religions, and the growing academic interest in these orientations, but he also highlights the 
curious development of a “kind of civic planetary earth religion” evolving without any 
“concomitant confession of supernatural beliefs” yet nevertheless claims “religious fidelity to the 
biosphere.”19 This form of dark green religion, Taylor argues, is surprisingly present in the 
supposedly secular work of prominent scientists Stephen Jay Gould, Wilson, and Carl Sagan 
who utilize “metaphors of the sacred to express their awe at the wonders of the universe and 
reverence for life.”20  
Significantly influenced by the work of religion scholars Berry, Tucker, Loyal Rue, and 
John Grim and in conversation with scientists Goodenough, Wilson, Brian Swimme, and 
Stephen Kellert, this vein of scholarship understands “scientific worldviews not as a leading 
cause of nature’s disenchantment but as a primary vehicle for restoring enchantment, wonder, 
meaning, and value to the natural world.”21 In this dissertation, I track this particular route in 
religion and ecology whereby “scientific narratives are sacralized and the diversity of life is 
accorded reverence” to inquire how these theorists approach affinity and attachment with/to 
nonhuman others.22 In chapter one, I will address this work in detail but it is significant to note 
here that this vein is read both as a methodology within religion and ecology and a science-based 
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20 Ibid., 998. 
 
21 Lisa Sideris, “Science as Sacred Myth? Ecospirituality in the Anthropocene Age” 
Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 9.2 (2015), 137. 
 





ecospirituality movement that Lisa Sideris terms “New Genesis” or “new cosmology.”23 Taylor 
notes an interesting aspect of new cosmology spirituality is that it stands “alone as something of 
a new religious movement” as a way of expressing “deep, driving feelings” toward biodiversity 
and it is also often “grafted onto liberal forms of already-existing religions” interested in 
exploring ecological questions.24 Nurturing these “feelings” or “emotions,” this scholarship 
advocates, could prove fertile for ethical investment. As Ursula Goodenough contends, “it seems 
likely that the emotional circuits invoked when we contemplate our deep evolutionary affinity 
with other creatures, and when we are infused with compassion, will turn out to map closely onto 
the circuits that drive our parental instincts, emotions that generate such feelings as tenderness 
and warmth and protectiveness. These same emotions extend to our understanding that the Earth 
must be nurtured, an understanding embedded in many religious traditions.”25 With hope that 
these affective circuits will lead the way, I read new cosmology’s main ethical argument as 
insisting that for the future, we must love nonhuman others as our sacred evolutionary kin.  
Taylor argues that this “affectively grounded spirituality of connection” in which “people 
feel awe and reverence toward the earth’s living systems and even feel themselves as connected 
and belonging to these systems” might not “retain anything we would recognize in today’s more 
common supernaturalistic metaphysics, but it might nevertheless require religious terminology to 
verbally capture the feelings.”26 While I will defer to other scholarship within religion and 
                                                        
23 Sideris (2013) terms this religiopoeisis project “New Genesis” but it is also recognized 
in religion and ecology as “The Epic of Evolution,” “Big History,” “The New Story,” or “The 
Great Story.” 
 
24 Taylor, “A Green Future for Religion?” 999. 
 
25 Ursula Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 128. 
 





ecology that saliently critiques the uses of “science” and “religion” in sacred natures discourse, 
my project is concerned with the unexplored affective resonances in this work. What do we mean 
by “religious emotions”? Why are feelings and emotions important to religion and ecology? Are 
awe, wonder, and reverence our primary religious emotions? How do these feelings relate to 
ethical action? Furthermore, what if our encounters and connections with/to nonhuman others 
stir up other feelings? What happens to our “natural” attraction and attachment to nonhuman 
others in devastated landscapes? My project contends that this vein of religion and ecology 
functions as scholarly and affective process in which particular experiences of affinity and 
attachment are normalized, policed, and celebrated. I am primarily interested in tracking what 
happens to the keywords and normative values of religion and ecology when they are made to 
address the complicated crisis contexts of devastated landscapes. The persistent focus on awe-
struck and benevolent relationships in new cosmology, I argue, encourages us to ignore and/or 
hide the affective intimacies that shape degrading environments and leads us away from 
developing the politics and contexts we need for a world in crisis.  
 
Affects 
 While affect theory may be underutilized in religion and ecology, and celebrations of the 
“affective turn” tend to speak of affect as novel, the translations of affect that resonate in this 
project are not new but rather a continuation of a “long tradition of feminist scholarship on 
emotional life,”27 what Lauren Berlant calls the “unfinished business of sentimentality,”28 that 
                                                        
27 Ben Anderson, Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2014), 6. 
 
28 Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in 





considers “‘the personal is the political’ as it has shaped theoretical and political practice and 
their relation to everyday life.”29 This work in feminist, queer, critical race, and disability studies 
fashions affect as the “social energy through which subjects, meanings, and cultures are 
produced, organized, and undone.”30 To make some sense of the emotional atmospheres of 
devastated landscapes, I appeal to two entwined modalities of affect. First, affect as economy or 
collective condition “that mediates how life is lived and thought”31 considers capacities to affect 
and be affected as “always mediated in and through encounters . . . shifting attention from the 
personal to the transpersonal whilst at the same time attending to the formation of subjectivity.”32 
Significantly in the work of Sara Ahmed, Lawrence Grossberg, and Ben Anderson, this 
translation of affect considers how emotions “align individuals with communities—or bodily 
space with social space—through the very intensity of their attachments.”33 This scholarship, 
particularly Ahmed’s sobering work on race and nation, pays attention to space, place, and 
embodiment by asking how the circulation of affects “shapes the materialization of collective 
bodies” and how individuals might be aligned, or out-of-step, with these collectives.34 Second, 
the similarly invested Public Feelings project with conversation companions Lauren Berlant, 
Ann Cvetkovich, and José Muñoz, takes “feelings as both subject and method” to bring 
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“emotional sensibilities to bear” on intellectual and political projects continuing to “craft new 
forms of feminist intellectual politics that are still lacking in the public sphere.”35  Implementing 
queer theories’ emphasis on “identities and public cultures that cultivate non-normative affects,” 
like the transformative possibilities of negative affects (failure, grief, rage, melancholy, shame, 
and depression) and “rethinking categories such as utopia, hope, and happiness,” Public Feelings 
side-steps conceptions of emotion as solely personal/private to “address histories of trauma that 
have not yet been overcome.”36 
The Gulf of Mexico after BP and Katrina joins a “series of spectacular toxic catastrophes 
with single-name recognition: Bhopal, Minamata, Love Canal, Chernobyl,” 37 Flint, where 
specificities of racial and social inequality, gross injustices, and complex sedimented histories of 
neglect are often glossed over in an amalgamation of revulsion. In this project I will trace 
numerous ways that “notions of human and social difference” are “projected onto the nonhuman 
world”38 and consider how “nonnormative bodies and minds can reframe what it means to be an 
environmentalist or ‘nature lover,’”39 by advocating for the cultivation of religious 
environmental theory that can speak to the numerous intersections of species, race, class, gender, 
and ability within an increasingly toxic world. Keeping in mind these translations of affect and 
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their framing of the human as immersed environmentally, historically, and culturally helps me in 
this dissertation to work through some troubling questions: why might encounters in devastated 
landscapes seem out-of-step with the affective modeling in new cosmology? Are the affective-
ethical visions of new cosmology tenable or do they necessarily disavow many everyday 
encounters? What sorts of spaces, places, and encounters does religion and ecology bind itself to 
through its affective investments? By beginning and remaining with encounters in devastated 
landscapes, I will shift the conversation to address the deep complexities and frustrations in 
cultivating and sustaining emotional investments with and in crisis environments and contend 
that lingering with so-called negative affects illuminates overlooked social and environmental 
inequalities as well as opens new possibilities for ecological activism.  
 
Negotiating Methodologies 
 It is no small task to examine post-disaster affinity and attachment while keeping a finger 
on the pulse of questions relating to sacrality, kinship, futurity, emotion, and ethics. Any number 
of intellectual trajectories could speak to the questions I am asking in this project about a region 
comprised of diverse ethnic and religious communities negotiating legacies of slavery, racism, 
poverty, entrenched yet volatile energy economies, and rapidly depleting coastal habitats. 
Significantly, work in feminist and critical geography, cultural memory, spatial theory, energy 
humanities, environmental justice and health equity movements, ecocriticism, and geography of 
religion all provide rich methodologies that are helpful for sifting through these complexities. To 
better understand and convey emotional life on the coast, I will draw, in part, from these 
disciplines (particularly scholarship in environmental justice, critical geographies, 
feminist/queer/critical race work on affect and cultural memory) but my framing does not allow 




project is that it is not work in sociology of religion or ethnography that could afford richer 
accounts through collaboration. Compelling narratives of particular religious communities 
encountering these disasters can be found in Brenda Phillips’ (2015) Mennonite Disaster 
Service: Building a Therapeutic Community After the Gulf Storms, Richard Turner’s (2016) Jazz 
Religion, the Second Line, and Black New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina, Katherine Michell 
Elvey’s (2010) “God Talk: Shifting Religious Rhetoric in Post-Katrina New Orleans, and Ellen 
Blue’s (2016) In Case of Katrina: Reinventing the Church in Post-Katrina New Orleans.  
What I do hope, however, is that this dissertation will serve as a model for deep 
commitments to interdisciplinary thinking and careful attention to the requirements 
interdisciplinary conversations can entail. While I will expand much more on this material in 
forthcoming chapters, one of the shaping elements of new cosmologist thought, particularly in 
Loyal Rue and others’ resonances with E. O. Wilson’s ideas, is a commitment to consilience. 
While consilience can mean a bringing together of diverse ideas to negotiate complex theories, it 
often reads here as an uncritical privileging of scientific thought, particularly for those scientists 
new cosmology venerates but does not contextualize or challenge. Consilience for Wilson, 
“entails that all enterprises of culture—a huge category—will eventually be explained when we 
attain complete knowledge of the human brain.”40 In its most troubling forms, “consilience is not 
simply” an “argument for a more creative or lively exchange between the sciences and 
humanities. Wilson’s more controversial claim is that the sciences will ultimately absorb 
territory currently occupied, and inadequately explained” (they argue) “by the humanities.”41 
Consilience, Lisa Sideris surmises in critique, “assumes that what can be grasped dimly by one 
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discipline can be better known—known with greater precision and certainty—by science.”42 
Surely troubling for many of us in the humanities that already recognize dwindling investments 
in the humanities within academia and wider culture, consilient commitments also frame a very 
particular conception of interdisciplinary work—one where new cosmologists pull from other 
disciplines what is useful to support their arguments while remaining impervious to critiques 
either within the sciences or without. Furthermore, this agenda does not recognize any of the 
politics of knowledge production thus it does not question the ethical implications of dwindling 
material support for the humanities nor does it recognize the work in the humanities taken on by 
critical race, queer, feminist, decolonial, and disability studies to speak with marginalized 
epistemologies. Consequently, it frames these conversations as low risk— easily maneuvered by 
the certainty that commitment to the benefits of teaching and celebrating the new scientific 
narrative will persuasively outweigh discrepancies, disagreements, and power struggles between 
religion and science, the sciences and humanities, and all the inequalities that fuel critical 
inquiry.  
One could respond to this certainty in numerous ways including tempering their 
confidence with more critical perspectives from the sciences. I view this dissertation, in part, as a 
resistance to consilience projects via my insistence that potent interdisciplinary projects are those 
that welcome vulnerability by allowing the voices we bring into conversation to shake up our 
fundamental disciplinary values and practices. To resist consilience agendas, I side with 
complexity and context by maneuvering the normative universal ethics of new cosmology into 
conversation with everyday material and emotional challenges. For source material throughout 
these chapters I weave in diverse narratives, particularly memoir, poetry, and news media, 
written in response to these disasters and their aftermath—emotional responses to life on the 
                                                        




Gulf Coast that include, but are not limited to, deep empathy, grief, disgust, anger, frustration, 
disorientation, confusion, solidarity, and tentative hope. My intention here is drawn from affect 
studies; it is to convey affective impressions by surrounding my text with voices that are 
attempting to make sense of disastrous and traumatic events, even while I insist that their affects 
are neither exhaustive nor final.  
To be fair, questions about landscapes and territory, space and place, sacred and profane, 
lived religion and embodiment, persistently occupy not only religion and ecology but also much 
of the study of American religion. To render this slice more manageable, I focus on thinking 
about humans in relationship with nonhuman creatures/environments and why emotional 
orientations in these relationships are particularly important. Despite working hard to “keep pace 
with globalization’s growing complexities” and the richness it lends to questions of sacrality, 
liminality, belonging, ritual, diaspora, displacement, etc., many scholars in American religious 
studies still, as Kevin Lewis O’Neill argues, “either treat space as a kind of neutral grid upon 
which religion happens or they remain focused on meaning” operating under an “uncontestable 
observation that religion makes space meaningful” sustaining lingering divisions between sacred 
and profane, local and global, North and South.43 My questions for new cosmology and the 
future of religion and ecology add to the scholarship hoping to unsettle this refrain by insisting 
that the historical particularity of environments, legacies of environmental and social 
abuse/abandonment, make all the difference for how we read, recognize, and advocate for 
emotional attachments to land and its human and nonhuman inhabitants. Neutral grids, 
ahistorical locales, and apolitical bodies are convenient theoretical fantasies.  
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Each approach to studying the confluences of religion and ecology has its own 
compelling elements and particular shortcomings. Since Lynn White’s 1967 essay, “The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” religion theorists have worked to uncover and 
address the various obstacles within religious traditions, practices, and thought that prove to be 
stumbling blocks for ecological projects and to carve out trajectories that hopefully 
address/transcend those obstacles. This dissertation responds to a prominent discourse within 
religion and ecology—new cosmology— that chooses evolutionary kinship and its potential to 
spark deep affinities with biodiversity as its hopeful course. In order to address shortcomings 
within this discourse, I will challenge its core ethical argument (for the future, we must love 
nonhuman others as our sacred evolutionary kin) by breaking it into parts. First, I focus on the 
overlooked affective implications of new cosmology’s commitment to the cultivation of a 
universal orienting narrative via “expert” scientific knowledge. Then I highlight diverse 
narratives/methodologies that offer better alternatives, perspectives, and opportunities to help us 
prepare for complicated futures. In chapter one, I outline the development of religion and 
ecology and then turn toward the work of Thomas Berry, Mary Evelyn Tucker, John Grim, 
Connie Barlow, Brian Thomas Swimme, Ursula Goodenough, Edward O. Wilson, and Stephen 
Kellert to frame their approach toward affiliation and attachment with/to nonhuman nature. 
Concluding the chapter, I lay out the troubling questions that arise from what remains shadowed 
by this approach that the rest of the dissertation will unpack and address.  
In chapter two, I begin to unsettle new cosmology’s universal ethical argument by 
relocating it within a very particular context. Tracing the environmental history leading up to the 
“unnatural” disasters named Katrina, Rita, and BP, I challenge religion and ecology to better 




and exclusion (long histories of particular investments) that shape everyday encounters along the 
Gulf. In two, I argue new cosmology’s conception of sacred works best when it is dis-located 
from everyday materiality. Working with material in critical geographies and sacred space/place 
to underline the political implications of how “the sacred” is defined, produced, reproduced, and 
protected, I draw attention to the places, communities, and creatures occluded, excluded, and 
abandoned by new cosmology’s conceptions of the sacred. Is the collective body of devastated 
landscapes, implicated together in crisis and attached to one another through toxicity, disgust, 
and aversion, no longer sacred? Are these creatures, habitats, and communities acceptable 
losses? Or are they the ethical quandary at the core of the kinship intimacies with nonhumans 
dark green religions desire to explore? What kind of investments illuminate material “left 
behind” — those unloved others still living lives? 
While new cosmologists hope to inspire affective renewal, in chapters three and four I 
argue that habitual investments in the awe and wonder of encounters with nonhuman nature have 
left new cosmology with few resources to speak to affiliation with degraded lands, damaged 
environments, toxic creatures, and the human communities that intimately encounter these 
quotidian complexities. Experiences within areas like our opening scene might not solely elicit 
affects like awe, wonder, or reverence. When we encounter toxic materials and their effects we 
are affected differently. For some, this precarity galvanizes a response in an attempt to care for 
these lives. For others, this ecological pain may elicit overwhelming shame or apathy. Some may 
see these creatures and their habitats as contagions themselves, monsters of our own creation that 
should be avoided, visibly witnessing to all that we have poured into the waters. Encounters with 
toxicity in Gulf communities are unfolding but some of these affects might coalesce into what 
we would call disgust, revulsion, dread, panic, horror. We do not gravitate toward these places. 




the Gulf— the queasy unease that sticks to devastated environments? By trading only in awe, 
wonder, and reverence, I contend that the affective economies of new cosmology bind 
themselves solely to places and creatures that engender those experiences. Pulling at the frayed 
edges of this discourse post-destruction, in chapters three and four I argue that new cosmology’s 
onto-ethical project (we must love nonhuman others) refuses to address what it truly 
champions—namely a very particular conception of what it means to be human and to love 
nonhuman others that does not address race, racialization, and the historical connections between 
environmentalism and white supremacy in the United States that very much continue to shape 
which bodies, communities, and habitats are valued/loveable. I question the ahistorical, rational, 
enclosed, and sovereign subject at the heart of new cosmology’s onto-ethical project by 
contending its impermeability and affective certainty makes it incredibly difficult to map new 
cosmology’s onto-ethical commitments onto degraded environments. In conversation with 
scholarship in feminist materialisms and feminist genealogies of affect theory, in chapter three I 
argue that human bodies are always already materially and affectively intimate with their 
environments and since environmental degradation and its unequal impact on the poor is a daily 
reality for much of the planet, religion and ecology can no longer assume a “healthy” or 
historically neutral subject. Consequently, we must grapple with our proximity to toxic exposure 
and its uneven seepage into bodies and communities. In chapter four, by examining how fear 
shapes devastated landscapes, I draw material feminisms, affect theory, and religion and ecology 
into conversation by thinking about embodied affects along the Gulf Coast. I argue that the 
intertwined concerns of environmental degradation and environmental racism impact our 
affective orientations. In a queer response to E. O. Wilson’s encouragement that we examine the 
circumstances and occasions on which we love and protect life, I inquire after the affective 




long histories of white supremacy, and troubling toxicity in order to shape affective projects in 
this devastated landscape. 
In chapters five, six, and seven, I examine the kinship of the declaration that we must love 
nonhuman others as sacred evolutionary kin. I find kinship models to continue to be ripe with 
tremendous possibility but instead of walking the path of sacralized science, I advocate for 
detouring toward more plastic conceptions of kinship. In chapter five, I highlight the limitations 
in new cosmology’s conceptions of kinship that make it very difficult to map its visions of 
affinity, attachment, and care onto a racially and environmentally toxic landscape. Many new 
cosmologists recognize that environmental degradation is an impending threat and prescribe 
deepening kinship intimacies with nonhuman others as a reciprocal solution for environmental 
concerns and a correction to unhealthy habits holding us back from our full humanity. But, I 
contend, these voices have not questioned if environmental degradation fundamentally alters 
what we mean by affinity, attachment, intimacy, and reciprocity. What does it mean, for 
example, to care for toxic habitats, ill creatures, and precarious communities as kin? Kinship in 
new cosmology asserts a biological connection with all life but does not consider any radically 
altering notions of intimacy. New cosmology kinship, I argue, works best when we pretend that 
all we inherit is positive evolutionary tendencies, ignoring how social histories, embodied 
differences, and declining environmental conditions can all shape us materially and affectively. 
In five, I argue kinship is not just biological but also performative. Drawing from queer and 
critical race critiques of kinship studies, I contend that new cosmology kinships do not resonate 
in devastated environments because they do not recognize that normative conceptions of kinship 
always limit which bodies, communities, histories, and legacies can count as beloved kin.    
Insisting that we cannot disconnect complacency with the disposability of the Gulf Coast 




disabled, and black communities, in chapters six and seven I argue we need models for kinship in 
religion and ecology that are more affectively attuned to racial trauma and abject desire. An 
ethics of love for devastated landscapes, I contend, must desire to dwell with the presence of 
troubling legacies of environmental racism, toxic impacts, and uncertain futures. Paying attention 
to other inheritances besides evolutionary affective tendencies, I cultivate resources for 
expanding the boundaries of kinship within religion and ecology by turning to critical intimacy 
scholarship that can help us think about the intersections of embodied difference and 
environmental decline. I construct two visions of what kin-love for devastated landscapes might 
look like. The first, in what I call a kinship of remainders, chapter six thinks with “remaining” in 
different ways: communities that remain after disaster negotiating environmental decline, bodies 
considered to be remainders by normative conceptions of kinship (residual, left-over, 
disposable,) and remaining-with (to endure, prevail, persist) environmental trouble to develop 
affinities and attachments forged not through awe, wonder, and reverence but perhaps grief and 
fear. To cultivate a kinship of remainders, I argue, requires religion and ecology to understand 
that kinship is an ongoing affective process that must address environmental trauma, loss, and 
mourning in order to speak to our environmental crisis.  
The second, in what I call queer eco-crip affinities, chapter seven draws from critical 
disability studies and queer ecologies to argue that one of the reasons new cosmology kinship 
does not map onto devastated environments is its deep discomfort with the persistence of abject 
bodies. Unsettling new cosmology’s ethical commitment for the future, I ask what kinds of 
futures are we imagining and which bodies/communities/creatures/habitats are included in these 
futures? The absence of ill, disabled, and mutating bodies/habitats/creatures within new 
cosmology ethics holds us back, I argue, from imagining affiliation and attachment with 




dissertation, chapter seven cultivates improper affinities by considering the ways devastated 
landscapes are positioned as undesirable, beyond hope, without future, and insists that we refuse 
conceptions of desire, hope, and futurity that absent ill/disabled bodies and environments. 
Drawing from Mel Chen’s suggestion that the queerness of queer ecologies describes “social and 
cultural formations of ‘improper affiliation,’ so that queerness might well describe an array of 
subjectivities, intimacies, beings, and spaces located outside of the heteronormative,” I advocate 
for encouraging impropriety in our kin care.44 Recognizing that desire always overflows the 
contours meant to contain it, queer eco-crip affinities might ask: what does it mean to desire 
nature when this “nature” is devastated? And, what does this “nature” desire? Relying on awe, 
wonder, and reverence in encounters with nonhuman kin, new cosmology is interested in 
intimacy-with and futurity-for less unruly cousins, more perfect lovers, than devastated 
landscapes afford. Here, I end by imagining what future avenues might open for religion and 
ecology by claiming and sustaining wounded, ill, and mutating bodies, creatures, and 
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 Sacred Evolutionary Epics: Awe, Reverence, Kinship 
 
 
“We cannot win this battle to save species and environments without forging an emotional bond 
between ourselves and nature as well—for we will not fight to save what we do not love.” 45 
Stephen Jay Gould, “Enchanted Evening” 
 
Since Lynn White’s (1967) germinal essay, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic 
Crisis,” theorists studying the confluence of religion and ecology have considered the 
implications of religious world-views for environmental health and degradation. White argues 
that western Christian dogma and thought, particularly its dominant anthropocentrism, “made it 
possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects.”46 Perhaps 
more galvanizing for the legacy of scholarship to follow, White concludes: “since the roots of 
our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we 
call it that or not. We must rethink and refeel our nature and destiny.”47  This essay and its 
numerous responses (apologetic, reparative, and alternative) advanced interdisciplinary 
environmental studies and birthed the field of religion and ecology. Itself a multidisciplinary 
endeavor, religion and ecology utilizes a variety of methodological approaches toward not only 
discussing the culpability of religious thought/practice but also toward developing new ethical 
models for human/nonhuman relationships, illuminating the religious roots of environmentalism, 
and examining the “influence of religion in shaping the environmental imagination.”48 
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Environmental degradation is a staggering problem in its enormity and complexity. Thus, as 
human understanding of this complexity deepens, so too do approaches within religion and 
ecology that make sense of and address our environmental decline. This chapter traces a 
prominent conversation within religion and ecology that chooses evolutionary kinship and its 
affective possibilities, actualized and deployed through what they identify are religious emotions, 
as the path forward.  
This onto-ethical trajectory within religion and ecology seeks to relocate conceptions of 
what it means to be human within evolutionary history characterizing humanity as but a small 
speck of the wonder that is our complex universe. Wary of Jewish and Christian cosmologies 
they regard as significantly devaluing the material world, these theorists advocate for reorienting 
these myths through teaching evolutionary sciences as giving rise to sacred cosmologies.49 
Rethinking the human within this universe story, these scholars contend, would generate an 
emotional shift in our theory and ethics toward humble respect and caring practices for 
nonhuman others. From this perspective, investment in the sciences could be the enchantment 
that leads humans to love nonhuman others as we begin to understand the very matter of the 
universe, what some might call “nature,” is sacred. Addressing White’s call to “rethink and 
refeel our nature and destiny,” this discourse sees possibilities for nurturing ecological sentiment 
by advocating a new sacred mythos of how our universe came to be and how humans should 
relate to its wonder.  
In this chapter, I consider some of the work of cultural historian Thomas Berry; religion 
scholars Mary Evelyn Tucker, John Grim, and Loyal Rue; science writer Connie Barlow; 
cosmologist Brian Thomas Swimme; biologist Ursula Goodenough; and evolutionary biologist 
                                                        





Edward O. Wilson. This group of scholars has sustained a growing conversation within religious 
ecotheory that Lisa Sideris calls the “new cosmology movement.” I trace their approaches 
toward affiliation with nonhuman nature and their particular investment in the ideal of loving 
nonhuman others as sacred kin. Grouping such diversity together, not without significant 
controversy,50 is precarious but Sideris argues that these voices form a “recognizable 
constellation, an ideal type”51 that proffers a “new, common creation story based upon our 
understanding of cosmogenesis,” and all are “engaged in a process of religiopoeisis, of crafting a 
new religion, grounded in a myth that explains our origins and destiny.”52 Later, I will unfold 
what is compelling about Sideris’s perspective as well as resistance to her arguments. But what I 
find unites these writers, why they are relevant for this project, is their appeal to the affective 
potential of scientific enchantment to engender ethical action. In what follows, I will map out 
this form of sacred natures discourse to survey their conceptions of evolutionary affinity with 
nonhuman others, how they believe evolutionary affinity leads to emotional attachment, and 
finally how this emotional attachment can result in ethical action. Like any methodology, every 
approach to studying the intersections of religion and ecology has particular political 
implications. Concluding the chapter, I will gesture toward some of the implications of this 
approach, explored in more depth in chapter two, by drawing attention to the places and 
creatures possibly occluded, excluded, and abandoned by these sacred kinships.   
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 Evolutionary Epics  
 The new mythology constellation that Sideris terms “new cosmology” has two 
progenitors: E. O. Wilson and Thomas Berry. The “Epic of Evolution” originated in Edward O. 
Wilson’s writings and is cultivated by Connie Barlow, Loyal Rue, and Ursula Goodenough. 53 A 
Harvard biologist with a particular affinity for ant behavior, E. O. Wilson is largely responsible 
for popularizing the terms “biodiversity,” “evolutionary biology,” “the evolutionary epic,” and 
“biophilia,” as well as influential in shaping contemporary conservation ethics and biodiversity 
studies. Of interest for this project: Wilson’s 1971 text The Insect Societies introduced his 
concept for sociobiology—a new discipline, with some controversy on his analysis on the origins 
of human behavior,54 to study the biological basis of social behavior in all organisms including 
humans. Responding to criticisms of his perspectives on the evolutionary origins of our social 
behavior, Wilson’s On Human Nature (1978) and Genes, Mind, and Culture (1983) further 
explore the role of biology in human ontology. His perhaps most enduring texts, Biophilia 
(1983), The Diversity of Life (1992), and The Future of Life (2002) study human attraction to the 
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natural environment with the argument that humans have an evolutionarily inherent need, 
threatened by the impending impoverishment of the environment, to preserve biodiversity in 
order to flourish as a species. Finally (though not his final text), of interest here is Wilson’s 1998 
work Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge which returns to what he sees are the original ideals 
of the Enlightenment. Consilience, also advocated by Goodenough and Rue, advocates for 
closing the gaps between the physical universe and humanity by reorganizing scholarship 
(including university curriculum) around an enchanting integration of both the sciences and 
humanities as they work together to establish a secular ground for ethics. Keeping these texts in 
mind, scholars interested in the confluences of religion and ecology understandably gravitate 
toward numerous themes in his writing. Wilson’s poetic style, olive-branch extension to the 
humanities, and interest in cosmology/mythology resonate with commitments in religion and 
ecology to maintain the importance of religious studies within larger conversations of 
environmental concern.    
One of the lasting themes of Wilson’s writing, Barlow argues, is the concept that humans 
can satisfy their evolutionary innate longing for “religious grounding,” “spiritual allurement and 
atonement,” and aptitude for reverence through a “cultural explanation derived from science . . . 
based on the evolutionary epic.”55 Through this grand and inspiring narrative, Wilson assures 
that humans can continue to “revisit questions of ultimate meaning and value” while dedicating a 
“good portion of our religious zeal to reverence for the vast diversity of life produced by nearly 
four billion years of struggle and symbiosis on Earth.”56 In a 1996 interview with Barlow, 
Wilson argued, “I believe that humanity must have an epic— must have its epics, plural . . . An 
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epic is a grand narrative usually in poetic form, that utilizes archetypes in explaining a theme that 
engages all of the nation or all of humanity.”57 Advocating for its potential to captivate, Wilson 
writes, “the evolutionary epic is probably the best myth we will ever have.”58 Through a deft 
storyteller like Wilson, Barlow contends, scientific history of the universe “becomes our shared 
story, our creation story, our sacred story.”59 
The power of the epic myth, Barlow emphasizes, is its ability to orient “people with a 
placement in time— a meaningful placement that celebrates extraordinary moments of a shared 
heritage. Those of us who have not only learned but embraced the scientific story of our roots 
know ourselves to be reworked stardust, biological beings with a multi-billion-year pedigree . . . 
For us, the history of life and the universe as told by science becomes more than a sequence of 
strange and arresting events.”60  Wilson deliberately invokes the epic form in numerous texts, he 
argues, because of the archetypes it offers including “cataclysm, rebirth, the summoning of 
heroes.”61 Wilson believes “that science offers humankind not only an awareness of the 
biodiversity crisis and the tools for saving species but also a story that can charge our very souls 
to take on the task.”62 In The Diversity of Life, Robert May argues, Wilson offers up the 
Environmental Ethic as “nothing less than a new religion” by side-stepping seemingly 
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anthropocentric religions to offer a vision for seeing the human “as one among many species, 
with our only special responsibility being to respect and conserve the biological riches we have 
inherited.”63 Concluding Diversity, Wilson argues that he ends the text with “what, among the 
Methodists, is known as the altar call. The altar call is that moment at the end of the sermon 
when the pastor calls all believers who wish to declare themselves for Jesus or to reaffirm their 
faith to do so by coming forward, to the altar or to the prayer rail, while hymns are sung.”64 
Humans can become the heroes of this sacred narrative if they answer the call to protect 
biodiversity. While Connie Barlow concedes that Wilson has never “explicitly told his version of 
the evolutionary story in flat-out epic form” others have made such attempts including our 
second progenitor of new cosmology, Thomas Berry.65  
The “Universe Story”66 is an intellectual project with similar affinities originating in 
Thomas Berry’s writings and continued by Mary Evelyn Tucker, John Grim, and Brian 
Swimme.67 Trained in western history and history of religions, Berry’s prolific scholarship spans 
interest in Asian traditions, the philosophy of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and cosmology of 
religion.68 In his 1978 essay for Teilhard Studies, “The New Story: Comments on The Origin, 
Identification and Transmission of Values,” Berry first articulates that humans need a new 
orienting mythos in order to meet contemporary social and ecological concerns: 
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It’s all a question of story. We are in trouble just now because we do not have  
a good story. We are in between stories. The Old Story—the account of how the world 
came to be and how we fit into it—is not functioning properly, and we have not learned 
the New Story. The Old Story sustained us for a long period of time. It shaped our 
emotional attitudes, provided us with life purpose, energized action. It consecrated 
suffering, integrated knowledge, guided education. We awoke in the morning and knew 
where we were . . . Today, however, our traditional story is nonfunctional in its larger 
social dimensions even though some persons believe it firmly and act according to its 
dictates . . . When we look outside the traditional believing community we see a society 
that is also dysfunctional. Even with advanced science and technology, with superb 
techniques in manufacturing and commerce, in communications and computation, our 
secular society remains without satisfactory meaning or capacity to restrain the violence 
of its own members. Our miracle machines serve ephemeral purposes. So we begin to 
talk about values. Where do we begin? My suggestion is that we begin where everything 
begins in human affairs, with the basic story, the account of how things came to be at all, 
how they came to be as they are, and how the future life of man can be given some 
satisfying direction. We need a story that will educate man, heal him, guide him.69 
 
The new orienting narrative Berry proposes, one that shapes us emotionally and ethically, is a 
negotiation of the impasse he sees between dysfunctional Christian cosmology and the spiritually 
detached scientific cosmology inherited from Charles Darwin.70 The difficulty of redemptive 
Christian cosmology, he writes, “is that it presents the world as an ordered complex of beings 
that are ontologically related as an image of the divine; it does not present the world as a 
continuing process of emergence in which there is an inner organic bond of descent of each 
reality from an earlier reality . . . Christian redemptive mystique is little concerned with any 
cosmological order or process since the essential thing is redemption out of the world through a 
personal Saviour relationship that transcends all such concerns.”71 While Berry recognizes the 
invaluable knowledge derived from scientific cosmology and evolutionary biology, he argues 
that this scientific story in its “commitment to the realm of the physical to the exclusion of the 
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spiritual” results in a “lack of meaning. It is not an integral story.”72 Berry draws from the work 
of Teilhard de Chardin to propose “The Story of the Universe,” a scientific cosmology that 
would provide an account of our shared universe. The Story, he argues, is infused with spiritual 
resonances appealing to “both scientist and believer” through images of creativity, communion, 
and intimacy.73 The New Story, he writes, decenters what it means to be human by arguing that 
the universe is a “web of relationships” and through a “more intense communion within the 
material world” life emerges into being. 74 For Berry, the New Story establishes “a new paradigm 
of the human,” one that views humanity as a small but remarkable part of this “cosmic-earth 
process.”75 Becoming sensitized to their part in this grand narrative, humans can have 
“confidence in the future” that “awaits the human venture.”76 
Berry’s later works build from these sentiments by focusing on his concern for the 
“effects of rapid industrialization on the ecosystems of the planet and the lack of response of the 
religions to this growing crisis.”77 Berry’s essays on religion and ecological healing encourage 
both interreligious dialogue and dialogue between science and religion. Berry calls for 
engagement of all the world’s religions in recovering their “cosmological sensibilities, to see the 
human as a microcosm as profoundly related to the universe as a macrocosm.”78 In 1992, with 
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cosmologist Brian Swimme, Berry wrote The Universe Story: From the Primordial Flaring 
Forth to the Ecozoic Era—A Celebration of the Unfolding Cosmos. Similar to Wilson’s rich 
narrative telling of the Epic of Evolution, The Universe Story describes evolutionary history with 
similar grandeur. Universe Story combines contemporary science with the “world’s great 
wisdom traditions” to explore “humanity’s place in the evolving cosmos and our ecological 
imperative.”79  
 Thomas Berry’s students Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim continue his sacred 
cosmology work through the Journey of the Universe project which includes a film, a book by 
Swimme and Tucker, “20 conversations with scientists, historians, and environmentalists,” 
conferences, colloquia, and teaching curriculum that all narrates the “14 billion-years story of the 
universe’s development, from the great flaring forth of the universe” to the evolution of 
“planetary life of greater complexity and consciousness.”80 Tucker describes Journey as a 
“functional cosmology” that combines astronomy and physics, chemistry and geology, biology, 
botany, anthropology and the humanities together to “trace the rise of humans” in a way that 
“allows for a comprehensive sense of mystery and awe to arise.” 81 Described as capable of 
capturing the human spirit and dependent upon a “profound appreciation of humans experiencing 
nature,” Journey continues Berry’s legacy of guiding “humans into the next period of human-
Earth relations” by conveying the role of humans as “critical to the further flourishing of the 
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Earth community.” 82  In book form, Swimme and Tucker argue that Journey: 
evokes wonder from scientists and nonscientists alike. And it challenges some religious 
traditions to rethink or expand their worldviews . . . Journey of the Universe is intended not 
to over-ride or ignore these other stories, but rather to bring into focus the challenge of 
creating a shared future. The great opportunity before us today is to tell this new universe 
story in a way that will serve to orient humans with respect to our pressing questions: 
Where did we come from? Why are we here? How should we live together? How can the 
Earth community flourish?”83  
 
 Echoing her mentor, Tucker writes “humans are the microcosm of the macrocosm—they are the 
mind and heart of the vast, evolving universe” and the Journey project hopes to capture hearts and 
minds for a new mission of earth healing.84  
While there is little evidence Wilson and Berry exchanged ideas (though Berry does cite 
Wilson in numerous texts) through those inspired by their work like Barlow, Rue, Goodenough, 
Tucker and Grimm, these conversations have intermingled via “spiritualizing and aestheticizing 
science”85 into a “commitment to mythopoeic science”86 as both a possibility for the 
development of secular ecological ethics and as a way for religions with various 
traditions/practices/beliefs to come together to promote sustainable futures. While one of the 
shared criticisms of Sideris’s collection of these voices under “new cosmology” is that she 
conflates diverse perspectives too easily,87 I am nevertheless compelled by their references of 
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one another that they do recognize affinities between The Epic of Evolution and the Universe 
Story.88 Loyal Rue writes that the Epic of Evolution is synonymous with “cosmic evolution” and 
“the universe story,”89 and Connie Barlow’s text Green Space, Green Time includes interviews 
with/conversations between Wilson, Goodenough, Tucker, Grim, and Swimme. Furthermore, 
Tucker’s criticism that Sideris, “has lumped together a group of thinkers with quite different 
specializations and trainings and with widely divergent publications and teaching 
commitments”90 rings with a bit of irony since this criticism seems to echo in many ways much 
of what the Journey of the Universe project, Berry’s Universe Story, and Wilson’s Epic of 
Evolution claim to accomplish— a path for divergent specializations and perspectives to come 
together guided by a new orienting vision. Universe Story and Epic of Evolution both offer a 
shared orienting narrative, one that scientifically details our beginnings with moving rhetorical 
power, as a way to position the human within a shared evolutionary history and hopefully to 
encourage respect for that history. This shared sacred history, they argue, cannot be contained by 
academic discipline or religious affiliation and it offers the opportunity for theorists and 
believers to galvanize one another. Neither Berry nor Wilson sees these evolutionary epics as 
necessary replacements for all other cosmologies or religions but they do offer what Barlow 
calls, a “planetary ethic,” that makes “no claim to supplant existing traditions but would seek to 
                                                        
Universe: An Integration of Science and Humanities,” in Journal of Religion, Nature, & Culture 
9, no. 2 (2015). 
 
88 Strangely, and I concur with Sideris again here, while critics accuse Sideris of 
conflation in her arguments there is very little specificity from these critiques about what 
distinctions there can and should be made between Universe Story and Epic of Evolution.  
 
89 Loyal Rue, “Epic of Evolution,” in Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, Bron Taylor, 
ed. (New York: Continuum, 2005), 612-615.  
 





coexist with them, informing our global concerns while we continue to orient our daily lives in 
our cultural and religious contexts.”91 Keeping this commitment to universal appeal and 
planetary relevance in mind, for the rest of the chapter I will continue to speak about Epic of 
Evolution and Universe Story advocates interchangeably as a constellation that promotes the 
retelling of grand scientific cosmologies as sacred orientations meant to awaken humans to new 
ways of thinking about meaning, value, belonging, and purpose.  
 
Sacred Natures  
“The stream of stars blinking on, blinking off, and the living stream of organisms coming 
into existence, going out of existence,” Barlow writes, “is beyond judgment of good and evil. It 
is, rather, magnificent. It is sublime, precious, and exceedingly worthy of reverence.”92 One of 
the defining features of the new cosmology constellation is the work these authors undertake to 
“awaken” others to the specialness of our universe and its profound complexity. “Reverence,” 
Goodenough writes in The Sacred Depths of Nature, “is the religious emotion elicited when we 
perceive the sacred” and we “are called to revere the whole enterprise of planetary existence, the 
whole and all of its myriad parts as they catalyze and secrete and replicate and mutate and 
evolve.”93 For new cosmology authors, planetary existence is sacred. Nature, from cell to forest, 
ant to ocean, is sacred. Strangely, though, in much of this work what the author means by sacred 
is not discussed. It is the case that within religious studies that sacred/the sacred/sacrality is so 
ubiquitous that many feel it does not need the pause for explanation. But it is curious that all of 
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these authors, particularly those who argue that they do not find fulfillment to questions of 
meaning and value within the world’s religions, use “sacred” and its affective resonances (awe, 
wonder, reverence) to describe their relationships with/to the natural world. Their use of “sacred” 
deserves pause, I argue, because this uncritical use sidesteps particular questions, like which 
creatures, bodies, environments, and encounters actually count as “sacred,” that can unsettle new 
cosmology’s seemingly straightforward care for the whole cosmos. For my purposes in this 
chapter I will leave the term speculatively open and dwell briefly with three familiar articulations 
in religious studies to think more about how they might resonate with new cosmology material.  
For sociologist and philosopher Émile Durkheim, the sacred is something set apart from 
our quotidian realities and attributed with “some kind of divine or transcendent characteristic, 
power or significance” that is essential for religious experience.94 Sacred things, Durkheim 
argues, “should not be taken to mean simply those personal beings we call gods or spirits. A 
rock, a tree, a spring, a stone, a piece of wood, a house, in other words anything at all, can be 
sacred,” but, he emphasizes, our “notion of the sacred is always and everywhere separated from 
[our] notion of the profane” its opposite, “by a sort of logical gulf between the two, the mind 
radically rejects any mingling or even contact between the things that correspond to these 
realms.”95 For Durkheim, any material could be sacred but he maintains a dichotomy between 
sacred materials and profane materials. The sacrality of material, he contends, is not inherent. 
Rather, “sacredness sets in by contagion . . . A special emotion gives it reality; it is attached to an 
object because this emotion has encountered that object on its path. Therefore it is natural that it 
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should spread from that object to all those it finds in proximity.”96 Durkheim’s affirmation that 
any material could be sacred and that this sacredness is affectively contagious, so that attraction 
to certain material could lead to proximally related material being caught-up in this specialness, 
is potentially galvanizing for new cosmology but his insistence on a sacred/profane dichotomy is 
more dubious for movements that use sacrality to argue all material is intrinsically valuable.  
Historian of religion Mircea Eliade, weaving Durkheim’s conception of the sacred with 
Rudolph Otto’s experience of the Holy, similarly envisioned distinctions between sacred and 
profane. Our profane world, for Eliade, is suffused with the sacred, that which is wholly other 
awe-inspiring mystery, via revelatory phenomena Eliade calls “hierophanies” or acts of 
manifestation where the sacred “shows itself” to humans.97 At times, Eliade’s conception of the 
sacred sounds much like the trajectory of dark green religion98 when he writes, “the cosmos as a 
whole is an organism at once real, living, and sacred.”99 But he seems more ambiguous about 
whether the natural world, nonhuman material, can itself be sacred. “Nature,” he argues, “always 
expresses something that transcends it... a sacred stone is venerated because it is sacred, not 
because it is a stone; it is the sacrality manifested through the mode of being of the stone that 
reveals its true essence.”100 Any material could potentially be the occasion of a hierophany yet, 
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he writes, the hierophany “transforms the place where it occurs: hitherto profane, it is 
thenceforward a sacred area.”101 Like Durkheim’s sacred potential in all material, Eliade’s 
conception of the sacred could prove ecologically fruitful. Though, his insistence that the sacred 
value of material “is always due to that something or that somewhere” of the hierophany toward 
which the sacred space or material directs, but “never to its own actual existence,” should be a 
stumbling block for theorists trying to articulate that every fiber of the unfolding mysterious 
universe is, in itself, sacred.102  
Social anthropologist Kay Milton’s articulation of “sacred,” I suspect, is the friendliest to 
new cosmology when she suggests the term sacred can be “applied to anything whose value is 
not based on reason, but is experienced directly, through the senses, and, when necessary, 
asserted dogmatically. Sacredness is thus linked to aesthetics, to affective experience.”103 For 
Milton, sacredness describes, “what matters most to people . . . What is sacred to someone is 
simply what they value most highly, be it their mother’s memory, their religious traditions, the 
mountain scenery near their home . . . What this understanding of sacredness depends on very 
heavily is emotion and feeling.”104 But Milton cautions that this conception of sacred, as 
affective attachment, is susceptible to bifurcations like the sacred/profane dichotomy. She makes 
the compelling argument that many people in the global north, particularly conservationists, 
already view the material world as “sacred” in this way, but this material is sacred only in so far 
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as it is set apart from humans—a pristine nature.105 For many people, she claims, “nature 
untouched by human hand is worth conserving, whereas nature that has been influenced by 
human activity is less valuable,” highlighting that “‘nature’ is an ambiguous term, used 
sometimes to include and sometimes exclude humanity.”106 For some environmental 
perspectives, Milton writes, this nature/culture dichotomy is too important and cannot be 
abandoned as the sacredness of certain material (places, creatures, landscapes) relies on the 
maintenance of clear boundaries between humanity and the natural world.107  
While I will question in chapters two and three if new cosmology is able to welcome 
environmentally devastated material and toxic bodies as sacred, I believe Goodenough’s call to 
revere “the whole enterprise of planetary existence, the whole and all of its myriad parts as they 
catalyze and secrete and replicate and mutate and evolve” generally reflects the sentiments of 
new cosmology— the universe in all its complicated existence, known and unknown, massive 
and miniscule in scale and perspective, is sacred not because a religious tradition has deemed it 
so but in the sense that Milton suggests.108 It is sacred as affective experience and intrinsically 
valuable for those humans who are able to tap into this consciousness. This depth, complexity, 
and sacrality can be anyone’s experience if they desire to have an intimate connection with the 
more-than-human universe. The intensity of emotions that bubble-up when humans spend 
sincere time contemplating this richness or experiencing elements of it, new cosmology argues, 
is similar to other human religious experiences. From Wilson’s perspective, human capacity for 
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awe, wonder, and reverence for the natural world may be evolutionarily innate but needs to be 
reawakened in order for this life-process to provide ultimate meaning to the big questions of who 
we are. “Building the evolutionary epic, telling the story,” he tells Barlow, “this is our best way 
to reanimate the deep emotions that are innate to the human mind, having evolved over 
thousands of generations of religious context. The self-assembly of complex systems, the 
evolutionary process: this is the epic we can create by exploring the material world. And there’s 
so much left to explore. It is of such profound and Olympian magnitude.”109   
Wilson and Goodenough argue that the epic of evolution, nurtured through deep driving 
emotional connections with the existence it details, has the potential to convey meaning, purpose, 
and shared morality to seeking humans. “Religions have come to serve many roles,” 
Goodenough writes, “addressing what we can call the Big Questions: What is the meaning of 
life? What is my life for? In Western faith traditions, the explanations offered are framed in the 
context of a creating, interested God who has both a purpose and a plan. The disciplines of 
science also seek to provide explanation, and although they do not directly take on the Big 
Questions, they offer up a worldview which is not obviously dictated by a personal God 
concerned with human beings.”110 Goodenough argues that science, particularly what we’ve 
come to understand in the evolutionary epic, “allows us to experience cognitive affinity as well 
as spiritual affinity with the rest of nature” and we can seek “guidance from nature as we 
articulate religious principles.”111  “The collective planetary enterprise of meaning, value, and 
purpose,” she writes, “is a sacred enterprise” and its “existence can serve” to provide “guidance 
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and spiritual resources for human existence and global resolutions.”112 Goodenough structures 
her text The Sacred Depths of Nature as a beautifully lyric daily devotional with short stories 
narrating biology followed by a meditation. The stories unfold out through The Epic of 
Evolution like a guiding light. For example, after a story on the origins of the Earth she 
evocatively unfurls the following: 
The realization that I needn’t have answers to the Big Questions, needn’t seek answers to 
the Big Questions, has served as an epiphany. I lie on my back under the stars and the 
unseen galaxies and I let their enormity wash over me. I assimilate the vastness of the 
distances, the impermanence, the fact of it all. I go all the way out and then I go all the 
way down, to the fact of the photons without mass and gauge bosons that become 
massless at high temperatures. I take in the abstractions about forces and symmetries and 
they caress me, like Gregorian chants, the meaning of the words not mattering because 
the words are so haunting. Mystery generates wonder, and wonder generates awe. The 
gasp can terrify or the gasp can emancipate. As I allow myself to experience cosmic and 
quantum Mystery, I join the saints and the visionaries in their experience of what they 
called the Divine.113 
 
What is important, what has the value and meaning humans seek, are the life processes 
themselves and their very existence. The fact they exist at all, she relates, fills her with such awe 
and wonder that she borrows from Christian mysticism in order to attempt to articulate these 
feelings. Concluding the text, Goodenough writes that the evolutionary epic story, “our story,”  
tells us of the sacredness of life, of the astonishing complexity of cells and organisms, of 
the vast lengths of time it took to generate their splendid diversity, of the enormous 
improbability that any of it happened at all . . . And so, I profess my Faith. For me, the 
existence of all this complexity and awareness and intent and beauty, and my ability to 
apprehend it, serves as the ultimate meaning and the ultimate value. The continuation of 
life reaches around, grabs its own tail, and forms a sacred circle that requires no further 
justification, no Creator, no superordinate meaning of meaning, no purpose other than the 
continuation continue until the sun collapses or the final meteor collides. I confess a 
credo of continuation. And in so doing, I confess as well a credo of human continuation. 
We may be the only questioners in the universe, the only ones who have come to 
understand the astonishing dynamics of cosmic evolution. If we are not, if there are 
others who Know, it is unlikely that we will ever encounter one another. We are also, 
whether we like it or not, the dominant species and the stewards of this planet. If we can 
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revere how things are, and can find a way to express gratitude for our existence, then we 
should be able to figure out, with a great deal of work and good will, how to share the 
Earth with one another and with other creatures, how to restore and preserve its elegance 
and grace, and how to commit ourselves to love and joy and laughter and hope . . . The 
Epic of Evolution is our warp, destined to endure, commanding our universal gratitude 
and reverence and commitment . . . Humans need stories—grand, compelling stories—
that help to orient us in our lives and in the cosmos.114  
 
 
The continuation of it all, being part of this history long before her that is also a part of every 
creature in every corner of the planet, is the bottomless spiritual well that provides not only 
orienting mythos, but sustaining emotion, value, and purpose. “The contemplation of all this 
continuation, all this connection, all this enormous effort to reach our present level of diversity,” 
she writes, “is for me a deep spiritual resource. I care about having it continue. Its continuation is 
a commandment.”115 Contemplation of the intricacy of the universe infuses us with awe in the 
presence of its splendor. Filled with awe, Barlow and Goodenough contend, humans can come to 
understand their place as a small but pivotal speck of this shared wonder and will begin to 
respond with reverent care for the sacred planet.   
While Wilson, Barlow, and Goodenough detail how the evolutionary epic can provide 
orientation, meaning, belonging, and purpose for anyone including those who are less attracted to 
religious cosmologies, Berry and Tucker speak primarily to the world’s religious traditions 
arguing that the powerful religious imagination can only be strengthened by re-awakening a 
sacred connection with the material world that has been lost. They call out to religions to fold 
their stories and histories into the mystery of the universe asking what an “ecological phase” for 
the Earth’s religions might look like. Part of what religions can be, Mary Evelyn Tucker 
suggests, is “vessels for nurturing the sense of the sacred” and as religions enter their ecological 
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phase their challenge is to reinvigorate a “sense of awe and reverence for the Earth” in all its 
dynamic intricacy “as a numinous matrix of mystery.”116 Berry, perhaps in response to Eliade, 
contends that “the universe is the supreme manifestation of the sacred”117 and he argues that the 
world religions should come to appreciate that the sacred is this wondrous mystery we can barely 
comprehend: 
the communion that comes through these experiences of the wild where we sense 
something present and daunting, stunning in its beauty, is beyond comprehension in its 
reality, but it points to the holy, the sacred . . . This notion is fundamental to establishing 
a cosmos, an intelligible manner of understanding the universe or even any part of the 
universe . . . We must remember that it is not only the human world that is held securely 
in this sacred enfoldment but the entire planet. We need this security, this presence 
throughout our lives. The sacred is that which evokes the depths of wonder. We may 
know some things, but really we know only the shadow of things.118  
 
Experiences in nature, enriched by expert scientific knowledge about the workings of life, Berry 
writes, should move humans (particularly those who feel moved by religious traditions) to 
understand there is still wonder here on this planet, a wilderness of spiritual riches left to be 
explored. However, Berry urges, our impending ecological concerns should fill us with a sense 
of urgency because of the devastation that we are causing to the natural world. “We will recover 
our sense of wonder and our sense of the sacred,” he writes, “only if we appreciate the universe 
beyond ourselves as a revelatory experience of that numinous presence whence all things come 
into being. Indeed, the universe is the primary sacred reality. We become sacred by our 
participation in this more sublime dimension of the world about us.”119 Integrating human stories 
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of meaning and purpose into the Universe story, being moved by this grand narrative, reorienting 
ourselves in reverent respect for the planet are, Berry believes, the future for religious studies. 
“We are moving,” he writes: 
from a theology of religion and an anthropology of religion to a cosmology of religion. 
This is the direction where, I think, religious studies will inevitably go in the future . . . In 
the immediate future, our religious concerns will, I believe, be more cosmological. They 
will be much more sensitive to the universe as the primary religious mode of being and to 
ourselves being religious through our participation in the religion of the universe. There 
will, I believe, be an emphasis on the planet Earth and on the universe itself as a single 
sacred community. The natural world will once again become scriptural text. The story is 
written not in any verbal text but in the very structure of the universe the galaxies of the 
heavens and in the forms of the Earth. . . This will require an immense shift in 
orientation, one that recognizes our emergence out of the long evolution of the universe 
and the Earth.120  
 
Rethinking the human as no longer the center of the universe but rather one part of one immense 
sacred community brings up questions of how humans should relate to others within this 
community. New cosmology teaches that humans should not only feel awe, wonder, and 




Evolutionary Kinship  
 What does it mean to be a part of one endless sacred community? What does it mean to 
live life planetarily? Who are my ecological kin and how do I learn to give them reverent care? 
Another defining feature of new cosmology is their argument that regarding nonhuman others as 
our evolutionary kin, all related to one another and all a part of the same matter that makes up the 
cosmos can encourage ethical action. “A recovery of the sublime meaning of the universe,” 
Berry writes, “could lead both to a greater intimacy of the human with the manifestation of the 
                                                        
 




divine in the natural world and to a greater intimacy of the different religions among themselves. 
It becomes increasingly clear that humans have a common origin and a common destiny with 
every other component of the Earth community. We live on the same planet. We breathe the 
same air. We drink the same water. We share the same sunlight. We are nourished by the same 
soil.”121 Here, Berry speaks of intimacy on different levels. One, being part of one immense 
sacred community, Berry believes, offers opportunities for religious traditions to recognize their 
intimate connections with one another rather than differences—a closeness offered by sharing 
this Earth space and its resources. From a planetary perspective, we share the same table, food, 
drink, and shelter. Two, Berry recognizes deep intimacy between humans and all other material 
on Earth as one immense sacred family sharing the same heritage, essence, and genealogy. From 
a planetary perspective, we are all extended kin. While in chapters two and three I speculate 
about how new cosmology might react to unwelcome family members, untidy houseguests, toxic 
lovers, and threatening neighbors, this kinship language has significant affective power. As my 
opening epigraph from Stephen Jay Gould captures, humans (ideally) protect their beloveds. 
Bonds of intimacy and affiliation galvanize us to protect and care for each other. Feelings of 
awe, wonder, and reverence, new cosmology argues, awaken humans to rethink their orientation 
in the universe. Affects of intimacy and attraction, feelings we might call love, that new 
cosmology contends work similarly to spark change. “We now have the wonder,” Berry and 
Swimme write, “not merely that we are related to and intimate with everything about us, but that 
we have a cousin relationship with every being in the universe, especially with the living beings 
of the planet Earth. We have not descended to a lower level; they have, as it were, been 
recognized at a higher level. Both their lives and ours are infinitely expanded by this intimate 
                                                        




presence to each other.”122 What does it mean to be in intimate presence with planetary others? 
What is required of humans who recognize these relationships? 
 E. O. Wilson’s work on biophilia, while speculative, is influential for not only new 
cosmology authors in expressing these kinship intimacies but also broader conversations in 
religious environmental ethics on the inexhaustible question of human/nonhuman attraction and 
relationship. “Biophilia,” Wilson writes: 
if it exists, and I believe it exists, is the innately emotional affiliation of human beings to 
other living organisms. Innate means hereditary and hence part of ultimate human nature. 
Biophilia, like other patterns of complex behavior, is likely to be mediated by rules of 
prepared and counterprepared learning—the tendency to learn to or to resist learning 
certain responses as opposed to others. From the scant evidence concerning its nature, 
biophilia is not a single instinct but a complex of learning rules that can be teased apart 
and analyzed individually. The feelings molded by learning rules fall along several 
emotional spectra: from attraction to aversion, from awe to indifference, from 
peacefulness to fear-driven anxiety. The biophilia hypothesis goes on to hold that the 
multiple strands of emotional response are woven into symbols composing a large part of 
culture. It suggests that when human beings remove themselves from the natural 
environment, the biophilic learning rules are not replaced by modern versions equally 
well adapted to artifacts. Instead, they persist from generation to generation, atrophied 
and fitfully manifested in the artificial new environments into which technology has 
catapulted humanity. For the indefinite future more children and adults will continue, as 
they do now, to visit zoos than attend all major professional sports combined (at least this 
is so in the United States and Canada), the wealthy will continue to seek dwellings on 
prominences above water amidst parkland, and urban dwellers will go on dreaming of 
snakes for reasons they cannot explain . . . The significance of biophilia in human biology 
is potentially profound, even if it exists solely as weak learning rules. It is relevant to our 
thinking about nature, about the landscape, the arts, and mythopoeia, and it invites us to 
take a new look at environmental ethics.123 
 
While there is no direct evidence for biophilia and whatever biophilic tendencies we have may 
have atrophied, Wilson contends that what we do know about evolutionary history would lead us 
to the logical understanding that since we evolved alongside other creatures they play a 
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tremendous role in what it means to be human not just in practical knowledge of our 
environments (what is food, what are possible tools, what to fear) but also as a resource for 
metaphor and myth. Coupled with the innate tendency Wilson sees in our species an ability to 
“translate emotional feelings into myriad dreams and narratives,” art and religious belief, poverty 
of biodiversity must impact the human psyche.124 Stephen Kellert expands further arguing that 
the biophilia hypothesis proclaims absolute “human dependence on nature” and extends much 
beyond basic sustenance to encompass “the human craving for aesthetic, intellectual, cognitive, 
and even spiritual meaning and satisfaction.”125 Wilson’s daring assertion, Kellert writes, also 
“reaches beyond the poetic and philosophical articulation of nature’s capacity to inspire and 
morally inform to a scientific claim of a human need, fired in the crucible of evolutionary 
development, for deep and intimate association with the natural environment, particularly its 
living biota.”126 The notion of biophilia should compel us to, in Wilson’s terms, “look to the very 
roots of motivation and understand why, in what circumstances and on which occasions, we 
cherish and protect life.”127  
Wilson’s understanding of biophilia manifests as an onto-affective attunement, one that 
again sits in the realm of interest of both religion and science, toward life in all its forms. 
“Humanity,” Wilson writes, “is exalted not because we are so far above other living creatures, 
but because knowing them well elevates the very concept of life.”128 Learning more about our 
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affiliation and nurturing our attraction to nonhuman others, Wilson argues, leads us toward 
protecting biodiversity and our capacity for biophilia, he suggests, is crucial for preservation and 
ecological activism. To the degree that humans are fascinated by and strive to understand this 
wilderness all around, Wilson argues, “we will place a greater value on them, and on 
ourselves.”129 Here, Wilson suggests, in this “innately emotional affiliation of human beings to 
other living organisms,” is the “spirit” of environmental ethics since humans need, he contends, 
endless biodiversity to be fully human.130 “Other species are our kin,” Wilson writes: 
this perception is literally true in evolutionary time. All higher eukaryotic organisms, 
from flowering plants to insects to humanity itself, are thought to have descended from a 
single ancestral population that lived about 1.8 billion years ago. Single-celled eukaryotes 
and bacteria are linked by still more remote ancestors. All this distant kinship is stamped 
by a common genetic code and elementary features of cell structure. Humanity did not 
soft-land into the teeming biosphere like an alien from another planet. We arose from 
other organisms already here, whose great diversity, conducting experiment upon 
experiment in the production of new life-forms, eventually hit up the human species.131 
 
What we are as humans is also what the planet is, a swarm of related life living together. 
Attraction to certain landscapes, the notice of creature movement around us, yearning for 
connection with Earth-others may all be the lingering remnants of what were more active 
affinities. 
In later chapters I will return to biophilia but here I want to highlight the tendency in new 
cosmology readings of biophilia to rely only on affects of love and delight despite Wilson and 
Kellert framing biophilia more as an “array of affective qualities”132 that include awe and wonder 
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but also aversion, indifference, and anxiety. 133 Biophilia is exciting in this context because it 
hypothesizes why nonhuman others fascinate us so and suggests that to be human is to live 
respectfully within this tremendous diversity providing a pathway for action. The planet needs 
care, the planet needs love, these Earth-others are our kin and need our protection because we 
also have always needed them in return. “The diversity of life, past and present,” Barlow writes, 
“contributes all the characters for the Earth episodes of this epic. Plants, animals, fungi, 
protoctists and bacteria alive today are the current players in a multi-billion-year, continuing 
saga. This pageant of life embeds our species in something far more magnificent than the 
comings and goings of cultures and kings. The diversity of life here today is our extended family, 
and the very epic that reveals our wide kinship can also help us re-story those beings.”134 The re-
storying Barlow describes reorients humans into a tale of “honor for those who came before,” 
and responsibility for all those who come after for even the loss of one species is a loss to “the 
universe of a particular way of perceiving a part of the cosmos,” our understanding of who we 
are, and our purpose for how we should live.135 “It is by way of this story,” Barlow writes, “that 
one’s very being can expand and fill with a passionate caring for the vast diversity of life- past, 
present, and future.”136 When we begin to truly understand “the universe as a communion of 
subjects, not a collection of objects,” Berry argues: 
we hear the voices of all the living creatures. We recognize, understand, and respond to 
the voices of the crickets in the fields, the flowers in the meadows, the trees in the 
woodlands, and the birds all about us; all these voices resound within us in a universal 
chorus of delight in existence. In their work Biophilia, E. O. Wilson and Stephen Kellert 
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have emphasized the feeling of humans with the larger array of living beings . . . New 
religious sensitivities emerge as we understand better the story of the universe, which is 
now available to us through scientific inquiry into the structure of the universe and the 
sequence of transformations that have brought the universe, the planet Earth, and all its 
living creatures into being. The new scientific story of the universe has a mythic, 
narrative dimension that lifts the story out of a prosaic study of data to a holistic spiritual 
vision. This new creation narrative enables us to enter into the deep mystery of creation 
with a new depth of understanding. It is our human version of the story that is told by 
every leaf on every tree . . . Through this story we understand with new insight how every 
component of the universe is integrated with every other member of the universe 
community. To be is to contribute something so precious that nothing before or afterword 
will ever contribute that special glory to the created world.137  
 
Through these sacred kinships new cosmology authors offer an ethics of reorientation for 
humans. Reconceptualizing our home in the universe, who our evolutionary kindred are, and 
how we are called to protect our mutual home engenders a humbling new perspective, new 
cosmology contends, one that traces deep emotional investment coupled with scientific 
understanding as the path into better futures.  
 
Affective Investments 
 Concluding this chapter, I will briefly synthesize some of the critiques of new cosmology 
scholarship and then move on to the core questions that will drive the rest of this project. Much 
of the criticism of new cosmology scholarship circulates around the significant concern of 
whether “scientific worldviews provide sufficient information and motivation to galvanize 
widespread action on environmental issues.”138 From the perspective of new cosmology, 
investing science with “mythic, revelatory power; far from disenchanting our world,” offers a 
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global cosmology as “primary vehicle for restoring wonder, meaning, and value.”139 But some 
scholars are less convinced about its universal appeal and are wary of its overlooked assumptions 
and its impact on other environment-related beliefs, practices, and ethics. In a 2015 response 
forum in The Immanent Frame, six religion scholars gave brief responses to these questions on 
cosmology and the environment. Bron Taylor and Lucas Johnston responded positively toward 
new cosmology material suggesting it offers opportunities for meaning and value for those 
experiencing “increasing disaffection” with “traditional institutionalized religions.”140 Taylor 
argues that given religions “penchant for setting up categories of inclusion and exclusion, purity 
and defilement,” “science-based worldviews are far less likely to have such effects than the 
world’s predominant religions.”141 Furthermore, the kinship ethics new cosmology promotes, 
Taylor argues, “erode supremacist ideologies, whether racist or anthropocentric.”142  
Whitney Bauman, Willis Jenkins, Mary-Jane Rubenstein, and Lisa Sideris, however, 
expressed more hesitancy toward the promise of new cosmology. Bauman contends it must be 
recognized that these stories “are not without their own socio-historical locations. No narrative, 
religious or scientific, can skirt its ‘locatedness.’”143 Furthermore, he argues that while “we as 
humans will find many common grounds in the emerging planetary story . . . this doesn’t mean it 
is a story that can be The One Story,” and “polydoxy of meanings and interpretations of the 
multiplicity of life” is a more appropriate reflection of our diversity.144 Jenkins argues that it is 
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unclear “what we can expect big stories to do for our practical arguments” about how we should 
live in a rapidly warming world.145 Jenkins contends that he does not find cosmologies morally 
irrelevant but finds little reason to think “that any cosmology will go far in practically specifying 
how humans should meet planetary challenges.”146 While Mary-Jane Rubenstein says new 
cosmology is a tempting proposal, “if only everyone believed the transcultural truth of our 
having crawled from the same primal ooze, or burst from the same cosmic blast, we might heed 
the convulsive warnings of our planetary home,” she worries this “fantasy is misguided, 
dangerous, and self-sabotaging.”147 Rubenstein warns that hidden perspectives “often encode 
anti-ecological values into scientific stories: the reproductive warfare of some linear biologies, 
for example; or the anthropocentricism of many emergence theories; or the disposable worlds of 
most multiverse cosmologies.”148 Furthermore, she points out with guidance from Nietzsche, 
“the fantasy of a scientific triumph over religion is self-sabotaging because belief in a single, 
objective truth is arguably the legacy of monotheism in the first place.”149 Like Bauman, 
Rubenstein recognizes valuing earth diversity is more appropriate through “multiple accounts of 
that multiplicity.”150 
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 Finally Lisa Sideris, who has offered sustained critiques of the constellation she calls new 
cosmology for some time,151 argues that if “wonder is present in these narratives, it appears in 
disappointingly familiar forms—wonder at humans as the consciousness, heart, or mind of a 
self-organizing, ever-complexifying universe in which the emergence of our species was implicit 
from the beginning: wonder at the modern human subject knowledgeable enough to have 
‘discovered’ cosmic patterns and processes that were opaque to all previous, unenlightened 
generations.”152 Sideris suggests new cosmology efforts to decenter, or at least reorient, the 
human might not be as successful as their authors intend. The generally “anthropic and 
anthropocentric flavor of the new cosmology,” she argues, “constitutes no marked improvement 
over the human-centeredness that is assumed to taint and disqualify traditional religions as 
sources of environmental values.”153 Compellingly, Sideris contends, in a strange way new 
cosmology’s attempts at resisting anthropocentrism within certain religious traditions have the 
potential to solely offer up one exceptional human for another. Humans need not look toward a 
deity for their design and destiny but can marvel at the intricate workings of evolutionary 
existence that led to marvelous appearance of humanity. Regardless, as Sideris highlights, 
humans are afforded exceptional status in their ability to make meaning about the universe 
around them and this exceptionalism affords little opportunity for humility. I find that new 
cosmology spends so much time focusing on reorienting the human within this grand scientific 
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narrative, it has missed opportunities to dig deeper into what it even means by “the human” and 
which humans serve as its ideal.  
One of Sideris’ most compelling critiques, and often overlooked by her detractors, is that 
“as a whole these movements discourage sensory, experience-infused forms of engagement with 
nature that are less dependent upon and mediated by expert knowledge.”154 While Sideris 
recognizes that new cosmology authors are careful to say their evolutionary epics do not 
supersede or wholly replace religious cosmologies, they do conflate “all that is real with 
whatever is scientifically known or knowable” and this conflation: 
encourages a disparagement of human-level, lived experience of the natural world as 
unreal. It asks us to look behind the scenes, beyond the senses, to what is assumed to be a 
more fundamental domain of reality. The result is a displacement of primary 
experience—encounters with a more directly sensed world— with a secondary and, for 
the most part, abstract and vicarious experience in the form of information dictated by 
experts. I accept that it is problematic to assert that our sensory experiences constitute an 
unmediated encounter with nature; nevertheless, science is not the same thing as nature, 
and to study the former is not to experience the latter. Nor is the study of the former 
necessarily conducive to seeking out experiences of the latter. . . This radical privileging 
of scientific reality puts environmental values on shaky ground. It estranges us from what 
we experience as real, meaningful, and beautiful. Why attach ourselves to this world of 
illusion?155  
 
Sideris weaves in David Abram’s work on ordinary experience in nature to suggest “relegating 
ordinary experience of the world to a secondary, derivative realm increases our reliance on 
experts to inform us of what is real and true about the world, what is worthy of our wondering 
response.”156 Additionally, while new cosmology authors argue that humans “grapple with a 
sense of alienation, that we do not feel sufficiently ‘at home’ in nature,” and evolutionary epics 
can offer a reoriented sense of the Earth as our shared home, Sideris expresses skepticism of new 
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cosmology’s ability, with its “almost unfathomably broad sweep of cosmic events,” to be able to 
“elicit or encourage positive responses to particular local places.”157 Granting their diagnosis of 
alienation as correct for the sake of argument, Sideris contends, “it is not altogether clear how 
exposure to the grand narrative of the universe will rectify the situation. Ultimately, this story 
situates us not so much in place as in space. There is something distinctly dislocating about the 
story’s all-encompassing scope. The sheer scale and remoteness of the universe vis-à-vis 
everyday life and lived experience may interfere with rather than foster a sense of being 
meaningfully connected and emplaced in our natural environments.”158 I am compelled to agree 
with Sideris’ assessments but with the caveat that it is not so much the case that new cosmology 
is adverse to sensory experience, I would argue, or human attraction and attachment to affective 
encounters with nature. Rather, new cosmology material is resistant to affective encounters 
outside the realm of awe, wonder, and reverence. New cosmology authors want us to feel, and to 
connect deeply via those feelings, but they want us to feel within in a particular context and 
toward a particular outcome. What happens when our encounters with “nature” stir up other 
feelings? 
 Any discourse that attempts to traverse the rocky territory between religion and the 
sciences (or the humanities and sciences) will meet critiques about the uses and abuses of both 
science and religion in this material. Sideris and her interlocutors have lengthy exchanges on 
whether or not new cosmology trades in scientism. My interests for this project, however, are in 
what new cosmology authors have to say about affinity and attachment with/to nonhuman others, 
a conversation that is obviously apt for this context and of interest to religion and ecology in a 
broader sense but can also hold relevance for other trajectories in environmental ethics. In much 
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of this material I find myself questioning if this discussion is really about what science can lend 
to religious ecologies or if it is even about science at all. Rather, I find new cosmology and the 
repetitive retelling of the evocative evolutionary narratives to be about normative ethical framing 
through habitual emotional orientation. We ought to be awed by these truths and then act 
accordingly. To not do so is counter to what new cosmology believes is human destiny—our 
ontological purpose.  
 In his article “Telling the Facts of Life: Cosmology and the Epic of Evolution,” science 
writer Jon Turney characterizes new cosmology work, particularly Barlow’s Green Space, Green 
Time, as part of a larger resurgence in popular science writing that “while offering interpretations 
of how things are in the natural world, becomes another arena for disputing about the human 
future,” and ultimately promotes “one particular set of values.”159 Picking up on Barlow’s 
language describing the evolutionary epic as the pageant of life in which all beings throughout 
space and time have a role, Turney argues that in order for all this history to have coherence as a 
set of values, it needs a moral. New cosmology authors tell the story as a grand spectacular 
display, one that “places the observer in relation to past events,” and can answer questions about 
how the world came into being but answering questions of “meaning and purpose requires 
further work by authors appropriating answers figured in technical terms for their own diverse 
ends.”160 For Barlow, and others, the ends are investment in the potential of affective encounters, 
through contemplation and direct experience, with the natural world to offer ethical guidance. It 
is unclear, though, how we directly experience the spectacular universe Berry, Tucker, and 
Swimme spend so much time detailing other than through the narratives of “expert” knowledge. 
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The problem with spectacular displays is that their brilliance and orchestration can blind one to 
overlooked cracks and corners. I continue to wonder if there are misfits at the borders of the 
pageant procession that are out-of-step with this affective modeling. What kinds of affective 
experiences does new cosmology normalize and what places, spaces, and creatures do they 
obscure by doing so? 
 “The way we speak about the natural world is not a transparent window,” Brendon 
Larson writes, “because it reflects the culture in which we live and its priorities and values. In 
the discourse about sustainability, for example, we look to environmental science for the facts, 
often neglecting the value-laden language in which they are communicated . . . they represent a 
complex way of human knowing.”161 While Larson is primarily concerned with ecolinguistics, 
addressing whether the language used in environmental science really promotes the sustainability 
outcomes scientists hope for, his observations about the sociocultural locatedness of language 
reverberates here for questions of religion, ecology, and emotion. The words we use matter and it 
is curious that repeatedly in both materials affiliated with the Epic of Evolution and the Universe 
Story, authors rely on awe, wonder, and reverence to convey meaning, value, and purpose. Why 
these emotions and only these? Are these emotions our only religious emotions? Are these 
emotions the only ones that lead to ethical action?  
  This work in sacred evolutionary kinships expresses fear about the rapid decline of 
biodiversity, sadness over lost species, and anxiety about what the future will hold but 
descriptions of encounters with nonhumans are very often descriptions of ideal ecological 
systems expressing wonder at their intricacy and reverence for being a part of their sacred 
lineage. In cases where the language tends toward the cosmic, particularly I find in Berry and 
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Tucker’s work, “nature” can actually seem quite removed from many quotidian concerns. While 
I would imagine that individually these authors would express concern for damaged 
environments and ill creatures, the challenges of communities recovering from disaster or 
negotiating environmental decline are not present at our immense shared table. Their stories are 
not folded into the New Story. This absence is a problem because it begs the question if these 
evolutionary epics and their ethics of reorientation are truly able to speak to contemporary 
ecological concerns. What does it mean to cultivate relationships in critically damaged 
environments? What does affinity and attachment look/feel like after ecological disaster? Are ill, 
damaged, disabled, and mutated creatures/habitats a part of our one sacred family? Given that 
new cosmology makes no mention of toxic or damaged environments, disabled or ill creatures, 
new cosmology is less resistant to categories of purity/defilement as Bron Taylor claims. The 
absence weighs here, I contend, as presence of discomfort and disillusionment with quotidian 
environmental realities. Furthermore, as I will trace in detail in the next chapter, since the burden 
of ecological devastation and decline (historically and presently) is disproportionately shouldered 
by poor communities of color, the refusal to engage environmental destruction in new cosmology 
visions seems to do little, counter to Taylor’s hopes, to “erode supremacist ideologies, whether 
racist or anthropocentric.”162 
 In chapters two and three, in conversation with affect studies and feminist materialisms, I 
consider these questions in the midst of everyday encounters post-disaster. Touching the land 
and creatures in these environments, engaging in restoration projects, consuming their bodies as 
food, taking in the air and waters of the Gulf all present humans with an unsettling experience of 
vulnerability as these interactions take a toll on not just our physical health but also our 
                                                        





emotional wellbeing and, perhaps, our confidence that we could control our relationships with 
nonhuman others. While all humans live in enmeshed environments, in devastated landscapes it 
is more difficult to deny our entanglements.  In these encounters, human and nonhuman others 
form disconcerting zones of proximity in which scenes of devastation tug at the onto-ethical 
cohesion of new cosmology that expects certain affective orientations. When the fallout of 
ecological disaster results in broken, damaged, wounded, deformed, and absented biodiversity, 
what do humans love and how do we love it? If these places, spaces, and creatures become no 
longer desirable as model habitats, what happens to these unloved others? What might a robust 
conception of biophilia that is able to speak to the ethical complexities of loving the “unloved 
others” of devastated landscapes look like? 163  
Thinking with common conceptions of “sacred” we have articulations of sacred as special 
material, set apart from other material, that moves us as we experience it through feelings we 
might call awe, wonder, or reverence. But when the material landscapes we live in are not 
pristine (as much of the planet is not) and these spaces, creatures, and material are decidedly not 
separate from humans (in fact at times terrifyingly close) what do we think about our 
relationships with material impacted by pollution and disaster? Can these spaces be sacred? Can 
contaminates be enfolded within the contagious sacred? Can toxic bodies be our ultimate 
concern? In what follows, I will return to these questions and trace how toxic materials and toxic 
relationships prove to be tricky for religion and ecology as they slip beyond dichotomies like 
sacred/profane, subject/object, nature/culture, human/nonhuman. Furthermore, the changes 
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wrought by disaster and toxic exposure provoke emotional responses but, I suggest, responses 
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nuances of wonder. Consequently, I have not included affective engagements with wonder, 
particularly wonder’s more monstrous forms or where wonder is a fascination with the grotesque 
or anomalous, that would be particularly helpful for puzzling through devastated landscapes in 
favor of dealing with the habitual positivity in new cosmology’s affective project. Sideris calls 
these “diminished accounts of wonder” and their “elevation of abstract, expert knowledge above 
our lived experience of the world,” distorted, deracinated wonder that is rooted in “hubristic, 
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other faith communities” (2017, 3; 8-12). New cosmology wonder is always positive and 
because it is divorced from any cultural/historical contexts, is limited in which bodies, identities, 
and relationships are able to resonate with their framing of wonder. For more nuanced and 
productive explorations of wonder see Lorrain Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the 
Order of Nature, 1150-1750. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998; Mary-Jane Rubenstein, Strange 
Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe. New York: Columbia University 
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Disasterscapes: Depletion, Abandonment, Toxicity  
 
 
“‘My wound is geography,’ writes Southern novelist Pat Conroy. ‘It is also my anchorage, my 
port of call.’ Some wounds—we are grateful to confess—never heal. They grow with us, 
festering and prodding, reminding us often that the wound is what grants the storyteller his 
narrative power. Most people, I suspect can plot a geography of broken places in their lives, 
pointing to fierce landscapes and threatening terrain they have negotiated alone or with others. 
Their wound even becomes, sometimes, an anchorage… The quest for the mystery of place 
functions as an infirmity of sorts, summoning ever-new forms of diagnosis and methods of 
treatment. Understanding the incurable attraction of human beings to places they perceive as 
sacred is an ‘affliction’ I have come to love. I can’t get over it.”  




One of the most moving stories of cleanup efforts after the BP spill is the origin of the 
Hermit Crab Survival Project. Park ranger Leanne Sarco working Grand Isle State Park Beach in 
Louisiana describes the project as a hopeful opening within weeks of frustration, anxiety, and 
desperation. “‘When we initially saw oiled animals,’” Sarco said, “‘we would call the US Fish 
and Wildlife hotline . . . I was frustrated by their response. At best, it would take them an hour or 
two to show up. By that time, the bird had moved on or already died.’”166 Cleanup officials told 
volunteers that they were not allowed to clean the beach or help wildlife common to the coast 
because they lacked the required special training.167 Amid her frustration Sarco said she saw, 
“hundreds of hermit crabs attempting to scramble ashore, only to get stuck under the sheen and 
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suffocate.”168 “‘BP and Fish and Wildlife were busy saving the birds, as well as edible wildlife—
animals with either an economic benefit or cuteness factor,’” Sarco said, but “‘hermit crabs were 
just part of the beach. When I saw the BP workers shoveling living hermit crabs covered with oil 
into bags for disposal, I knew I had to at least try to help them.’”169 The crabs, it turns out, were 
not off-limits to Sarco and her hundred volunteers who using everyday objects in a makeshift lab 
cleaned and released approximately ten thousand creatures.170 
 Artist Jacqueline Bishop originally came to Grand Isle to collect oil to use in her 
dystopian collage work. After experiencing alarming skin reactions to the dispersants in the Gulf 
water, Bishop abandoned her plan to collect the oil and “began to use her camera to document 
the extent of the disaster and to chronicle the cleanup response. She took pictures of oiled 
marshlands and tar balls on beaches, as well as of BP work crews—including teams of 
supervised inmates from the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola. She also began taking an 
inordinate number of pictures of hermit crabs.”171 In an interview with Eben Kirksey, Nicholas 
Shapiro, and Maria Brodine, Bishop described grounding her “desire for a liveable future in the 
figure of the hermit crab” by joining the Survival Project.172  Cleaning the little creatures 
“involved edging Q-tips into their shells without injuring their delicate bodies. ‘I felt so 
comfortable cleaning the hermit crabs,’” Bishop said, “‘swabbing with the Q-tip was the same 
gesture as painting, except I was taking oil off instead of applying it.’”173  
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This brief glimpse into interspecies encounter is a profound model of affiliation and 
attachment. It also, however, stirs up troubling ethical questions. Why are some humans drawn to 
the struggling crabs but not others? Why are some humans compelled to care for these creatures 
while others regard them as refuse?  Stories like this one provide yet another occasion (albeit 
with some peculiar twists) to do as biophilia proponent E. O. Wilson suggests: inquire after the 
motivations (what circumstances and on which occasions) of human action to protect nonhuman 
others. In chapter one, I traced arguments from influential voices within religion and ecology that 
regard disincentive to cherish life as the result of ontological orientations that do not recognize 
affinity with the more-than-human world as our evolutionary legacy and ethical attachments as 
our sole hopeful recourse. Championing the unifying and galvanizing power of scientific 
cosmologies to provide an orienting mythos for all humans, these spectacular retellings of the 
universe story offer opportunities for emotional investment in the more-than-human world by 
positioning humans as a small part of the wondrous planetary family. In awe of the beauty of our 
shared universe and feeling the appropriate reverence for its sacred intricacy our ethics will shift, 
these scholars contend, in favor of biophilic care for our genetic kin. However, what stories, 
relationships, bodies, and politics do we disregard in this pursuit of a single orienting narrative? 
This chapter argues that painful environmental legacies and unsettling quotidian encounters 
render questions of affinity and attachment particularly troubling for religion and ecology.  
 Considering the Hermit Crab Survival Project, new cosmology authors would resonate 
with the compulsion to care for these little creatures. New cosmology proponents might site 
Sarco’s undergraduate work in hermit crab biology174 as a catalyst for later interventions, arguing 
that scientific inquiry can lead to empathy. Indeed in conversation with Connie Barlow, E. O. 
                                                        
 





Wilson, Lynn Margulis, Paul Mankiewicz, and Stephen Harding describe forming allegiances 
with species they study, “intimate involvement with wild things— sometimes very intimate,” 
that leads to conservation work.175 Others, like Lee Klinger, describe affinities for particular 
habitats (the formation of bogs) and bioregions— a love for place that guides their projects.176 
These narratives, Barlow argues, are indicative of the conviction that “life loves life” and those 
who “deeply value biodiversity, who find it sacred, have fired that conviction with the memory 
of an intimate encounter with one or more real organisms at some point in our lives” organisms 
that are familiar and “creatures that are still alien, that are at home in the wild and can therefore 
never be fully at home with us— try as we might.”177 These biophilic attractions, flashes of 
fellow feeling or familial affinity even with very different organisms and strange regions, can 
become attachments that new cosmology argues could be affectively cultivated. While this 
material rarely delves into the mechanics of affinity and attachment, how we affect and are 
affected by others and how we form emotional bonds, new cosmology nevertheless offers a 
normative conception of the human characterized by affective investment. To be appropriately 
human is to be in relationship with nonhuman others, awed by their existence and invested in 
caring for their wellbeing. But, as I contend in chapter one, there is an unspoken limit to these 
relationships and investments. Why do some encounters, feelings, and attachments post-disaster 
seem out of step with these affective norms?  In this chapter I begin to ask why intimacies post-
disaster seem to fall outside the onto-ethical paradigm of new cosmology by pairing new 
cosmology’s universal narrative with a particular context. Here, I dig into the environmental 
history and contemporary concerns of the U.S. Gulf Coast where 2005 sister storms Hurricane 
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Katrina and Hurricane Rita (two of the strongest storms the Atlantic has ever experienced) and 
the 2010 BP oil disaster (the largest “accidental” marine oil spill in history) drastically altered 
what can be said about environmental concerns in the region.  
While new cosmology speaks to hermit crab affinity, this material is less helpful for 
making sense of the motivations of the other actors in our opening. It would be less complicated 
to let the faceless BP funded cleaning crews remain as corporate foils, all that was wholly awful 
about the spill represented by their careless shoveling of live creatures into bags. In hindsight, 
however, we know that while gaining tax credits BP largely employed migrant worker and 
supervised work release labor from the prison in Angola to clean the spill, factors that necessitate 
conversations on the circulations/distributions of power, privilege, and vulnerability.178 Racial 
tensions in Grand Isle heightened during the cleanup as the predominantly white and Cajun 
community verbalized discomfort with black crews leaving their worksites and docked sleeping 
quarters to venture into the community for meals and leisure.179 While we can only speculate, 
what might it feel like for the predominantly black and brown bodies, working for grossly low 
wages in sweltering heat and exposed to chemical dispersants, to encounter these crabs? What 
might cleanup workers think about these zones of intimacy as their bodies began to manifest the 
long-term health effects related to the spill?  
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I will return to these difficult questions in the following chapters but for now, the open 
questions for religion and ecology are, why is environmental disaster beyond the frame of 
dominant discourses in the field? And, how do we begin to better address environmental disaster 
and uncertain futures? The first step is to start recognizing environmental disaster is an everyday 
reality for many communities. American studies scholar Curtis Marez argues that the aftermath 
of disasters and the complicated problems associated with their names (Katrina, BP) have a way 
of transforming what we thought we knew about the past and the present’s pressing issues.180 
“To what extent is disaster ‘exceptional,’” Marez asks, “and to what extent is it the norm?”181 
The U.S. Gulf Coast is a devastated landscape in recovery not only from BP but also from the 
spectacular failures of response to Hurricane Katrina and the lack of care for black bodies. The 
entire Katrina event visibly testified to the kind of racial inequality and environmental injustice 
many Americans claimed did not exist in their nation, thereby illuminating numerous ways that 
“particular bodies and populations are made disposable.”182 In the case of Katrina, is disaster the 
“moment the levees broke” or, Marez asks, does disaster also “signify the political-economic 
context that preceded the hurricane” and the “matrixes of disposability” exposed by its wake?183 
The Gulf Coast after BP, Katrina and Rita, I argue, offers an opportunity to scholars in religion 
and ecology to consider how our theory disregards disasterscapes and their function as the norm 
for many beings on the planet. 
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One could counter that to force new cosmology and evolutionary history to engage and 
account for quotidian concerns, to compel big history to speak to daily injustice, struggle, and 
despair, is unfair. However, I make the argument in the previous chapter that while new 
cosmology hopes to cultivate a galvanizing narrative with the kind of awe-inspiring grandiosity 
that rivals religious mythos, they do intend for these stories to influence everyday ethics— a 
reorientation of our relationship with/to nonhuman others in such a way that we see ourselves as 
part of a cosmic sacred family with responsibilities to care for this family. These stories of 
wonder and intimacy are effective, they argue, because of their universal appeal with the ability 
to be grafted onto religious traditions or act as a civic home for those exploring emotional 
connections with/to non-human others. But if they struggle to include disasterscapes where awe, 
wonder, and reverence compete with anxiety, aversion, and apathy, and they do not speak to 
large populations living after environmental decline where intimacies with nonhuman others risk 
vulnerability and exposure, can new cosmology claim universal appeal? Can the sacrality of new 
cosmology negotiate toxicity? Are all non-human others truly regarded as sacred or does this 
sacrality hover above quotidian encounters as an ideal, glossing over histories of injustice, abuse, 
and pollution? How might religion and ecology address the skeletons here in this branch of the 
planetary family? At face value, new cosmology offers an intriguing bend to this conversation—
an exciting democratization of sacrality, space, and ontology by positioning the whole universe, 
and its dizzying array of intricate, alien, unfathomable parts, as sacred. However, as I 
summarized in the previous chapter, this sacrality is vaguely unparticular, un-rooted, un-
inclusive of large portions of the planet in its sidestepping of environmental degradation. My 
contention is that the focus of new cosmology on one affective-ethical narrative renders this 
discourse unable to attend to contemporary concerns. Drawing critical geographies, space and 




conceptions of sacred nature, here I sit with the particulars of degradation along the Gulf Coast 
to advocate for opening sacrality to damage, loss, and mutation.  
 
 Landscapes of Depletion: Erosion, Super Storms, Spills  
“I have got in touch with a few people. Or they have managed to get in touch with me. I have 
managed to send some emails out. The happiness that comes from knowing people are still alive 
is brief like the flame of a match. Be happy, then be miserable. I have to watch all this gut-
twisting stuff on TV—water, angry people, lies, familiar street signs in water, pregnant women 
wading in the water. Wade in the Water is part of the title of my poetry anthology. Irony. A boat 
is anything that floats . . . They are not showing my neighborhood on TV. It may be that I have 
no neighborhood, no house, no nothing. How to start… to start over . . . All the faces and hands 
are African American. The news informs us all the people are black. I feel miserable, sick. I 
guess I have trauma. Unlike the common cold, trauma affects the mind, the soul, the body. I am 
restless. All the African Americans are . . . Guns, gunfire. Who is shooting? Some people in the 
shelter make ugly comments about the stupid people who are still in New Orleans. It does no 
good to respond. They are convinced anyone who stayed was stupid. They are convinced thugs 
are shooting at helicopters. Anger makes my body hot . . . That is a dead man in the water? Who 
is killing? Time. Football lives. Writing something other than the information people give me for 
their FEMA applications helps. Dead. And no drinking water. And wading in poisoned water 
with the snakes and the dead bodies of animals and people floating by. Writing. Help! I have not 
been writing the way I want to write. I have been thinking about writing, the fragility of writing, 
how personal it is. Water can wash it away. Baseball games—the national pastime lives. Boats 
and helicopters and the military … the people who could help are over there-Iraq- killing 
terrorism. Sand. They must be killing shadows in the sand. The terrorism is here- hurricanes in 
the South, on the Gulf Coast, in and around the Crescent City. Yes, I have to write.” Jerry W. 
Ward, Jr. The Katrina Papers184 
 
“Explosion. Fireball. Destroyed: Eleven men. Created: Nine widows. Twenty-one father-less 
kids, including one who’ll soon be born. Seventeen injured. One hundred and fifteen survive 
with pieces of the puzzle lodged in their heads. Only the rig rests in peace, one mile down. Only 
the beginning. Blowout. Gusher. Wild well. Across the whole region, the natural systems 
shudder. Months to control it. Years to get over it. Human lives changed by the hundreds of 
thousands. Effects that rippled across the country, the hemisphere, the world. Imperfect judgment 
at sea and in offices in Houston, perhaps forgivable. Inadequate safeguards, perhaps 
unforgivable. No amount of money enough. Beyond Payable.” Carl Safina, A Sea in Flames185 
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 2005. A very bad year.  By the morning of August 25th Tropical Depression Ten circling 
near the Bahamas began to look more ominous. “Upgraded” to Tropical Storm Katrina, the storm 
moved toward northeastern Miami-Dade County and became a Category 5 hurricane shortly after 
pulling into the balmy bath of the Gulf of Mexico. When August 26th projections moved 
Katrina’s eye toward Grand Isle, emergency management officials on the Louisiana coast began 
discussing catastrophic impact for below sea-level New Orleans. August 28th at 9:30am, New 
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco issued the first-ever 
mandatory evacuation for the city warning that “the storm most of us have feared” was soon to 
make landfall.186 Blanco urged residents to get out as soon as possible and for those 112,000 
residents without cars to find rides wherever they could. Those who could not get rides were 
directed to relocate to the Superdome as a shelter of last resort as soon as possible.187  
When Katrina made landfall at 6:00am on August 29th near Buras-Triumph Louisiana, 
the destruction was more devastating than even the grimmest predictions. Storm surge and 
seventeen hours of hurricane-force winds severely damaged the shores of Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Alabama. 80% of the greater New Orleans area was under water, many areas under more 
than ten feet of water, mostly due to engineering policy failures like 53 levee and floodwall 
breaches spilling billions of gallons of water from the Gulf of Mexico, Lake Borgne, and Lake 
Pontchartrain into New Orleans.188 2006 reports estimated in New Orleans alone, at least 1,118 
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people lost their lives, 135 are missing and presumed dead, and more than 400,000 residents had 
to flee the city— many will not return. Direct damage to property is estimated at $21 billion with 
public infrastructure damage estimated at an additional $6.7 billion.189 121 known dead in 
Mississippi, 67 missing, and 90% of structures up to mile inland from the shore were completely 
obliterated.190 Most troubling for long-term restoration projects, Katrina flooding saturated the 
region in a toxic combination of oil, chemicals, waste, sewage bacteria, and garbage. The Coast 
Guard reported five major oil leaks from damaged tankers and refineries including at least 
819,000 gallons leaking into south New Orleans.191 Surrounding downtown New Orleans is a 95-
acre superfund site, a former toxic dump that lost its topsoil covering in the flooding and leached 
its chemicals into the area.192 Survivors either had to swim, float, or wade through this hazardous 
muck to safety or wait, days of waiting on rooftops, for rescue. Three weeks later Hurricane Rita, 
the fourth-most intense storm ever recorded in the Gulf, hit Louisiana’s western coast decimating 
what was left of the coastal communities after Katrina. The two storms were so large “Katrina 
destroyed the Louisiana coast from the Mississippi state line to Grand Isle and Rita pretty much 
finished the job from Grand Isle to the Texas border.”193 My attempts to summarize this level of 
destruction are grossly inadequate. I cannot do it justice. 
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Unnatural Disasters and Disposability 
 Why were these storms so devastating? While mind-stretching, the statistics about these 
disasters do not capture the truly immense, frustratingly complex, injustices impacting those that 
call this region home and that continue to shape the impact of these events. Helpful for 
understanding these complexities, in his groundbreaking work Slow Violence and the 
Environmentalism of the Poor, Rob Nixon coins the term “slow violence”194 to redirect our 
attention to “violence that occurs gradually and out of sight,” the “attritional catastrophes that 
overspill clear boundaries in time and space” and that are “marked above all by displacements—
temporal, geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and 
underestimate, in advance and retrospect, the human and environmental costs.” 195 Such 
displacements “smooth the way for amnesia,” Nixon writes, “as places are rendered irretrievable 
to those who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in the corporate 
media.”196 It might seem counterintuitive to use slow violence to think through disasters like 
Katrina with their spectacular impact and media attention, but Nixon and others in environmental 
justice provide ways to illuminate all the actions, choices, and abandonments that lead up to and 
follow (even speculatively in the very distant future) environmental catastrophes that remain 
beyond our “rapidly eroding attention spans.”197 We must figure out ways to creatively address, 
politically and representationally, the “slow erosions of environmental justice,” and the particular 
environmental concerns of populations habitually positioned as disposable in order to understand 
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that the world’s poor “can seldom afford to be single-issue activists: their green commitments are 
seamed through with other economic and cultural causes as they experience threat not as 
planetary abstraction but as a set of inhabited risks, some imminent, others obscurely long 
term.”198 Nixon’s work resists strains of environmental thought like new cosmology that 
continue to attempt to address environmental concerns separate from their political 
dimensions,199 particularly the reverberations of chattel slavery, neocolonialism, and fast 
capitalism.    
In a 2006 report In the Wake of the Storm: Environment, Disaster, and Race after 
Katrina, Manuel Pastor et al. argue that Katrina, while “sweeping away businesses, homes, and 
lives” and embedding “images of desperate and seemingly abandoned residents” into American 
minds, shattered two “illusions Americans usually associate with disasters.”200 The first of these 
“is that the government would always be there as an effective safety net.”201 Shocked by the 
“slow and now much criticized federal response” and the “stranded individuals and families” that 
were “left to fend-or not to fend-for themselves,” sentiment after the storms, they argue, is 
characterized by a “growing wave of criticism and cynicism about government capacity.”202 The 
second illusion that “Katrina swept away” was “the traditional belief that natural disasters are a 
sort of equal opportunity affair— acts of God that affect us all. But as the government’s 
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emergency rescue and recovery efforts floundered,” they argue, “particularly in beleaguered 
New Orleans, the country began to realize that this was not the case.”203 Make no mistake, 
longtime environmental justice advocate Robert D. Bullard writes, “the disaster in New Orleans 
after Katina was unnatural and man-made.”204  
 The disproportionate environmental burden dealt to poor communities of color is 
painfully unsurprising to those advocates who, since the United Church of Christ Commission 
for Racial Justice’s 1987 groundbreaking study Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States, 
continue to argue that environmental and social justice concerns are intertwined. In the 1980’s 
environmental issues became part of the civil rights agenda initiated by what Bullard calls a 
“fragile alliance” between labor organizers, environmental groups at the 1983 Urban 
Environment Conference in New Orleans, the UCC Commission for Racial Justice, and 
predominately black grassroots activists living in “cancer alley,” the chemical manufacturing 
corridor between Baton Rouge and New Orleans.205 The UCC Commission findings from two 
cross-sectional studies of demographic patterns associated with “commercial hazardous waste 
facilities” and “uncontrolled toxic waste sites,” demonstrate entrenched environmental inequality 
with a consistent national pattern of race proving “to be the most significant among variables 
tested in association with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities.”206 Toxic Wastes 
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and Race reported, “three out of every five Black and Hispanic Americans lived in communities 
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites” with more than “15 million Blacks” living in communities 
with “one or more uncontrolled toxic waste sites.”207 Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty, a 2007 
update, found “many of our communities not only face the same problems they did back then, 
but now they face new ones because of government cutbacks in enforcement, weakening health 
protection, and dismantling the environmental justice regulatory apparatus.”208 While “Katrina 
blew the lid off the ‘dirty little secret’ of race, vulnerable populations, disaster response, and 
unequal protection,” Rev. M. Linda Jaramillo writes, Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty only 
reconfirmed what many living in these communities already knew: “people of color are 
particularly concentrated in neighborhoods and communities with the greatest number of 
hazardous waste facilities” raising serious questions “about the ability of current policies and 
institutions to adequately protect people of color and the poor from toxic threats.”209 
 What these studies recognize as national vulnerabilities is perhaps even more the case in 
the South, as Pastor et. al.’s In The Wake of the Storm report indicates. “The South,” they write, 
is “host to the majority of the nation’s African American population” comprising “32 percent of 
the population in Louisiana, 36 percent in Mississippi and 26 percent in Alabama.”210 Those “left 
behind as the flood waters rose in New Orleans,” they write, “were from neighborhoods that 
were even poorer and more African American. Such increased vulnerability is typical of the 
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South, a place where the history of slavery, Jim Crow, and white resistance has affected both 
race relations and the region’s ecology. The plantation system exploited not only humans but 
also the land, and the South has often been thought of” as “a sort of dump for the rest of the 
nation’s toxic waste.”211 Pockmarking much of the landscape impacted by these storms are areas 
Vernice Miller-Travis calls “sacrifice zones” where residents suffer a “disproportionate burden” 
of toxic chemical exposure.212 “Sacrifice zones,” Steve Lerner writes, is a term that was 
originally used “by government officials to designate areas dangerously contaminated as a result 
of the mining and processing of uranium into nuclear weapons.”213 During the Cold War, Lerner 
writes: 
 when the Soviet Union and the United States were racing to build up their nuclear  
 arsenals, large areas in both nations were contaminated with radioactivity. In the United  
 States, some of these catastrophically polluted places were fenced off and warning signs  
 were posted; but others were not, and people continued to live in them and fall ill. Today  
 hundreds of these national sacrifice zones are scattered across the United States, where  
 the by-products of uranium mining operations, nuclear weapons production facilities, and  
 atomic test sites have left behind irradiated landscapes unfit for human habitation.214  
 
But these locations contaminated by radioactivity are not the only “places ‘sacrificed’ to the 
ravages of intense pollution,” Lerner contends.215 He makes the case that the “‘sacrifice zones’ 
designation should be expanded to include a broader array of fenceline communities or hot spots 
of chemical pollution where residents live immediately adjacent to heavily polluting industries or 
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military bases.”216 Residents in these areas are overwhelmingly low-income minorities that “are 
required to make disproportionate health and economic sacrifices that more affluent people can 
avoid.”217 The decision of where to locate these plants, dumps, and hazardous sites Miller-Travis 
argues, “takes us back to the question of who is valuable.”218 “Permission to locate a new 
industrial facility adjacent to an existing residential area,” Lerner argues, “is often sold to the 
community in terms of the jobs it will create.” 219 This tradeoff, Miller-Travis explains, “is 
viewed by the environmental justice community as a kind of ‘economic blackmail’ . . . ‘It is a 
heinous thing to ask people to do, but it happens all the time,” Miller-Travis asserts, “in essence, 
people are offered a choice between jobs and a shorter life.”220 These fenceline communities are 
one form of “spatial segregation,” Lerner argues, where the “geographic concentration and 
economic isolation of low-income and minority citizens in rural pockets, inner suburbs, and 
central-city ghettos” exposes communities of color, those on the “wrong side of the tracks,” to 
industrial development that zoning laws push far from white communities.221  
New Orleans itself is a staggeringly apt study in all these environmental justice issues 
harming communities “long before Katrina’s flood-waters emptied the city.”222 New Orleans is 
located along the Mississippi River Chemical Corridor which is host to “more than 125 
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companies that manufacture a range of products including fertilizers, gasoline, paints, and 
plastics.”223 Areas impacted by the disasters already disproportionately had problems with 
childhood environmental lead poisoning and air quality related asthma and respiratory disease.224 
“When the hurricane hit,” Pastor et. al. write, “the existing inequalities and the history of 
discrimination in the American South played out in tragic yet predictable ways. Evacuation 
strategies, for example, left the most vulnerable populations—the poor, minorities, the elderly—
inadequately protected.”225 Weeks before Katrina and Rita, Bruce Nolan, a Times-Picayune 
reporter, distinctly summed up these abandonments in his critique of emergency transportation 
plans: “city, state and federal emergency officials are preparing to give the poorest of New 
Orleans’ poor a historically blunt message: In the event of a major hurricane, you’re on your 
own.”226 
When thinking about these storms, “landfall is not just a physical question,” geographer 
Cindi Katz argues, because “geography is always socially produced.”227 Every landscape, she 
writes, “can reveal sedimented and contentious histories of occupation: struggles over land use 
and clashes over meaning, rights of occupancy, and rights to resources.”228 On the Gulf, “Katrina 
churned through historical geographies of extraordinary multiculturalism but extreme racial 
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segregation, of amazing environmental wealth exploited rapaciously, of mythic significance in 
the American and even global imaginary whose celebrations masked the enduring legacies of 
poverty and discrimination that they fed off and opposed.” New Orleans, romanced as “the 
southernmost port of the United States and the northernmost port of the Caribbean,” is a city, 
Katz writes, “whose strange wonderfulness— that vibrant patchwork of beautiful, colorful, 
messy difference— is celebrated more than its hideous horribleness— the twisted legacies of 
venal corruption shot through with deep if quirky racism— is mourned and criticized.”229 The 
labor of Bullard, Lerner, Katz, and others working in environmental justice illuminates that what 
Katrina “revealed to the nation” was what the “hardened contours of racialized impoverishment 
and the residual costs of environmental exploitation” do to people’s lives, particularly black 
bodies, rendering them invisible, inconsequential.230  
“The wholesale abandonment of the poor on the part of the state and capital in New 
Orleans was not a turn of phrase or hyperbolic calling to attention in the wake of Katrina,” Katz 
writes, “it was a social fact.”231 “Underneath all the physical wreckage and debris,” Katz argues, 
“what Katrina and the flood in its wake scoured was the desperately uneven landscape of social 
reproduction in New Orleans. It revealed the costs of long term disinvestments in the social wage 
. . . the costs of enduring social and environmental injustice; the neglect of crucial infrastructure 
including even New Orleans’s intricate water management system; and the evisceration of public 
support for housing, healthcare, education, and social welfare . . . all jumbled together.”232 
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Within this, what Katz terms, “landscape of depletion” it is important to understand these 
disasters as the product of “long-term disinvestment” in the social reproduction, “environmental 
infrastructure, health care, education, housing, and social justice,” that ensures the futurity of the 
“material social practices of everyday life” for communities on the Gulf Coast. 233 It is also an 
occasion to ask if the recovery years after the storms are producing more of the same. 
 
 
Displacement and Dispossession 
 
 To get an idea of the immense material changes left after a superstorm the size of Katrina 
and Rita requires absorbing a set of stunning statistics. Katrina left an estimated 22 million tons 
of debris, more than half in Orleans Parish alone.234 350,000 motor vehicles, 60,000 boats, 
300,000 underground fuel tanks, and 42,000 tons of hazardous waste that all had to be collected 
and disposed of in ways that did not risk more contamination.235 Katrina blew down offshore oil 
platforms and refineries, caused six major oil spills releasing 7.4 million gallons of oil, hit five 
Superfund sites, and contaminated drinking water supplies.236 Of course injustices did not end 
once the waters began to recede and the cleanup began but the destruction wrought by Katrina 
and Rita reoriented justice efforts toward opportunities for resisting the “pre-disaster status quo” 
during the recovery and rebuilding process.237 However, as Manuel Pastor et. al.’s assessment In 
The Wake of the Storm details, distressing realities of disparity, dislocation, and dispossession 
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during recovery and rebuilding persist. Survivors of the storms suffered what they term the 
“second disaster” where those communities most impacted by the flooding were also most likely 
to be “underprepared and underinsured, and to be living in unsafe, substandard housing.”238 The 
slow distribution of federal aid to these communities left many residents of lower-income 
neighborhoods in New Orleans “concerned that federal, state, and local officials will not 
prioritize their communities for cleanup and reconstruction” rendering the city  “little more than 
a theme park for tourists.”239 The “uneven geographies of cleanup and reconstruction,” Katz 
argues, are palpable in every day encounters like “mundane practices of disrespect and disregard 
such as the city’s failure to even replace street signs destroyed or washed away in many poor 
neighborhoods so that those intent on rebuilding might find their way.”240  Lack of investment in 
futures for these neighborhoods indicates, even in restoration opportunities, a clear distinction 
between “the visible city of tourism and the invisible city of residential deprivation.”241  
 One of the most pressing concerns for working through pre-Katrina social and 
environmental erosion in recovery is the right to return and rebuild for those dislocated by the 
storm. “On August 29 a black city, called by activists the most Afro-centric city in the United 
States, was almost literally blown off the face of the Earth,” environmental justice advocate Eric 
Mann writes, and “the bungled and chaotic evacuation effort scattered more than a quarter of a 
million black people to the winds. The majority went to Shreveport and Baton Rouge, Louisiana; 
Houston, Texas; and Atlanta, Georgia, but New Orleans activists say that the dispossessed and 
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dispersed members of the black community are in 44 states. Many of them are still trying to find 
their way home.”242 The five-day “active abandonment of New Orleans” Clyde Woods writes, 
was followed by years of “massive resistance to the demands of displaced residents to return.”243 
Corrosive policies and governmental failures, Katz writes, “left gaping room” for non-
governmental organizations, religious, and grassroots communities to continue facing “the 
sprawling rot that was there all along.”244 These activists245 identified housing, and grim 
possibilities for “low-income, non-white residents” to return as the leading impediment to 
recovery efforts.246 Katrina alone forced more than a million Louisiana residents to flee their 
homes with an estimated 100-300,000 of those residents at risk for ending up permanently 
displaced.247 FEMA contracted for 120,000 mobile homes but weeks after Katrina, faced with 
difficulty getting evacuees out of shelters due to water, sewer, and electricity infrastructure 
problems, FEMA still had 4,600 Louisiana families in trailers, hotel rooms, or cruise ships 
docked in New Orleans and 100,000 evacuees still housed in “barrack-style shelters scattered 
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across twenty-six states.”248 To discourage evacuees from moving into their communities, some 
Louisiana parishes near New Orleans, Bullard and Wright detail, “adopted emergency 
ordinances limiting the density of mobile-home parks.”249 Compounding these abandonments, 
the trailers FEMA purchased for $2.6 billion were notoriously vulnerable to inclement weather 
and later found to be toxic to their inhabitants.250 After evacuees started showing signs of 
formaldehyde exposure (nausea, rashes, asthma attacks, memory impairment, insomnia, 
headaches, intestinal problems) the Sierra Club tested FEMA trailers and found 83% of the 
tested trailers had formaldehyde levels way above the EPA limit leading to potential long-term 
health effects.251 2007 Congressional hearings found FEMA “deliberately neglected to 
investigate any reports of high levels of formaldehyde in trailers so as to bolster FEMA’s 
litigation position in case individuals affected by their negligence decided to sue them.”252 Two 
years after the storm, an estimated 195,000 people were still living in FEMA trailers.253 For those 
that were able to stay or return but were not part of rebuilding investments, “people declared 
disposable by some ‘new’ economy to find themselves existing out of place in place,” they must 
negotiate what Nixon calls “displacement without moving,” referring to the “loss of the land and 
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resources beneath them, a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of the very 
characteristics that made it inhabitable.”254 
Prior to Katrina, 5% of the New Orleans population lived in public housing, about “7500 
units of public housing” yet two years after the storm only 1200 units were made habitable while 
the rest remained barricaded or were demolished.255 For those barred from returning and settling 
elsewhere, disasters only serve to worsen competition for affordable housing. For example, the 
East Baton Rouge Parish population “surged from 425,000 to 1.2 million as a result of Katrina. 
Katrina made Baton Rouge one of the fastest-growing regions in the country. The influx of these 
new residents to the region created traffic gridlock and crowded schools,” and “many of the 
mostly white suburban communities and small towns are not known for their hospitality towards 
blacks.” 256 Federal cash assistance programs to repair homes only served homeowners and 55% 
of the New Orleans community were renters.257 Where were those citizens who made up the 
“fabric of the city,” Katz argues, those “teachers, nurses, waiters, bellhops, taxi drivers, small 
business owners, police and firefighters supposed to live” without this infrastructure?258  “What 
hope is there for the future of New Orleans as a working, habitable city,” Katz asks, “as opposed 
to a theme park if the core of its working population is essentially evicted?”259 
 
                                                        
254 Nixon, Slow Violence, 19.  
 




257 Katz, 22.  
 







Stormy, Oily Forecasts 
 Eroding social protections and opportunities for communities on the Gulf Coast, 
particularly poor communities of color, are intensified by erosion on the coastline. For some time 
before Katrina, environmental activists working in the Gulf warned that sinking land, rising seas, 
and warming oceans would lead to superstorms like Katrina and Rita.260 Oil and gas drilling and 
its effects have all but eroded away the protective wetlands and barrier islands that slow down 
hurricanes.261 It is difficult to convey just how important the oil and gas economy is to the Gulf 
Coast. While many Americans might imagine a few rigs dotting the horizon, Mike Tidwell 
writes there are “no fewer than 4,000 colossal platforms in the Gulf used for oil drilling and 
production. They employ 85,000 workers, far more than the entire U.S. space program.”262 
Stretched end-to-end they would span from “Washington, D.C. to Philadelphia, rising more than 
ten stories above the ground and with a width nearly that of a modern aircraft carrier. On nautical 
charts, the individual oil platforms in the Gulf are so numerous they look like stars in the sky, a 
kind of galaxy at sea. They even group themselves—coincidentally—into ‘constellations’ not 
unlike the Big Dipper and Southern Cross.”263 Numerous studies, Tidwell writes, show “at least 
a third—and probably more— of Louisiana’s land loss stems directly from the erosion and 
altered hydrology caused by the industry’s ten thousand miles of pipeline canals and navigation 
channels.”264 As inland oil and gas reserves rapidly run out “all across the region, wells and tank 
                                                        
260 Mike Tidwell, Bayou Farewell: The Rich Life and Tragic Death of Louisiana’s Cajun 
Coast (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), xiv. 
 
261 Tidwell, Bayou Farewell, xiv.  
 









batteries have been abandoned, the hulking equipment rusting and falling apart waiting to be 
carted off as scrap metal,” and the “large companies- Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco, BP 
Amoco, and others” are eager to be “done with this old and dying coast, this depleted shoreline, 
free instead to turn to the vast reserves just beyond the horizon, there in the fathomless sea. Out 
there, along the ocean floor, lies the new frontier.”265 “The question persists,” Tidwell writes 
prophetically in 2003, “what will this coast do when a Category 4 hurricane finally does come 
ashore with almost nothing to stop its surge tide, which is likely to be in the neighborhood of 
eighteen feet? The water will furiously topple all levees in its path and go and go and go, all the 
way to the outskirts of Baton Rouge, like a liquid bulldozer, flattening everything it meets, and 
hundreds of thousands of people will be at risk of drowning.”266  
 In 2010 one of these rigs, Deepwater Horizon, one of so many, exploded killing 11 
people. The damaged well at the Macondo formation pumped crude oil into the Gulf for 87 days. 
BP risked the health futures of 16,000 miles of coastline and its inhabitants to disperse the oil 
and disperse the blame. For those rebuilding after Katrina and Rita, some of them New Orleans 
residents who waited for days on rooftops without government response, what did it feel like to 
watch the underwater footage of plumes of crude gushing for days? For fishing communities that 
sorted through the haystack messes of splintered boats, docks, and homes in order to rebuild, 
what did it feel like to wait and see how much oil would wash ashore, how many fish would die, 
how many days they would be unemployed? How might activists feel facing another 
insurmountable disaster threatening their homes, bodies, and human/nonhuman neighbors? 
While difficult to represent, this complex environmental, racial, and economic history of 
“acceptable” risks, disinvestment, displacement, and dispossession shapes the Gulf landscape 
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and how it is experienced by those that attempt to call it home through erosion, erasure, and 
haunting remainders. Like toxic exposures, do these abandonments also sediment in bodies 
shaping our emotional orientations and future attachments?  
 
 
The Sacred and the Human  
Keeping these historical and pressing environmental concerns in mind, I return to the 
discussion of sacred natures. In chapter one I argued that while new cosmology authors (some of 
whom claim their fidelity to nature is a secular feeling best expressed through religious affects) 
do not clearly define what they mean by “sacred” when they claim nature is sacred and should be 
revered/experienced as such, it seems to be the case that “sacred” likely functions as affective 
experience and ethical compulsion. Through working to revitalize our evolutionarily innate 
capacities to marvel at the more-than-human world by sacralizing scientific knowledge and 
encouraging others to treat the planet with reverent care, these authors argue humans will find 
renewed meaning and purpose on the planet as one type of being amongst the dizzying array of 
sacred kin. However, as I summarized, critiques of new cosmology point out the inability of their 
epic narratives to persuasively speak to practical environmental concerns or to the social 
locatedness of their own stories. But most troubling, I find, is their lack of reflection on what 
they mean by “the human” or which humans serve as their models. It seems to be the case, at 
least in its current iterations, that the onto-ethics of sacred natures discourse functions best under 
the assumption that encounters with nonhuman others do not shake our onto-ethical ideals too 
much. 
For example, while new cosmology authors do not meditate at length on ontology, they 
do offer some insight into how they implicitly position the human within the universe through 




Universe Story: From the Primordial Flaring Forth to the Ecozoic Era—A Celebration of the 
Unfolding of the Cosmos, they describe human relation within the epic of evolution thusly: 
the human being within the universe is a sounding board within a musical  
instrument. Our mathematics and our poetry are the merest echoes of the  
universe entire. We are unable to capture more than fragments, even ciphers of 
fragments, in our most exalted moments. Even so, as we become captivated by the 
quantitative aspects of our knowledge of the epistemological concerns of our knowing, 
often forget this deeper psychic dimension of things that activated our awareness. We 
enter a narrowing of human reality and take the sounding board for the whole. Poetry and 
the depths of soul emerge from the human world because the inner form of the mountains 
and the numinous quality of the sky have activated these depths in the human. Just as 
with carbon, we can analyze a mountain into the form of rock and the type of mineral that 
compose the mountain. Mountains can also be understood as agencies in the world, 
participating in the ongoingness of the universe. That is, mountains act, and in a 
multivalent way. They sculpt the cycles of the hydrosphere and atmosphere. They shape 
the climates and thus the biology of the local region. And particular mountains also stun 
at least some of the animals. A human being, for instance, can climb a mountain and get 
hit by something so profound, at so deep a level, that the human will never be quite the 
same. This precise feeling will not occur on the ocean or in a cave or a valley. Other sorts 
of experience will take place there. This specific moment will emerge only in the 
presence of the mountain; it is evoked out of potentiality by the mountain. The dynamic 
of the mountain is accomplishing something in the universe, is acting, is altering reality. 
From our quantum perspective on evolutionary cosmology, we can approach the reality 
of a human stunned by a particular mountain only through a series of negatives. It is not 
accurate to say that the human has invented or created these feelings all by itself. It is not 
accurate to imagine that these feelings are present objectively in such a form within the 
mountain. It is not accurate to think that these same feelings would happen if a different 
sentient being were there, or a different mountain. The feelings are neither subjective 
fantasies of the animal nor simply objective experiences of the mountain. Such profound 
feelings, such emotions that are even tinged with personal significance and with hints of 
destiny, are the mutual evocation of mountain, animal, world. Depth communication of 
primordial existence is the reality at the foundation of all being. Humans give voice to 
their most exalted and terrible feelings only because they find themselves immersed in 
the universe filled with such awesome realities. The inner depths of each being in the 
universe is activated by the surrounding universe.267  
 
This passage conveys the grandeur I discussed in chapter one. Our math, poetry, and other 
creative endeavors, they write, try to speak to the magnificence of the universe but it slips 
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beyond our abilities. Compellingly, at first glance The Universe Story attributes nonhuman 
nature some stunning agentic capacity. Mountains are not inert matter but rather sculpt the 
environment around them. The mountain acts in the life processes of its home.  Meditating on 
one of Earth’s most awe-inspiring formations, Swimme and Berry infuse a sense of mystery into 
contemplating carbon and atmospheric cycles by writing humans, and “some” other animals, 
relate instinctively to these processes affectively though perhaps in ways that we do not fully 
understand. “Some” mountains have the agentic capacity to move us and our reverberating 
wonder, attempts to capture that mystery and ensure its continuation, is our role.  
Perhaps they have a certain mountain in mind, or a personal mountaintop experience to 
relate to, but the agentic capacity of mountains becomes more insubstantial in the particulars. 
These feelings are connected to the mountain—other locales will conjure other feelings and 
while the feelings are “evoked out of potentiality by the mountain” not all beings will be 
moved.268 Furthermore, Swimme and Berry argue the emotions do not originate in human 
subjectivity, nor are they an inherent property of the mountain, but rather formed in relationship, 
the “mutual evocation of the mountain, animal, world.”269 So why this mountain? Any 
mountain? Which “sentient” beings? Does all material have agentic capacities or just particular 
materials? What are the conditions of possibility that allow one to be awed by a particular 
mountain? Swimme and Berry do not expand but there are some clues to implicit positioning of 
the human in relationship to nonhuman others as they continue: 
the capacity within human awareness to hear and respond to the  
spontaneities of the universe was deeply appreciated by primal peoples of every 
continent. In order to approach their genius we need to recognize in the vast diversity of 
their cultural expressions an insistence on establishing a close relationship with the 
psychic depths of the universe. Their aim was a life in resonant participation with the 
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rhythms of reality. For this reason the drum became their primary instrument. The drum 
was part of the sacred techniques for orchestrating the unity of the human universe dance. 
The drumbeat and, more broadly, the songs, chants, and dances of our ancestors 
expressed the visions and dreams awakened in them by the spirit work, by those 
dimensions of nature beyond the phenomenal world, but integral with materiality—the 
wild dimension of the universe . . . Tonight on every continent humans will look into the 
edge of the Milky Way, the band of stars our ancestors compared to a road, a pathway to 
heaven, a flowing river of milk. Formed by the seemingly insignificant ripples in the birth 
of the universe, this milky band has been activating its stars with its own fluctuating 
waves for ten billion years, and when we stare at it, we stare back at our own generative 
matrix. New ripples in the fabric of space-time, we humans ponder those primal ripples 
that called us into being. The vibrations and fluctuations in the universe are the music that 
drew forth the galaxies and stars and their power of weaving elements into life. Not to 
hear such music? If autism or deafness had interrupted the music at any time in this 
fifteen-billion-year event, the symphony would have suddenly gone silent.270 Our human 
responsibility as one voice among so many throughout the universe is to develop our 
capacities to listen as incessantly as the hovering hydrogen atoms, as profoundly as our 
primal ancestors and their faithful descendant’s in today’s indigenous peoples. The 
adventure of the universe depends upon our capacity to listen. Humans tonight will watch 
the Milky Way galaxy not only with eyes, but also with radio telescopes, satellites, and 
computer-guided optical telescopes, with minds trained by the intricate theories of the 
composition, structure, and dynamic evolution of matter. Though we wait as faithfully as 
the ancient Inuit who stared eye-to-eye with a blue-black whale, we will not see a galactic 
eye blinking back at us. Though we may be as dedicated to the wild spirit of the night 
sky, no eye of the universe will appear from behind a cloud. Nor do we need such an 
experience to realize what that ancient hunter came to realize. For after such long 
centuries of inquiry, we find that the universe developed over fifteen billion years, and 
that the eye that searches the Milky Way galaxy is itself an eye shaped by the Milky 
Way. The mind that searches for contact with the Milky Way is the very mind of the 
Milky Way galaxy in search of its inner depths.271 
 
Here, humans are inherently drawn to these sacred mysteries, the same mystery that makes up 
our very being, and we should strive to listen to the reverberations of the universe—mysteries 
that have always captivated us. Swimme and Berry appeal to “primal” humans, their 
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“descendants” in contemporary indigenous peoples, and their fascination with the workings of 
the material world as the best examples to follow for this attunement. While much of Universe 
Story feels under cited, with their appeal to the primal, mystery, and humans celebrating sacred 
mysteries I was, again, expecting a gesture to Mircea Eliade here. In chapter one I speculated 
that Eliade’s ambivalence about whether or not the natural world itself can be sacred rather than 
only a manifestation of the sacred might render his conception of sacrality less helpful for efforts 
to sacralize all material in the universe. But here, contemplating human and nonhuman relation, 
agentic capacity, and being, Swimme and Berry seem to echo Eliade’s conceptions of sacrality. 
Manuel Vásquez writes that Eliade believes “modernity has disenchanted reality, dulling our 
sense for the sacred” thus the “scholar of religion should not be primarily interested in 
contemporary experiences of the sacred.”272 In order to understand the power of the sacred, 
Eliade argues, scholars should turn their attentions to “primitive man”:  
 the man of archaic societies tends to live as much as possible in the sacred or  
in close proximity to consecrated objects. The tendency is perfectly understandable, 
because, for primitives as for the man of all pre-modern societies, the sacred is equivalent 
to power, and in the last analysis, to reality. The sacred is saturated with being. Sacred 
power means reality and at the same time enduringness and efficacy. The polarity sacred-
profane is often expressed as an opposition between real and unreal or psuedoreal. Thus, 
it is easy to understand that religious man deeply desires to be, to participate in reality, to 
be saturated with power.273 
 
It is important to remember, though, as Vásquez highlights in his critique of Eliade’s work, in 
“approaching so-called primitive societies, Eliade is not interested in the particularities of the 
ethnos. He does not aspire to construct a painstaking ‘thick description’ of the native’s local, 
ever-changing intersubjective world, as an interpretive ethnographer working in Clifford 
Geertz’s mold would.” Instead: 
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Eliade is interested in the ‘primitive man’ as the privileged point of entry in the journey 
toward the origins of religion . . . Eliade wants to study early peoples because he thinks 
they provide an open window to the essence of humanity, which in illo tempore was 
inextricably bound up with the sacred . . . What the historian of religion is ultimately after 
is ‘the original religious matrix’ that grounds our Dasein, to use a Heideggerian term. 
S/he seeks to ‘grasp the permanence of what has been called man’s specific existential 
situation of ‘being in the world,’ for the experience of the sacred is its correlate. In fact, 
becoming aware of his own mode of being and assuming his presence in the world 
together constitute a ‘religious experience.’274 
 
Through pursuing what Vásquez calls his “religious ontology,” Eliade “leads away from history, 
materiality, and praxis” toward transcendent “divine archetypes.”275 Thus Eliade, Russell 
McCutcheon argues, “sets up an implicit distinction between the study of religious aspects of 
human life and the study of that which is expressed in these varied forms, the study of the sacred 
conceived as an ahistorical agent that operates outside and through the natural world.”276 
Reading Eliade alongside the more cosmic iterations of new cosmology, like Swimme and 
Berry’s Universe Story, leads me to believe that these authors, like Eliade, might be sensitive to 
the dizzying array of material in our universe that humans throughout history have deemed 
sacred, but they are less interested in encountering materiality on its own terms. If they are 
pointing toward some essential sacred and archetypal human, attuned toward more abstract, 
ahistorical, and transcendent conceptions of materiality, the question becomes—can this sacred 
be accessed through damaged environments? What is our role as humans in devastated 
landscapes, to ignore our present entanglements and celebrate healthier environments? Should 
we invest in them in hopes that the awe and wonder new cosmology advocates transcends 
histories of fear, abandonment, and vulnerability in this particular locale? Perhaps these sacrifice 
zones must also be sacrificed to the essential sacred?    
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While Berry and Swimme acknowledge the agentic capacity of some material to affect us 
through our feelings of awe, wonder, and reverence, their agency seems confined to these 
movements. To truly recognize the agency of nonhuman others, however, would also require 
recognizing their ability to surprise and repel us, their ambivalence to our existence, and their 
recalcitrance to our desires. New cosmology appeals to the language of sacrality to afford 
nonhuman material higher status in our collective conscious. It is not mere inert matter but 
integral in relationship to all the other marvelous parts of the universe including everything that 
makes up who we are as humans. In its reliance on more transcendent conceptions of sacrality, 
new cosmology is left without the tools to encounter and address the particulars on location, 
historicity, and socio-cultural resonance. However, as I will unfold in the next chapter, it is the 
particulars of encounter that determine how we affect and are affected by our environments and 
all the beings that dwell within them.  
So why hold onto sacrality at all? Why not dismiss this tangle as too loaded for 
contemporary ecological concerns? As is also the case in their use of “kinship,” I contend that 
new cosmology authors have a much more intriguing concept in the works than they realize. If 
we hold onto sacred as emotional investment and an accompanying kinship ethic while still 
allowing for the complexities of environmental degradation, it opens up religion and ecology to 
an array of fascinating inquiries. What if we claim the Gulf Coast and all its inhabitants, some 
damaged, deformed, ill, and mutated, with unsettling pasts and complicated futures as sacred? 
Rather than arguing it was once sacred and could be again or potentially made sacred through 
salvific hopes, what might be possible through arguing it is sacred as is— a landscape filled with 
beloveds that matter? What work is being done/needs to be done to keep the coast as our ultimate 
concern? Can we speak about the Gulf as a place of power not in its purity, but as it is, was, and 




While new cosmology discourse offers a twist to discussions of space and place in its 
curious orientation toward cosmic spatiality, I find work in sacred space helpful for making the 
case that the uses of the language of sacrality in new cosmology are themselves political acts, 
engendered through ritual and emotion, often at the expense of particular bodies, locales, 
histories, and communities. Work in religious studies on “the contested category of the sacred,” 
David Chidester and Edward Linenthal argue, generally falls within two “broad lines of 
definition . . . one substantial, one situational.”277 Substantial definitions of the sacred, like those 
employed in “Rudolph Otto’s ‘holy,’ Gerardus van der Leeuw’s ‘power,’ or Mircea Eliade’s 
‘real,’” they claim are attempts to “replicate an insider’s evocation of certain experiential 
qualities that can be associated with the sacred” described affectively as “uncanny,” “awesome, 
or powerful manifestation of reality, full of ultimate significance.”278 Van der Leeuw, they argue, 
“attributed sole, transcendent, and ultimate agency to sacred power” maintaining the sacred 
“positioned itself in the world.”279 In contrast, situational analysis, they summarize, traces back 
to Émile Durkheim and locates “the sacred at the nexus of human practices and social projects” 
insisting that “nothing is inherently sacred.”280 These perspectives, including Arnold van 
Gennep, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Jonathan Z. Smith, regard the sacred as an “adjectival or 
verbal form, a sign of difference that can be assigned to virtually anything,” what van Gennep 
calls the “pivoting of the sacred,” “through the human labor of consecration.”281 The sacred is 
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thus the “by-product of this work of sacralization.”282 Reengaging conceptions of the sacred, 
Kim Knott writes, with “social and cultural constructionist approaches from anthropology and 
sociology,” Smith provocatively argues, “‘human beings are not placed, they bring place into 
being,’ and they do this—at least in the case of sacred places—through ritual. Ritual, that 
creative process whereby people make a meaningful world that they can inhabit, ‘is not . . . a 
response to ‘the sacred’; rather, something or someone is made sacred by ritual.’”283 
The division between the two perspectives is most contested, Chidester and Linenthal 
claim, when regarding sacred space. Eliade, again, maintains that the sacred “errupted, 
manifested, or appeared in certain places, causing them to become powerful centers of 
meaningful worlds.”284 In contrast, Smith demonstrates how “place is sacralized as the result of 
the cultural labor of ritual, in specific historical situations involving the hard work of attention, 
memory, design, construction, and control of place.”285 Regardless of where one’s position falls 
between the “poetics and the politics of sacred space,” and work in new cosmology seems to 
dabble in both, Chidester and Linenthal argue that within theory on sacred space “construction 
and contestation has always been a subtext, even in attempts to work out a substantial, 
essentialist definition of the sacred.”286 Even Van der Leeuw, they claim, while cultivating a 
romantic poetics of sacred space in his enthusiasm for “natural sacred sites, the forests and 
caverns, rocks and mountains, waterfalls and springs” seemed to recognize “the very category 
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‘nature’ was a nineteenth-century invention.”287 They argue that Van der Leeuw understood 
“every establishment of sacred place was a conquest of space” in that embattled “selection, 
orientation,” and limitation are involved in claiming something as sacred.288 Furthermore, in his 
work on the sanctity of homes functioning through reinforced boundaries, Van der Leeuw raises 
the “possibility that a politics of exclusion might be an integral part of the making of sacred 
space,” in that boundaries determine who is inside and outside of sacred space.289 For Van der 
Leeuw the most sacred places were far removed from human access and, resonant with new 
cosmology arguments that humans lost their  orientation in the cosmos and long for new 
narratives, the “most authentic religious experience in relation to sacred space was 
homesickness.”290  
Explicitly recognizing, however, “the politics of position and property, exclusion and 
exile” inherent within conceptions of the sacred, Chidester, Linenthal, and Knott argue, opens up 
new opportunities for understanding how the sacred is “produced and reproduced” in America. 
One, “we can identify sacred space as ritual space” that might “enact a myth, signal a transition, 
reinforce political authority, or express emotion” through spatial practice.291 These spatial 
practices are performed “in conscious tension with the way things are normally perceived to be 
in the ordinary world” with ritual acts of “worship, sacrifice, prayer, meditation, pilgrimage” and 
ceremony working to consecrate these spaces as sacred by “producing the distinctive quality and 
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character of sacred space.”292 The human body and its ritualized disciplines, they argue, are 
crucial for the production of sacred space. Our bodies, in “gestures and rhythms, its speaking, 
eating, and excreting, situate embodied practices in place.”293 Furthermore, in conversation with 
Veikko Anttonen, Knott argues that the interactions of mind, body, space, and place are 
fundamental to the production of sacred as a limit or  “category boundary,” working even on a 
“preconceptual level” to produce “cognitive categorization and its cultural applications of the 
notions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and third space between them, the boundary.”294 “The 
boundaries between body, territory and beyond,” Knott writes, “become culturally dependent 
cognitive markers” for determining which entities, places, spaces, and communities have value. 
295 
Significantly, once we recognize that embodied practices can consecrate, Chidester and 
Linenthal contend, we understand “they can also desecrate a sacred space. Throughout the 
history of religions, the production of sacred space has depended upon control over purity” with 
the management and controlling of bodily functions, habits, and movements “required for the 
production and maintenance of sacred space.”296 While different religions and cultures have 
different perspectives on purity and defilement, Chidester and Linenthal argue that “rigorous 
discipline of the body” in the concerns of purity is prevalent in American religious 
perspectives.297 For example, they gesture toward American theologian Jonathan Edwards who 
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declared, “‘this world is all over dirty. Everywhere it is covered with that which tends to defile 
the feet of the traveler.’”298 From Edward’s perspective, they write, “body and soul had to be 
defended from defilement” and “the body itself was a microcosm of the defiling world. ‘The 
inside of the body of man,’ Edwards held, ‘is full of filthiness, contains his bowels that are full of 
dung, which represents the corruption and filthiness that the heart of man is naturally full of.’ In 
a world so thoroughly defiled, almost nothing can be done to establish purity. It cannot be 
constructed through ritual but must depend upon an unmerited grace. Nevertheless, American 
heirs of Jonathan Edwards have persisted in observing various ritualized practices for exercise 
control over the body in the interest of establishing purity in a defiling world.”299  
 Two, Chidester and Linenthal contended “sacred space is significant space, a site, 
orientation, or set of relations subject to interpretation because it focuses crucial questions about 
what it means to be a human being in a meaningful world.”300  Sacred space serves as a means 
for “grounding classifications and orientations in reality, giving particular force to the 
meaningful focus gained through these aspects of a worldview.”301 As significant space, sacred 
space asks what it means to be human by focusing on “classification of persons, carving out a 
place for a human identity that can be distinguished from superhuman persons, perhaps to be 
worshiped, and those classified as subhuman who can be excluded, manipulated, dominated, 
degraded, or sacrificed.”302 To understand these spaces and their ontological resonances 
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“considerable attention will have to be paid to the interpretive labors” invested in making these 
spaces significant.303 For the sacralization of “natural”  environments in American history, 
American Indian religious practice, “the spiritual politics of modern environmentalists,” 304 and 
“religious interpretation of land and landscape,” what Catherine Albanese calls “nature religion,” 
defines an “open set of interpretive strategies for investing the natural environment with sacred 
significance.”305 It is important to remember, though, that “all this interpretive industry” should 
convince us to recognize that nature is always a cultural product.306 While nineteenth century 
“romantic naturalism transferred a sacred web of sentiment from God to nature” thus tying 
natural spaces to emotions and rituals “formerly reserved for a majestic God,”307 it did so only by 
obscuring the “economic production, packaging, and presentation of natural environments in 
America” and the military conquests on First Nations lands and peoples that guaranteed access to 
these spaces.308 Furthermore, the wilderness spaces that remain in the U.S., spaces one could 
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claim as sacred in their separation from humans, are still thoroughly cultural productions of 
space through the political gymnastics required to reserve them as protected American 
investments with recorded profits.309  
Three, Chidester and Linenthal insist on recognizing sacred space as fundamentally 
contested space. While poetic perspectives like Eliade’s “view sacred space as simply ‘given’ or 
‘revealed,” it is inevitably “entangled with the entrepreneurial, the social, the political, and other 
‘profane’ forces,” that take part in setting sacred space apart.310 Where space is located, what and 
whom is located within it, what and whom is protected, all these questions are essential to its 
existence as sacred but these questions also “open or foreclose possible futures” by determining 
narratives that give shape to public memory and public sentiment, as in the case of monuments, 
memorials, shrines, etc.311 Environmental movements are no strangers to the contested character 
of sacred space. Chidester and Linenthall gesture to the work of radical environmentalists whose 
“dramatic rituals of resistance, from civil disobedience to industrial sabotage, in defense of what 
they have perceived as a sacred natural order” mobilize the tools they outline including, 
“innovative myths, rituals, and forms of communal organization.”312 Environmental activism 
shows “how sacred space is perceived as sacred precisely because it is always in danger of 
desecration.”313 
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What is obvious from all this scholarship on the sacred is that “sacred” is overripe with 
meaning. Sacred is shaped by legacies of construction that undoubtedly seep into our 
contemporary usage. While new cosmology authors are not explicit about whom they draw from 
while invoking the sacred, their usage is nevertheless in conversation with this scholarship. 
Along these lines, it would be a productive exercise for new cosmology authors, and for religion 
and ecology as a subdiscipline, to think more about the politics of the sacred by asking if their 
implicit conceptions of “sacred” require investments in particular boundaries and which places, 
spaces, and peoples are kept outside these boundaries. For those invested in Chidester and 
Linenthal call “poetic” conceptions of the sacred like Eliade’s, if they regard nonhuman others as 
inherently sacred and affectively experience their resonating power and significance, does 
environmental decline impact nature’s power? Will there come a time when we no longer have 
ideal natural spaces to gesture toward to anchor this power? Politically, if these authors believe 
nature is made sacred through cultural labors then how does new cosmology participate in the 
work of sacralization? Which rituals do they employ to control this sacralization?314 If new 
cosmology wants to reconceptualize the sacred, what conceptions must they explicitly resist? 
Which emotions, bodies, and habitats should we use, or conversely ignore, to anchor this 
worldview? What cultural tools do we use to produce this new sacrality? I will return to purity 
and defilement in the next chapter, but it is important to ask ourselves about these persistent 
divisions and how we police the embodied boundaries consciously and unconsciously. If we 
argue that interactions of mind, body, space, and place are fundamental to the production of the 
sacred, then how do we see the results of environmental racism and degradation impacting these 
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interactions? This legacy of abuse and abandonment in the Gulf region shapes bodies and 
landscapes, experiences and relationships thus would it not also impact the interactions that 
produce the sacred? Finally, has the conscious and unconscious refusal to cultivate the sacred 
within environmental decline determined possible futures for portions of the planet? Might 
insistence on cultivating the sacred within environmental destruction open possible futures for 
devastated landscapes?   
 
Silt Traces  
Nuanced environmental theory on the Gulf must negotiate brutal inheritances: 
sedimented histories of racial injustice, “disposability as structural violence,”315 and legacies of 
toxic exposure. These constellations makeup the everyday affective worlds along the Gulf 
coast— the murky, mucky, frustrating work left after the spectacles have passed out of so many 
attention spans. On Grand Isle, Leanne Sarco points to an economic/affective investment in the 
birds over the crabs, but there’s also something particularly jarring about oil slick birds with their 
dripping wings stuck at grotesque angles that captures the affective compulsion of the 
spectacular versus the quotidian. Publicly attending to the birds while offstage ordering the 
disposal of live crabs was the most expedient way to return to business-as-usual for BP but the 
“death of the disregarded”316 still reverberates— so many crab bodies, so many floating black 
bodies in New Orleans. How do these persistent exclusions, abandonments, exposures, and 
trauma leave traces in bodies, communities, landscapes? Do these histories affect us like our 
biophilic resonances? How might future encounters be influenced by these vulnerabilities? In 
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these complex economies, hopes that teaching sacred cosmologies would result in compassion 
for our nonhuman genetic kin seem naïve but resistance to challenging the political limitations of 
sacred natures discourse leaves us at an impasse. In the next two chapters, I pick-at our 
discomfort with devastation by asking, what if the geographical wounds Belden Lane romances 
in our opening epigraph were less hyperbolic and more actual material and psychic wounds? 
How might we speak to persistent wounds of place that include: attachments to toxic homes, 
affinity with damaged creatures and eroding coastlines, longing for places and spaces washed 
away by the floods, vulnerability to toxic risks, chemical sensitivities, and post-traumatic stress? 
While we consider affinity and attachment with/to nonhuman others, how might we also witness 
to the politics of geography, recovery, and environmental impact? In the next chapter, I model 
the methodological alliances that will be necessary for religion and ecology to begin theorizing 
this chaotic jumble of historical and pressing injustices, hurting bodies and minds, tired 
















Disastrous Intimacies  
 
 
“There’s nothing left of Buras now or the rest of lower Plaquemines Parish. It was crowded with 
collapsed homes and upside-down schoolhouses and buildings speared through by flying 
telephone poles. Shrimp boats lie wrapped around the legs of fallen water towers in roadways 
crowded with unmoored barges and dead cows. That’s what happens when a Category 4 
hurricane arrives with 125-mile-per-hour winds and a twenty-foot surge tide and no barrier 
islands or marshes to slow it down. As the storm continued it crashed into New Orleans and the 
coast of Mississippi, images of its destruction were now seared into our national consciousness: 
the Superdome and I-10 overpass, the Convention Center and the 17th Street canal levee, hungry 
looters, starving pets, and cadavers left on sidewalks or wrapped in sheets by the dozens in 
hospital chapels. And local, state, and federal rescue efforts failed to respond adequately—or not 
at all. One storm, long foreseen in all its details, laid bare more of our deepest fault lines as a 
nation- fault lines of poverty, race, health care, national security, the environment, and energy.” 
Mike Tidwell, Bayou Farewell317 
 
“Hurricanes are Satan’s gumbo, environmental gumbo, gumbo with toxic flavors—Swamp New 
Orleans is a filthy bathtub.” Jerry W. Ward, Jr., The Katrina Papers318 
 
Disasters like Katrina, Rita, and BP lend a particularly strange resonance to conceptions 
of intimacy. Purely in spatial terms, whether it be through adjusting to living with strangers in 
shelters, trying to get a feel for new neighborhoods and homes, sorting through the wreckage for 
one’s belongings and treasures, or walking familiar paths altered by erosion, pollution, and 
debris, disasters dislocate familiarity and bring foreign objects and bodies into close proximity. 
Intimacy as part of human relational life is similarly impacted by disaster as humans mourn the 
loss of or disconnection from lovers, family, friends, and neighbors, as they care for physically 
and mentally ill loved ones in the aftermath, and through dealing with the stresses recovery, 
relocation, and rebuilding bring into relationships. Finally, in terms of familiarity with one’s own 
body, disasters like these invite unsettling changes into our daily embodiments. Dealing with the 
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emotional trauma of superstorms and their aftermath, healing from wounds physically and 
emotionally, negotiating toxic exposures and what the future might bring, disasters can make us 
particularly disfamiliar with the bodies we once thought we knew, the homes we were familiar 
with, the other bodies we love/d while simultaneously bringing us into intimate relation with 
some truly frightening material. For approaches in religion and ecology that are affectively 
grounded in connection and encourage deepening intimacy with nonhuman others, these realities 
stir up a distressing stew of questions. How do we relate to human and nonhuman others within 
ecological systems that are incredibly damaged? What does intimacy in these environments look 
and feel like? Should religion and ecology continue to encourage deepening affinities and 
attachments within devastated landscapes? 
Troubling both the assumed “human” and the “relationship” in new cosmology onto-
ethical ideals for human/nonhuman relationships, I argue that this scholarship’s conception of the 
human is more discrete, impervious, and rational than realities on the Gulf afford. Understanding 
complex life in devastated landscapes, I contend, requires an ontology without sharp divisions 
and an affective attunement that puzzles through our unsettling intimacies with others. To do this 
will require resources that will enable us to think about what an orientation toward life that digs 
into quotidian relations in a gravely damaged environment might entail. Employing material 
feminisms and feminist genealogies of affect theory, in this chapter I discuss the co-constitutive 
materiality of the organic and inorganic residents that exist in this devastated landscape as well 
as the affective economies that bind them together as communities in crisis.319 While scholarship 
in religion and ecology is rich in emotional language, historically appealing to the power of 
emotional investment as locus for green movements/theology within religious communities, 
there has yet to be engagement with growing scholarship in affect theory that digs into 
                                                        




embodiment, everyday sensation, and the social construction of emotion. Thus, integrating affect 
theory in this project serves not only to challenge some of the assumptions within religion and 
ecology about the affective structure of affinity and attachment but also as a constructive 
exercise to demonstrate what affect theory has to offer the interdisciplinary commitments of the 
subdiscipline. Furthermore, since humans experience the planet as embodied, sensing creatures, I 
contend that work in religion and ecology that considers space, place, and emotional 
relationships with “nature” must take these embodied realities into account and not all 
embodiments are represented equally by scholarship. Consequently, I rely primarily on work in 
material feminisms and feminist genealogies of affect theory to insist that the kinds of bodies we 
have and the cultural legacies they bear matter. Here, I will question what we mean by “religious 
emotions” and if emotions like awe, wonder, and reverence are as universal or rationally chosen 
as new cosmology contends.  By way of scaffolding for the chapter: first, puzzling through what 
it means to be human post-disaster I consider how the ontologies of what some scholars are 
calling the “nonhuman turn” offer a very different vision to new cosmology by contending that 
we are always already a body vulnerable to that which is toxic. Second, I draw from affect theory 
to understand what emotions do: what cultural conditions make certain feelings possible or not 
possible, how emotions bind particular bodies together and against others, and how affective 
spaces, through the production of felt difference, teach us what to value and desire.  
 
Material Feminisms 
“With Katrina, there was a question of responsibility, and blame. New Orleans is associated in 
the public imagination with the enjoyment of sex, unhealthy food, drinking. It was somehow like 
the country was saying to the city, ‘Let’s look at your life decisions. What did you expect when 
you were wearing that sexy dress?’” Eve Troeh for NPR320 
                                                        








“I drive around and try to figure out those Byzantine markings and symbols that the cops and the 
National Guards spray-painted on all the houses around here, cryptic communications that tell 
the story of who or what was or wasn’t inside the house when the floodwater rose to the ceiling. 
In some cases, there’s no interpretation needed. There’s one I pass on St. Roch Avenue in the 8th 
Ward at least once a week. It says: ‘1 dead in attic.’ 
That certainly sums up the situation. No mystery there. It’s spray painted there on the front of the 
house and it probably will remain spray-painted there for weeks, months, maybe years, a 
perpetual reminder of the untimely passing of a citizen, a resident, a New Orleanian. 
One of us … 
I wonder who eventually came and took 1 Dead in Attic away. Who knows? Hell, with the way 
things run around here—I wonder if anyone has come to take 1 Dead in Attic away. And who 
claimed him or her? Who grieved over 1 Dead in Attic and who buried 1 Dead in Attic? Was 
there anyone with him or her at the end of what was the last thing they said to each other? How 
did 1 Dead in Attic spend the last weekend in August of the year 2005? What were their plans? 
Maybe dinner at Mandich on St. Claude? Maybe a Labor Day family reunion in City Park—one 
of those raucous picnics where everyone wears matching T-shirts to mark the occasion and they 
rent a DJ and a SpaceWalk and a couple of guys actually get there the night before to secure a 
good, shady spot? 
I wonder if I ever met 1 Dead in Attic. Maybe in the course of my job or maybe at a Saints game 
or maybe we one stood next to each other at a Mardi Gras parade or maybe we once flipped each 
other off in a traffic jam. 
1 Dead in Attic could have been my mail carrier, a waitress at my favorite restaurant or the guy 
who burglarized my house a couple years ago. Who knows? 
My wife is right. I’ve got to quit just randomly driving around. This can’t be helping anything. 
But I can’t stop.” 
Chris Rose, “1 Dead in Attic,” The Times-Picayune321 
 
 
 Enveloped within what some scholars are calling the “non-human turn,”322 material 
feminisms and affect theory negotiate frustrations with the representational theory of linguistic 
methodologies in the 1970s-1990s.323 Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman argue that the linguistic 
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turn’s “complex analyses of the interconnections between power, knowledge, subjectivity, and 
language” was incredibly productive for feminist scholarship allowing us “to understand how 
gender has been articulated with other volatile markings, such as class, race, and sexuality, 
within cultural systems of difference that function like a language.”324 Deconstructing the 
gendered dichotomies that “ground Western thought: culture/nature, mind/body, subject/object, 
rational/emotional,” etc., postmodern linguistic theory, particularly in its feminist forms, 
“exposed the pernicious logic that casts woman as subordinated, inferior, a mirror of the same, or 
all but invisible.”325 However, a growing conversation among feminist theorists of the body, the 
sciences, and the environment326 argue there are troubling liabilities within linguistic projects. 
Particularly problematic is that while “postmoderns claim to reject all dichotomies, there is one 
dichotomy that they appear to embrace almost without question: language/reality” by insisting 
that the “real/material is entirely constituted by language.”327 Resisting the “epistemology of 
modernism” that is “grounded in objective access to a real/natural world,” linguistic theory, 
material feminists claim, was uncomfortable with concepts of “the real” or “the material” and 
insisted “what we call the real is a product of language and has its reality only in language.”328 
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Despite the importance of “discursive critique and rearticulation for feminist scholarship and 
feminist politics,” this discursive realm is “nearly always constituted as to foreclose attention to 
lived, material bodies and evolving corporeal practices” making it difficult to cultivate 
scholarship that rethinks materiality, “the very ‘stuff’ of bodies and natures.”329 Some linguistic 
theory, Susan Bordo argues, functions best “at the expense of attention to the body’s material 
locatedness in history, practice, and culture.”330 Furthermore, “this overly narrow focus on power 
as a discourse, in turn, severely limits our capacity to explore and confront the multiple physical 
ways (beyond symbolic violence) in which power impinges on the bodies of women,” people of 
color, queer communities, and nonhuman others.331 “Our materiality,” Bordo writes, “(which 
includes history, race, gender, and so forth, but also the biology and evolutionary history of our 
bodies, and our dependence on the natural environment) impinges on us—shapes, constrains, and 
empowers us—both as thinkers and knowers, and also as ‘practical,’ fleshy bodies.”332  
Focusing on materiality is understandably contentious for feminism, since western 
thought historically relegated women to the maligned domain of “irrational” nonhuman nature. 
Resisting persistent cultural Cartesianism, some feminists, like Monique Wittig and Gayle 
Rubin, advocate that feminist critique should retreat from notions of “nature” that make it 
treacherous (misogyny, “essentialism, biological determinism, homophobia, and racism”) in 
favor of language and culture.333 However retreating from these discussions only “serves to 
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calcify nature as a solid ground for heterosexist infrastructure.”334 Furthermore, the exclusive 
focus on “representations, ideology, and discourse” has made it difficult for feminist theory to 
engage with the sciences in any “innovative, productive, or affirming way” pushing 
environmental feminisms to the margins and leaving feminists struggling to respond to massive 
ecological problems like climate change, species erasure, and environmental disasters. 335   
 Central to this methodology, and most compelling for future work in religion and 
ecology, are material feminism’s innovative approaches to agency and ethics. In response to the 
question, do all mountains have agentic capacity, material feminists would respond in the 
affirmative as well as include all the material, human and nonhuman, existing on the planet. 
Material feminists redefine our understanding of the “relationships among the natural, the 
human, and the nonhuman” by developing theories that insist nonhuman nature is “more than a 
passive social construct but is, rather, an agentic force,” what Jane Bennett terms vital 
materiality, “the material agency or effectivity of nonhuman or not-quite-human things.”336 Vital 
materialisms regard nonhuman others as “bona fide agents . . . actors alongside and within us”337 
that interact with and change the “other elements in the mix, including the human.”338 For this 
scholarship, “nature ‘punches back’ at humans and the machines they construct to explore it in 
ways that we cannot predict.”339 Understanding nonhuman others as vital agents requires, these 
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scholars contend, rethinking what it means to be a human in the mix. I will expand more on some 
of these conceptions later in the chapter but three of these interactionist ontologies are 
particularly helpful. Susan Hekman argues that modernist ontologies assumed a “fixed reality 
about which we seek absolute knowledge” and that humans can have “unmediated knowledge of 
an objective world.”340 Consequently, postmodern linguistic theorists are leery of discussing 
ontology in favor of epistemology, demonstrating how our knowledge production is shaped by 
language. Material feminists, and other material theorists, Hekman contends, return to ontology 
by arguing yes, our “knowledge is always mediated by concepts, and, in many cases, technology 
as well” but she insists these concepts and theories also have material consequences.341 “There is 
a world out there,” Hekman argues, “that shapes and constrains the consequences of the concepts 
we employ to understand it,” and ourselves.342 
Hekman draws from the work of contemporary philosopher of science, Andrew 
Pickering, who brings “the material world back into the equation of science” by arguing “the 
world is filled with agency; it is continually doing things that bear on us.”343 Attempting to 
develop a  “performative’ image of science, in which science is regarded as a field of powers, 
capacities, and performances, situated in machinic captures of material agency,” Pickering resists 
normative representational conceptions of science. 344 These approaches position science as “an 
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activity that seeks to represent nature, to produce knowledge that maps, mirrors, or corresponds 
to how the world really is” and are, thus, plagued by a “set of fears about the adequacy of 
scientific representations that constitute the familiar philosophical problematics of realism and 
objectivity.”345 While work since the 1970s, particularly on the sociology of scientific knowledge 
and reflexive science studies, troubles this model (and cultural studies has already somewhat 
embraced nonrepresentational theory) it continues to shape our contemporary understandings of 
science.346 But, Pickering contends, there are other ways to think about science—one can start 
from the idea that “the world is filled not, in the first instance, with facts and observations, but 
with agency. The world, I want to say, is continually doing things, things that bear upon us not as 
observation statements upon disembodied intellects but as forces upon material beings . . . much 
of everyday life, I would say, has this character of coping with material agency, agency that 
comes at us from outside the human realm and that cannot be reduced to anything within that 
realm.”347 Within this material agency, Pickering situates the human thusly: “scientists are 
human agents in a field of material agency which they struggle to capture in machines. Further, 
human and material agency are reciprocally and emergently intertwined in this struggle. Their 
contours emerge in the temporality of practice and are definitional of and sustain one another. 
Existing culture constitutes the surface of emergence for the intentional structure of scientific 
practice and such practice consists in the reciprocal tuning of human and material agency, tuning 
that can itself reconfigure human intentions.”348 This onto-theory he characterizes as the mangle, 
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resonant in some ways with Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage, and it is an impure mixing up of 
everything together, “the human and the nonhuman, the material and the discursive,” that 
produces unpredictable results.349 “Human and material agency,” he writes, are reciprocally and 
emergently intertwined . . . their contours emerge in the temporality of practice and are 
definitional of and sustain one another.”350 The “mangle,” he writes, highlights that the 
“contours” themselves of “material and social agency are mangled in practice.”351 Human 
intention, practice, machines, nonhuman material, philosophies of science, conceptions of nature, 
all are “emergently intertwined.”352 What Pickering calls his ‘mangle realism” is grounded in the 
very understanding that “how the material world is leaks into and infects our representations of it 
in a nontrivial and consequential fashion.’”353  
 A second vital concept of co-constitutive materiality is Nancy Tuana’s viscous porosity. 
In “Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina,” Tuana thinks about the city of New Orleans in the 
wake of Katrina in a way that embraces “an ontology that rematerializes the social and takes 
seriously the agency of the natural.”354 Viscous porosity, Tuana argues, is an interactionist 
ontology that emphasizes “emergent interplay” and the “in-between of the complex interrelations 
from which phenomena emerge.”355 Kin to Pickering’s “dance of agency” in mangled realism 
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and Donna Haraway’s “material-semiotic,” Tuana’s ontology seen through “the eye of Katrina 
reveals no hard-and-fast divide between natural and social; rather they are seamlessly swept 
together in its counter-clockwise rotation.”356 Katrina only came into being, she remarks, through 
a “concatenation of phenomena— low pressure areas, warm ocean waters, and perhaps swirling 
in that classic cyclone pattern are the phenomena of deforestation and industrialization” but the 
problems of Katrina are not so easily separated into “natural” or “human-induced.”357 
“Viscosity” she employs to convey there is no “sharp ontological divide” between “human and 
environment . . . social practices and natural phenomena.”358 While distinctions can be made, 
boundaries between human and nonhuman other, material and culture, science and philosophy, 
are mercurial and we have overlooked sites of “resistance and opposition.”359 Resisting the 
persistent Edenic myth of “passive indigenous peoples who simply lived in but did not transform 
‘nature,”’ Tuana argues that the people who lived in what became New Orleans actively shaped 
its land but it always pressed back through “swampy land bred” illnesses and low-land 
flooding.360 Historically, humans have further shaped it through the desires and abandonments I 
have outlined. Thus, humans may have thought they subdued the landscape through technology 
but if Katrina teaches us anything it is that these interconnections have agency and it “behooves 
us to remember,” the dance between humans and material that makes living below sea level 
possible.361 Regarding the “toxic soup” Katrina left behind, Tuana employs “porosity” to convey 
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that this “dance of agency between human and nonhuman agents also happens at a more intimate 
level” as the “boundaries between our flesh and the flesh of the world we are of and in” are 
porous.362 “While porosity is what allows us to flourish— as we breath in the oxygen we need to 
survive and metabolize the nutrients out of which our flesh emerges—this porosity often does 
not discriminate against that which can kill us. We cannot survive without water and food, but 
their viscous porosity often binds itself to strange and toxic bedfellows.”363 As environmental 
justice advocates on the coast continue to protest, toxic wastes are a long-standing concern for 
the Gulf coast and her communities. These toxins settle in bodies, disproportionately and with 
materialized racial bias, belying “any effort to identify a ‘natural divide between 
nature/culture.”364  
 One final helpful articulation of relational ontologies, Stacy Alaimo explores the 
“interconnections, interchanges, and transits between human bodies and nonhuman natures” by 
figuring human corporeality as trans-corporeality.365 In Alaimo’s trans-corporeality, the “human 
is always intermeshed with the more-than-human world.”366 Again resonant with Deleuze and 
Guattari, Pickering’s mangle, and Tuana’s viscous porosity, Alaimo’s vision of the human 
underscores the trans to indicate “movement across different sites” opening up a “mobile space 
that acknowledges the often unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman 
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creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, and other actors.”367 Thinking across bodies, 
human and nonhuman, Alaimo hopes “may catalyze the recognition that the environment, which 
is too often imagined as inert, empty space or as a resource for human use, is, in fact, a world of 
fleshy beings with their own needs, claims, and actions.”368 Alaimo suggests we situate our 
inquiries “within the many interfaces between human bodies and the larger environment” 
considering the ethical and political possibilities that unfurl when our “conceptions of the human 
self are profoundly altered by the recognition that ‘the environment’ is not located elsewhere out 
there, but is always the very substance of ourselves.”369 Like Pickering and Tuana, Alaimo 
argues that these shifts are both material and discursive as this understanding of the “substance 
of one’s self as interconnected with the wider environment marks a profound shift in 
subjectivity. As the material self cannot be disentangled from networks that are simultaneously 
economic, political, cultural, scientific, and substantial; what was once the ostensibly bounded 
human subject finds herself in a swirling landscape of uncertainty where practices and actions 
that were once not even remotely ethical or political matters suddenly become the very stuff of 
the crises at hand . . . humans are the very stuff of the material, emergent world.”370 
These three conceptions of co-constitutive materiality, of intertwined ontoepistemologies, 
are the kinds of approaches needed that can effectively grasp all the working elements of 
environmental and social degradation along the Gulf coast. They demonstrate the unavoidable 
porosity of bodies and the need to reshape environmental thought around these vulnerabilities. 
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Pulling these conversations together, the conceptions of power and discourse of the linguistic 
turn and the focus on the body and nonhuman nature of the material, allows material feminism 
the ability to question the social construction of the sciences via asking how scientific knowledge 
is produced, upon whose bodies it is built, what histories it illuminates and erases, and finally 
what sorts of work it allows us to do through coalition building. Thus, Tuana argues that 
relational ontologies are inherently “ethical” ontologies. Because our understandings of human 
and nonhuman boundaries are mangled, viscous, and transcorporeal, impossible to separate and 
ponder in tidy boxes, material feminists argue that our ethical conceptions similarly need 
rethinking. 
For example, Alaimo and Hekman argue that material ethics requires we “compare the 
very real material consequences of ethical positions and draw conclusions from those 
comparisons. We can, for example argue that the material consequences of one ethics is more 
conducive to human and nonhuman flourishing than that of another.”371 Furthermore, material 
feminisms insist that ethics must be “centered on the material consequences” of our theory.372 
Approaching environmental issues from this perspective requires wading in uncertainty which 
may be uncomfortable waters for many environmental scholars, including new cosmology 
perspectives, that hope for tidier narratives and more assured futures. Reconceptualizing the 
human as a transcorporeal subject forces us to “relinquish mastery” as we find ourselves 
“inextricably part of the flux and flow of the world that others would presume to master” 
affecting a rather “disconcerting sense of being immersed within incalculable, interconnected 
material agencies that erode even our most sophisticated modes of understanding.”373 What 
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material feminisms offer, however, is a shift from “ethical principles to ethical practices” which 
“unfold in time and take place in particular contexts” allowing for incorporating the “needs, the 
significance, and the liveliness of the more-than-human world.”374 A focus on ethical practices, 
as opposed to ethical principles, unsettles the need for environmental discourses to “extend 
themselves over and above material realities,” like superstorms and environmental racism, 
offering opportunities for taking on “multiple material consequences.”375  
While chaotic, a little unsteady, discomfortingly vulnerable, these methodologies offer 
such tremendous possibility for religion and ecology to rethink relationships between humans 
and nonhuman others. Complicating new cosmology’s tentative steps into agency and 
embodiment, and echoing Lisa Sideris’s critique of new cosmology’s dependence on science to 
offer the really real expert knowledge of the world, material feminisms would caution our 
approaches to science. Material feminisms ask, what are the political implications of 
championing sacralized sciences? Instead of marveling that some mountains seem to possess 
agentic capacity, what are the material and discursive conditions that turn us toward particular 
nonhumans over others? Which bodies, stories, places, and communities are obscured, ignored, 
and erased through the creation of the new narrative? Why does new cosmology make the 
choices that it makes and include the human-nonhuman relationships that it does? Furthermore, 
why does it not include some relationships, particularly relationships in and with damaged 
environments, as part of its religious ecotheory? The human that experiences nonhuman others in 
new cosmology scholarship seems implicitly to come to encounters blissfully neutral, free from 
historical influences or contemporary political entanglements, and exercises control over all 
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encounters. Yes, the human is moved by awe and wonder, but not moved too much as “nature” is 
afforded only those affective registers and “the human” only those responses. New cosmology 
scholarship does not allow these affective engagements to get too unruly. In devastated 
landscapes nonhuman others affect us in more ways than these orderly allowances. What 
happens when we begin to acknowledge the weight of past experiences and habits that we carry 
with us into encounter? I will address these questions further in chapters four and five.   
 
Cultural Emotions  
 
“This wasn’t the way America was supposed to be . . . Many people in the United States 
genuinely believe—with a fervor that puts religious fanatics to shame—that nobody else in the 
world can do anything better than America. But the failure of government at all levels in 
responding to the hurricane disaster rehashes a much older story about the United States, one that 
has been steadily and deliberately noisily drowned or whited out of mainstream discourse. It is 
the story of race, class, poverty, and studied incompetence . . . for the rest of us, blacks in the 
United States serve as the proverbial canary in a coal mine. Those images on TV should, 
therefore, be a lesson for Africans and other people of African ancestry all over the world. 
Whether you are in peril in Darfur, Sudan, Ruhengeri, Rwanda, or New Orleans, saving your 
black behind isn’t a priority for the American government, founded on a doctrine of white 
supremacy.” Vukoni Lupa-Lasaga, “Katrina Unmasks the Real America,” for The Monitor376  
 
 
 “Fuck you, you fucking fucks. 
 
I don’t give a damn what the hell you Yankees/Texans do, do it in your own yard, and shut the 
fuck up. We don’t care what you do, and we don’t want your damned PVC sided beige square 
houses uglying up our town. Go home, and quit looking at my home as simply a chance to line 
your wallets. 
 
I’m so glad all you Chicagoans have figured out exactly how to fix New Orleans. Look at your 
own nasty city and explain why you can’t deal with the snow other than to throw tons of salt on 
the road, and why you can’t buy a beer for under $5. Fuck you, you fucking fucks. 
 
What about you fucks that don’t want to rebuild NOLA because we’re below sea level. Well, 
fuckheads, then we shouldn’t have rebuilt that cesspool Chicago after the fire, that Sodom San 
Francisco after the earthquakes, Miami after endless hurricanes, or New York because it’s a 
magnet for terrorists. 
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And fuck Kansas, Iowa, and your fucking tornados. 
 
Fuck you, San Antonio. You aren’t getting our Saints. When I get to the Alamo, I’m taking a piss 
on it. You probably go to funerals and hit on the widow. Classless fucks. 
 
Fuck you Houston and Atlanta. No matter how many of our residents you steal, how many of our 
events you pilfer, you still ain’t got no culture. One of our neighborhoods has more character 
than all of your pathetic cookie-cutter suburbs laid end to end. Fuck you, fuck you all. 
 
Fuck you Tom Benson. I hate you on so fucking many levels, but the main one is this: they 
aren’t your Saints, they’re ours. The NEW FUCKING ORLEANS Saints. All you had to do was 
say that you were coming back. But you didn’t. You had to fuck around to try to get more 
money. Fuck you, you greedy bastardo. Don’t think we haven’t noticed that you have phased out 
all of the merchandise that has the state of Louisiana on it. Don’t think we haven’t noticed how 
hard it is to get some Saints merchandise that actually says “New Orleans” on it. Fuck you, Fuck 
San Antonio, Fuck your whole fucking family. And if you and Rita think that anybody is going 
to patronize your car dealerships, then you got another thing coming, fuckface. 
 
Fuck you New York. You lose a neighborhood and get scads of federal aid. We lose an entire 
FUCKING COAST, and the freespending W administration finally decides to become fiscally 
responsible. And fuck you all for taunting the New Orleans Saints fans, who have to deal with 
playing a home game in the Meadowlands. Fuck you, you classless motherfuckers. New Orleans 
donates a fire engine to the FDNY after 9/11, and you give us shit. Fuck you, fuck your town, 
fuck your residents, fuck your politicians. You. All. Suck.” Ashley Morris, “Fuck you, you 
fucking fucks,” Ashley Morris: the blog377 
 
 
 Opening our ontological inquiry to co-constitutive natures and transcorporeal movement 
requires recognizing we are not only materially open to our complex environments but 
susceptible to being emotionally pivoted, affected by human and nonhuman others. Affect 
theory, building on the more-than-linguistic turn in cultural criticism, can be very loosely defined 
as inquiry into bodily capacities to affect and be affected. It is impossible, however, to offer 
readers in religion and ecology a more substantial definition that would also definitively 
characterize all the work within this umbrella for a number of reasons. First, affect’s theorization 
is in process within many disciplinary approaches, some that are in conversation but nevertheless 
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have their differences including philosophy, cultural studies, psychology and psychoanalysis, 
cultural anthropology and geography, neurosciences and science studies, gender, queer, and 
critical race theories, and most recently religious studies.378  
Second, there is much contention within this scholarship on whether or not to draw strong 
divisions between affect and emotion. Donovan Schaefer’s Religious Affects: Animality, 
Evolution, and Power helpfully addresses this disagreement by tracing a dual genealogy for 
contemporary affect theory tied to two seminal texts, Brian Massumi’s 1995 essay “The 
Autonomy of Affect,” and Eve Kososky Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s Shame and Its Sisters: A 
Silvan Tomkins Reader. 379 Massumi’s text crystallizes “a particular intellectual lineage—from 
Spinoza to Nietzsche to Deleuze to contemporary neuroscience” via Baruch Spinoza’s sense of 
affects as “a multitude of forces that are the plural, heterogeneous materials of subjectivity. 
Deleuze characterizes this as the ethological approach, in which bodies are understood as a 
compendium of crisscrossing lines of force.”380 For Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze, Schaefer writes, 
“affect dislocates the anthropocentric perspective, opening up onto a multiplicity of animal ways 
of being organized around the variety of ‘natures’ making up the bodies of different organisms. 
The ethological approach explores the variety of animal life streams by mapping our affective 
makeup as heterogeneous networks, rather than undifferentiated subjects.”381 Massumi uses 
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terms like compulsion, and intensity but insists that affect and emotion are distinct as “conscious 
awareness is structurally incongruent with the overwhelming intensity of affect in this plenum of 
intensity.”382 For Massumi, Schaefer writes, the “autonomy of affect: its escape from structures 
of capture and control, its formal indiscernibility to conscious awareness” makes affect 
“ontologically incompatible with the structuring grid of personal experience.”383 For Deleuzian, 
or “subphenomenological” affect theorists, like Massumi, Eric Shouse, and Erin Manning, 
feelings are “personal and biographical” and emotions are “socially expressed feelings” 
characterizing what is “stable . . . structured … and detectable” about social life, those captures 
that affects slip beyond.384 The other strand, Schaefer writes, traces from psychologist Silvan 
Tomkin’s theory of “affects as an ensemble of psychological engines— as emotions that rise to 
the level of the personal, even if they are not reducible to language.”385 This model, what 
Schaefer calls “phenomenological affects” draws from phenomenological traditions in 
philosophy and approaches affects as “woven into the textures of experience, hovering around, 
rather than beneath, the line of ‘conscious’ awareness” of named emotions “(shame, happiness, 
fear, anger, etc.) and the as-yet-unnamed emotions of embodied affective palettes.”386 For 
Tomkins, affect theory “diagrams a complex and transitory landscape, in which language and 
embodied histories interface with evolutionary, affective, and cognitive structures—the shifting 
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material repertoire of embodied life.”387 Thus, for Sedgwick, Frank, and others reading Tomkins 
like Teresa Brennan, Elspeth Probyn, Lauren Berlant, and Kathleen Stewart, the way we feel 
“has a complex, heterogeneous history” and affects are “something that rises into embodied 
spheres of awareness.”388 Sedgwick, Schaefer writes, “insisted on bringing to the fore Tomkin’s 
sophisticated sense of the plasticity of affects, the possibility that emotions could be reshaped 
and redistributed through the embodied histories of individual bodies: ‘Affects can be, and are,’ 
she reminds us, ‘attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, 
institutions, and any number of other things, including other affects. Thus, one can be excited by 
anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by joy.’”389 
 Third, my attempts at wading into this fascinating but intricate constellation of projects 
will be one of the first maneuvering affect theory and religion and ecology into conversation. I 
will not claim that my approach to feeling, emotion, and affects is definitive nor even the most 
effective for ecotheory. Currently there is significant excitement, understandably with their 
emphasis on pre-or extra-linguistic affective flows, about the possibilities Spinoza, Deleuze, and 
Massumi’s work offer to ecotheory and animal studies.390 Concerned, though, with the lack of 
attention paid to the intersections of religion and ecology with marginalized bodies, I find myself 
persistently drawn to scholarship orienting affect studies within ongoing work on race, class, 
gender, sexuality, and ability.391 The scholarship I read and champion in this project is, I argue, 
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the most effective for thinking through natureculture complexities because it starts from the 
inside out, beginning with the feelings of marginalized embodied daily life and moving to their 
theorization. These approaches, particularly the work of Sara Ahmed, Mel Y. Chen, Ann 
Cvetkovich, and Avery F. Gordon, are less rigid about divisions between affect and emotion and 
conceptualize affects as part of “the cultural politics of everyday life.”392 “I tend to use affect in a 
generic sense,” Cvetkovich writes, “rather than in the more specific Deleuzian sense, as a 
category that encompasses affect, emotion, and feeling, and that includes impulses, desires, and 
feelings that get historically constructed in a range of ways (whether as distinct specific emotions 
or as a generic category often contrasted with reason) but with a wary recognition that this is like 
trying to talk about sex before sexuality.”393 Cvetkovich also uses,  
feeling as a generic term that does some of the same work: naming the undifferentiated 
‘stuff’ of feeling; spanning the distinctions between emotion and affect central to some 
theories; acknowledging the somatic or sensory nature of feelings as experiences that 
aren’t just cognitive concepts or constructions. I favor feeling in part because it is 
                                                        
Ahmed, and Whitney Bauman are salient examples. But I find that the secondary scholarship 
mining similar genealogies in Deleuzian affect and materialist theories (like new materialism, 
speculative realism, and object oriented ontologies) sometimes theorizes the virtual, the 
posthuman, the autonomy of objects, and affects’ autonomy from the social as convenient 
avenues for talking about materialist politics without wading into discussions of race, gender, 
class, and ability or what I would argue are the actual daily implications of this theoretical work. 
Furthermore, by characterizing these scholarly interests as “new turns,” particularly in how this 
work is taken up in the blogosphere/public scholarship, some of this commentary avoids 
addressing its debt to feminist and critical race theories. In a 2015 AAR panel I contributed to 
addressing ecology and New Materialism, a female commentator asked a male presenter to 
address some of the critiques of object-oriented ontologies coming from feminist and Chicana 
theorists and he was quick to respond frustratingly that “new” scholarship like OOO cannot yet 
be expected to coherently address issues like sexism and racism. For more productive 
commentary see Severin Fowles’, “The Perfect Subject, (Postcolonial Object Studies)” Journal 
of Material Culture 21.1 (2016) and Anthony Paul Smith’s “On the Use and Abuse of Objects 
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intentionally imprecise, retaining the ambiguity between feelings as embodied sensations 
and feelings as psychic or cognitive experiences. It also has a vernacular quality that 
lends itself to exploring feelings as something we come to know through experience and 
popular usage and that indicates, perhaps only intuitively but nonetheless significantly, a 
conception of mind and body as integrated. Public Feelings take seriously questions like 
‘How do I feel?’ and ‘How does capitalism feel?’ as starting points for something that 
might be a theory but could also be a description, an investigation, or a process. Terms 
such as affect, emotion, and feeling are more like keywords, points of departure for 
discussion rather than definition.       
 
Drawing from these perspectives by using affects as a point of departure, our work in 
religion and ecology might ask, what do encounters with nonhuman others feel like? Why do we 
desire, or not desire, connection? When we move in certain environments how might we describe 
what these spaces and places feel like? Why do some encounters resonate as positive while 
others we might begin to characterize as negative, ambivalent, or repulsive? How do we come to 
desire, or not desire, connection with/to places and creatures we have never physically 
encountered? For new cosmology scholarship, orientations and attachments are very important 
but their largest stumbling blocks regarding feelings and emotions is their insistence on 
ahistorical perspectives and neutral politics. They imagine a feeling human subject without any 
of the cultural differences and specificities that might shape that subject. They are chiefly 
concerned with cultivating an orienting narrative that will readdress common ontological 
inquiries (who are we? where do we come from? what is our purpose?) and encourage kin 
attachments to creatures and habitats. But thus far this orientation toward some nonhuman others 
functions by ignoring, in its lack of context, that it comes only at the expense of many 
disregarded others. How/why does new cosmology affectively orient toward some bodies and 
landscapes and away from others? For the remainder of the chapter I will consider these 
questions primarily in conversation with Sara Ahmed’s affective work on place, space, race, and 
orientation. Ahmed’s scholarship is particularly helpful here because she works at the 




practices. Ahmed agrees with new cosmology that affective language, particularly via habitual 
repetition, is social power that can shape identities and alliances but, importantly, she contends 
that there are always political implications. Affects join some bodies and communities together 
while separating from others. Ahmed’s work can help us begin to think about how racial and 
environmental histories in the American south continue to shape affective orientations. 
 
Encounters and Impressions 
In “Collective Feelings, Or the Impressions Left by Others,” Sara Ahmed begins with 
similar questions, “how do emotions work to secure collectives through the way in which they 
read the bodies of others? How do emotions work to align some subjects with some others and 
against other others?”394 Responsively, Ahmed argues that affects are embodied but also social 
and transpersonal. “Emotions,” she writes, “play a crucial role in the ‘surfacing’ of individual 
and collective bodies. Such an argument challenges any assumption that emotions are a private 
matter, that they simply belong to individuals and that they come from within and then move 
outwards toward others. It suggests that emotions are not simply ‘within’ or ‘without’, but that 
they define the contours of the multiple worlds that are inhabited by different subjects.”395  
Affects, she argues, are primarily relational and “materialization takes place through the 
‘mediation’ of affect,” forming the skin of bodies and the skin of collectives. 396 Emotions work 
“to create the very distinction between the inside and the outside,” she argues, and “this 
separation takes place through the very movement engendered by responding to others and 
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objects. Rather than locating emotion in the individual or the social, we can see that 
emotionality−as a responsiveness to and openness towards the worlds of others−	involves an 
interweaving of the personal with the social, and the affective with the mediated.”397 For 
example, she gestures to the function of skin, the surface that paradoxically connects and 
separates us from one another, where skin “appears to contain us” but also where others “impress 
upon us.”398 “I have an impression of others,” she writes,  
but they also leave me with an impression; they impress me and impress upon me. 
Indeed, we can think about impressions as the marks left by others, in which the others 
might leave their mark insofar as they have already left . . . The skin may in this way 
record past impressions, past encounters with others, who are others insofar as they have 
already made an impression. Hence the very impression of the skin surface is itself an 
effect of impressions . . . sense perception and emotion take place in what I would call the 
contact zone of impressions; they involve how bodies are ‘impressed upon’ by objects 
and others.399 
 
Ahmed’s conception of “contact” goes beyond pure tactile encounter to also include the 
perception of others that may or may not physically touch us as contact “involves the subject as 
well as histories that come before the subject.”400  
Thus, affects carry socio-historical resonances. Drawing from a lineage that includes 
Deleuze, Spinoza, and what she writes is Descartes’ surprising perception that feelings “take the 
‘shape’ of the contact we have with objects,” Ahmed argues that the “perception of others as 
‘causing’ an emotional response is not simply my perception, but involves a form of ‘contact’ 
between myself and others, which is shaped by longer histories of contact.”401 Ahmed’s reads 
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racism as one “particular form of intercorporeal encounter” that “depends on histories of reading 
that come, as it were, ‘before’ an encounter between subject and another takes place.”402 For 
example, in the “moment of contact” between a “white racist subject who encounters a racial 
other” and experiences an “intensity of emotions (fear, hate, disgust, pain),” this “‘moment of 
contact’ is shaped by past histories of contact, which allows the proximity of a racial other to be 
perceived as threatening, at the same time as it reshapes the bodies in the contact zone of 
encounter. These histories have already impressed upon the surface of the bodies at the same 
time as they create new impressions.”403 In this way affects are performative as they “repeat past 
associations” while “generating their object.”404 Hate, for example, “may generate the other as 
the object of hate insofar as it repeats associations that already read the bodies of others as being 
hateful. Indeed, the loop of the performative works powerfully: in reading the other as being 
hateful, the subject is filled up with hate, as a sign of the truth of the reading.”405 I will return to 
these ideas at the end of the chapter to think about how fear and hate, in responses to the Gulf 
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 Ahmed argues that while “emotional responses to others involve the alignment of 
subjects with and against other others,”406 emotions do not “positively inhabit any-body as well 
as any-thing, meaning that ‘the subject’ is simply one nodal point in the economy, rather than its 
origin or destination.”407 These, what she terms, affective economies, “need to be seen as social 
and material as well as psychic,” where objects, nonhuman others, environments, and 
communities are caught up and intertwined within the “circulation of signs of affect” that shape 
the “materialization of collective bodies.”408 Within “affective economies,” she writes, 
“emotions do things, and they align individuals with communities—or bodily space with social 
space—through the very intensity of their attachments.”409 Our histories, Ahmed writes, “are 
bound up with attachments precisely insofar as it is a question of what sticks, of what 
connections are lived as the most intense or intimate, as being closer to the skin.”410 As a stirring 
demonstration of affects’ sticky associations, the viscous combination of bodies, materials, and 
emotions,  Ahmed draws this passage from Audre Lorde’s 1984 Sister Outsider: 
 The AA subway train to Harlem. I clutch my mother’s sleeve, her arms full of  
 shopping bags, Christmas-heavy. The wet smell of winter clothes, the train’s 
lurching. My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little snowsuited body down.  
On one side of me a man reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a fur hat staring  
at me. Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze drops down, pulling mine with 
it. Her leather-gloved hand plucks at the line where my new blue snow pants and her 
sleek fur coat meet. She jerks her coat closer to her. I look. I do not see whatever terrible 
thing she is seeing on the seat between us—probably a roach. But she has communicated 
her horror to me. It must be something very bad from the way she’s looking, so I pull my 
                                                        
406 Ibid., 33.  
 
407 Sara Ahmed, “Affective Economies,” Social Text, 79 22.2 (2004), 121. 
 
408 Ahmed, “Affective Economies,” 121. 
  
409 Ibid., 119.  
 





snowsuit closer to me away from it, too. When I look up the woman is still staring at me, 
her nose holes and eyes huge. And suddenly I realize there is nothing crawling up the seat 
between us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to touch. The fur brushes my face as she 
stands with a shudder and holds on to a strap in the speeding train. Born and bred a New 
York City child, I quickly slide over to make room for my mother to sit down. No word 
has been spoken. I’m afraid to say anything to my mother because I don’t know what I 
have done. I look at the side of my snow pants secretly. Is there something on them? 
Something’s going on here I do not understand, but I will never forget it. Her eyes. The 
flared nostrils. The hate.411 
 
“In this encounter,” Ahmed writes, “Audre Lorde ends with emotion; she ends with ‘the hate’. . . 
What passes is not spoken; it is not a transparent form of communication. The sense that 
something is wrong is communicated, not through words, or even sounds that are voiced, but 
through the body of another, ‘her nose holes and eyes huge’. The encounter is played out on the 
body, and is played out with the emotions. This bodily encounter, while ending with ‘the hate’, 
also ends with the reconstitution of bodily space. The bodies that come together, that almost 
touch and co-mingle, slide away from each other, becoming relived in their apartness.”412 The 
white woman’s disgust and Lorde’s confusion shape the resonance of the space conveying what 
is and is not appropriate, what is and is not acceptable, in the eyes of white culture. Their bodies 
“move apart” and allow for the “redefinition of social as well as bodily integrity” with the 
emotion of hate aligning “the particular white body with the bodily form of the community—	the 
emotion functions to substantiate the threat of invasion and contamination in the body of a 
particular other who comes to stand for and stand in for, the other as such.”413 In other words, 
“the hate encounter aligns not only the ‘I’ with the ‘we’ (the white body, the white nation), but 
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the ‘you’ with the ‘them’ (the black body, Black people).”414 In the narrative, Lorde’s 
“misperception” of the cause of the woman’s embodied disgust “creates an object. The object—
the roach—comes to stand for, or stand in for, the cause of ‘the hate’. The roach crawls up 
between them; the roach, as the carrier of dirt, divides the two bodies, forcing them to move 
apart.”415 Audre also recoils but realizes it is she, herself, that is “the ‘it’ that stands between the 
possibility of their clothes touching. She becomes the roach—	the impossible and phobic 
object—	that threatens to crawl from one to the other.”416 The circulation of affects in the 
moving train (disgust, hate, confusion, and fear) “brings others and objects into existence; hate 
slides between different signs and objects whose existence is bound up with the negation of its 
travel. So Audre becomes the roach that is imagined as the cause of the hate . . . It is not simply 
that any body is hated: particular histories are re-opened in each encounter, such that some 
bodies are already read as more hateful than other bodies,” and what sticks remains, an 
amalgamation of disgust, cockroaches, and racists impressions of and upon black bodies.417 
Keeping Ahmed’s work on affective impressions, economies, encounters and events in mind, I 
will return again to histories of black bodies regarded as animal others at the end of this chapter. 
But Ahmed’s reading of what is happening in this train space clearly demonstrates what, in her 
later work, she calls “the drama of contingency,” that affects rise to the surface in relation, being-
with and directed-toward others within what she terms “the messiness of the experiential, the 
unfolding of bodies into worlds”418 Events, Ahmed argues, encounters between our bodies and 
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the bodies of others like the tense amalgamation of black and white bodies on the train, “have 
backgrounds,” backgrounds that explain “the conditions of emergence” for what plays out in 
these encounters.419  
 
Affective Mapping 
 The social movement of affects in Ahmed’s scholarship helps us understand not only the 
importance of feelings and emotions in the surfacing of bodies and collectives, I/we in intimate 
and perhaps agitating proximity with you/them, but how space, place, environments, and objects 
are similarly affectively charged. In her text Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, 
Others, Ahmed performs feminist, queer, and critical race readings of classic works in 
phenomenology and spatial theory, scholarship from Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Henri Lefebvre. Here, Ahmed offers a queer phenomenological 
reading of “orientation” that is helpful for understanding that affinities and attachments, while 
often assumed to be rational choices (or at least in the case of new cosmology choices made in 
line with our ancestral proclivities) carry situated and complex affective social investments. 
Paying particular attention to the “orientation” in sexual orientation, and the “orient” in 
orientalism, Ahmed considers how “spatial orientations (relations to proximity and distance) are 
shaped by other social orientations, such as gender and class, that affect ‘what’ comes into view, 
but also are not simply given, as they are effects of the repetition of actions over time.”420 
Furthermore, she argues, compulsory heterosexuality and racism “‘orientates’ bodies in specific 
                                                        
 
419 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 38. 
 





ways,” where “different orientations, different ways of directing one’s desire, means inhabiting 
different worlds.”421  
“The starting point for orientation,” Ahmed writes, “is the point from which the world 
unfolds: the ‘here’ of the body and the ‘where’ of its dwelling. Orientations, then, are about the 
intimacy of bodies and their dwelling places.”422 Reading Merleau-Ponty, Ahmed writes the 
“body provides us with a perspective,” but the: 
‘here’ of the body does not simply refer to the body, but to ‘where’ the body dwells. The 
‘here’ of bodily dwelling is thus what takes the body outside of itself, as it is affected and 
shaped by its surroundings: the skin that seems to contain the body is also where the 
atmosphere creates an impression; just think of goose bumps, textures on the skin 
surface, as body traces of the coldness in the air. Bodies may become oriented in this 
responsiveness to the world around them, given this capacity to be affected. In turn, given 
the history of such responses, which accumulate as impressions on the skin, bodies do not 
dwell in spaces that are exterior but rather are shaped by their dwellings and take shape 
by dwelling.423 
 
Inhabiting spaces, becoming familiar, “involves orientation devices,” Ahmed continues, “ways 
of extending bodies into spaces that create new folds, or new contours of what we could call 
livable or inhabitable space” but if “orientation is about making the strange familiar through the 
extension of bodies into space, then disorientation occurs when that extension fails. Or we could 
say that some spaces extend certain bodies and simply do not leave room for others.”424 We 
know from the work of Nigel Thrift, Edward Soja, and Cindi Katz that space is not a neutral 
container but is “dynamic and lived” and through attending to “orientation,” we can recognize 
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that space is dynamic via the body being “directed in some ways more than others.”425 What 
comes to be regarded as “normative” ways to inhabit bodies and worlds are an “effect of the 
repetition of bodily actions over time, which produces what we can call the bodily horizon, a 
space for action, which puts some objects and not others in reach.”426 It is not simply that bodies 
“have a direction, or that they follow directions,” Ahmed argues, rather, “in moving this way, 
rather than that, and moving in this way again and again, the surfaces of bodies in turn acquire 
their shape. Bodies are ‘directed,’ and they take the shape of this direction.”427  
When we follow directions, Ahmed writes, we seem to “arrive, as if by magic” so that the 
“work of arrival is forgotten in the very feeling that the arrival is magic” but “the work involves 
following directions” and we will “arrive when we have followed them properly: bad readings 
just won’t get us there.”428 However, “following a line is not disinterested,” she writes, “to 
follow a line takes time, energy, and resources, which means that the ‘line’ one takes does not 
stray apart from the line of one’s life as the very shape of how one moves through time and 
space.”429 Following directions, following lines to arrival, also takes social investment. “Such 
investments,” Ahmed argues, “‘promise’ return (if we follow this line, then ‘this’ or ‘that’ will 
follow), which might sustain the very will to keep going. Through such investments in the 
promise of return, subjects reproduce the lines that they follow.”430 What comes to matter, what 
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garners and rewards value, are those objects, bodies, and behaviors that invest in and reproduce 
these lines. For example, Ahmed considers sexuality in terms of “‘having an orientation, which 
itself is understood as being ‘directed’ in one way or another . . . sexual desire orientates the 
subject toward some others (and by implication not other others) by establishing a line or 
direction” so that the “direction one takes makes some others available as objects to be 
desired.”431 We could view sexuality where “being directed toward the same sex or the other 
sex” is traveling along different lines.”432 However, because “heterosexuality as an orientation 
toward ‘the other sex’” is regarded as normative, bodies are required to “follow a straight line 
whereby straightness gets attached to other values including decent, conventional, direct, and 
honest” that reward and value those bodies following that line and regard bodies with 
homosexual desires as aberrant deviations from the straight line.433 Adrienne Rich’s work on 
compulsory heterosexuality is helpful here, Ahmed argues, because it demonstrates that a “set of 
institutional practices” require “men and women to be heterosexual” so one is required to 
become straight, to participate in the “fantasy of a natural orientation . . . that organizes worlds 
around the form of the heterosexual couple, as if it were from this ‘point’ that the world 
unfolds.” 434 These “orientations are binding,” she writes, “as they bind objects together.”435  
Following the heterosexual family line, “subjects are required to ‘tend toward’ some 
objects and not others as a condition of familial as well as social love” 436 and these objects: the 
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opposite sex, heterosexual reproduction, familial inheritance, particular approaches to happiness, 
love, and care, styles, “capacities, aspirations, techniques,” and the materials that facilitate and 
reward this way of being, are infused with affective power as a social good.437 Heterosexuality is 
an “effect of how objects gather to clear a ground, how objects are arranged to create a 
background” where repeated actions over time, investment in these lines of being, make this line 
normative—just how things are, a “given.”438 We can see that the “‘tending toward’ certain 
objects and not others . . . produces what we would call ‘straight tendencies’,” Ahmed writes, “a 
way of acting in the world that presumes the heterosexual couple as a social gift” allowing the 
“straight body, and the heterosexual couple, to extend into space” affectively shaping spaces, 
bodies, and objects in ways that others are not allowed.439 For example, Ahmed gestures to Gill 
Valentine who writes, “heterosexual desires congeal over time to produce the appearance that the 
street is normally a heterosexual space” so homosexual ways of being seem out of place, 
deviations from the straight line, improper, threatening, and made to feel unsafe for other ways of 
being.440  
Like compulsory heterosexuality, whiteness functions similarly to diminish some bodies’ 
capacity to move within and reach beyond these lines of social investment. Ahmed, reading 
Frantz Fanon’s scholarship describing “the lived experience of being the object of the hostile 
white gaze,” writes that Fanon’s work demonstrates how histories of colonialism render 
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whiteness as background.441 Racism “‘stops’ black bodies inhabiting space by extending through 
objects and others; the familiarity of the ‘white world,’ as a world we know implicitly, 
‘disorients’ black bodies such that they cease to know where to find things— reduced as they are 
to things among things.” 442 This “disorientation affected by racism diminishes capacities for 
action” for “if the world is made white, then the body at home is one that can inhabit 
whiteness.”443 Racist histories shape the surfaces of bodies and collectives, orienting them in 
specific directions and “such forms of orientation are crucial to how bodies inhabit space, and to 
the racialization of bodily as well as social space.”444 Bodies, Ahmed writes, remember these 
histories even if we attempt to forget them so in a way, “race does become a social as well as 
bodily given, or what we receive from others as an inheritance of this history.”445 To be 
inheritors of whiteness is to “become invested in the line of whiteness: it is both to participate in 
it and to transform the body into a ‘part’ of it, as if each body is another ‘point’ that accumulates 
to extend the line. Whiteness becomes a social inheritance; in receiving whiteness as a gift, white 
bodies—or those bodies that can be recognized as white bodies—come to ‘possess’ whiteness as 
if it were a shared attribute.”446 This inheritance, that is both embodied and historical, is 
“‘always already’ there, before our arrival . . . a world shaped by colonial histories, which affect 
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not simply how maps are drawn, but the kinds of orientations we have towards objects and 
others.”447  
In her phenomenological reading of race, Ahmed argues that “spaces acquire the shape of 
the bodies that ‘inhabit’ them,” via our bodily habits, in particular she underscores whiteness as a 
“bad habit,” tendencies that we inherit that “allow some bodies to take up space by restricting the 
mobility of others.”448 Like compulsory heterosexuality, Ahmed and Linda Alcoff suggest “race 
might be understood as a matter of the ‘behind,’” with race functioning as the concealed 
backdrop for “social action and the promise of social mobility.”449 Whiteness as background 
goes “unnoticed” in encounters with objects, goods, spaces, places, and others that whiteness 
assumes are an extension of its skins/way of being.450 White bodies “do not have to face their 
whiteness; they are not orientated ‘toward’ it, and this ‘not’ is what allows whiteness to cohere, 
as that which bodies are orientated around” shaping both spaces and the bodies that inhabit 
them.451 Furthermore, whiteness as an institution affectively produces collective and public 
spaces as white norms. For example, Ahmed and Nirmal Puwar describe the strange out-of-
placeness nonwhite bodies feel in academic spaces: “black feminists walk into the room and I 
notice that they were not there before, as a retrospective reoccupation of a space that I already 
inhabited. I look around and reencounter the sea of whiteness. Whiteness is only invisible for 
those who inhabit it, or for those who get so used to its inhabitance that they learn not to see it, 
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even when they are not it.”452 Spaces, Ahmed presses, “are oriented ‘around’ whiteness,” the 
“institutionalization of a certain ‘likeness,’ which makes nonwhite bodies uncomfortable and feel 
exposed, visible, and different when they take up this space.”453 Like compulsory 
heterosexuality, while whiteness functions as unrecognized background its reproduction requires 
work, lines of investment, repetitions “made over time,” that shape spaces and encounters.454  
Returning to Fanon’s phenomenology of black bodies, Fanon positions whiteness as a 
“bodily form of privilege: the ability to move through the world without losing one’s way. To be 
black or not white in ‘the white world’ is to turn back toward oneself, to become an object, 
which means not only not being extended by the contours of the world, but being diminished as 
an effect of the bodily extensions of others.”455 If white bodies are the assumed universal, “if to 
be human is to be white, then to be not white is to inhabit the negative: it is to be ‘not.’”456 
Ahmed reads the “experiences of a black man in a white world” as “the loss of orientation, as the 
body becomes an object alongside others. The experience is one of nausea, and the crisis of 
losing one’s place in the world, as a loss of something that one has yet to be given.”457 Fanon’s 
phenomenology, Ahmed writes, “could be described in terms of the bodily and social experience 
of restriction, uncertainty, and blockage, or perhaps even in terms of the despair of the utterance 
‘I cannot.’”458  “For bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social,” Ahmed writes: 
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bodily movement is not so easy. Such bodies are stopped, where the stopping is an action 
that creates its own impressions. Who are you? Why are you here? What are you doing? 
Each question, when asked, is a kind of stopping device: you are stopped by being asked 
the question, just as asking the question requires you to be stopped. A phenomenology of 
‘being stopped’ might take us in a different direction than one that begins with motility, 
with a body that ‘can do’ by flowing into space. To stop involves many meanings: to 
cease, to end, and also to cut off, to arrest, to check, to prevent, to block, to obstruct, or to 
close. Black activism has shown us how policing involves a differential economy of 
stopping: some bodies more than others are ‘stopped’ by being the object of the 
policeman’s address. The ‘hey you’ is not here addressed to the body that can inherit the 
ego ideal of an organization, or who can be recruited to follow a given life, but to the 
body that cannot be recruited, to the body that is ‘out of place’ in this place. In other 
words, the ‘unrecruitable’ body must still be ‘recruited’ into this place, in part through the 
very repetition of the action of ‘being stopped’ as a mode of address . . . Stopping is 
therefore a political economy that is distributed unevenly between others, and it is also an 
affective economy that leaves its impressions, affecting the bodies that are subject to its 
address.459  
 
By habitually investing in a neutral affective subject, one that needs not wrestle with 
exposure, violence, disorientation, and restriction in their affinities and attachments, new 
cosmology champions the white subject as universal.460 Through their insistence on a single 
narrative, a body unshaped by difference, and normative affective encounters/relationships with 
nonhuman others, new cosmology ignores differences in experience and encounter that do not fit 
into its vision and therefore continually reinvest in: whiteness as an institution, objects and 
desires only available to white bodies, and spaces/places/encounters that whiteness deems 
valuable. The urgent teachings of the Black Lives Matter movement, a social movement focusing 
on the prevalence of state-sanctioned anti-black violence, demonstrate that stopping as a 
technology of racism affirms and reproduces whiteness as an institution by materially and 
affectively shaping all spaces as improper objects for black bodies. Black bodies are not safe 
from institutional violence as children or adults, in their homes, schools, or social gatherings, 
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parks or neighborhoods, legally armed or unarmed. Black bodies in all places are subject to 
stopping leaving no home for black bodies. While white bodies can ignore these realities and 
move unawares through space and toward objects of desire, black bodies must remain 
hyperaware of these continual restrictions in the hopes, often blighted, of safety. As the affective 
encounter between young Audre and the white woman on the train demonstrates, the white 
woman assumes all the space on the train is within her reach, appropriately her space, while 
Audre comes to understand through the circulations of affects within this intimate space that her 
body is expected to remain restricted—not too close to whiteness, preferably not near at all. 
While new cosmology authors argue humans grapple with alienation in the “natural” world 
without a single reorienting narrative, they have not considered how this narrative they have 
constructed further alienates black bodies through solidifying whiteness and its freedoms as the 
unrecognized background of new cosmology’s vision. Whiteness as background for 
environmental theory is, of course, not unique to new cosmology environmentalism but the 
continuation of inherited legacies. In the next chapter, I will explore how whiteness as 
background is worked into the very fabric of American religious environmentalism to prepare for 
developing ways to resist habituating these same affective habits. 
Before moving to think further about affective relationships with nonhuman others, it is 
important to understand what work in affect theory, particularly Sara Ahmed’s scholarship, 
teaches us about affinity and attachment. In summary, affects arise in encounters with one 
another and these encounters are preceded by particular histories that we both embody and 
promulgate through our habitual movements. Affinities and attachments are neither neutral nor 
ahistorical as our bodies inherit lines of social investment that determine how we are able to 
move (or not move) through the world, which places/spaces/bodies/environments we can and 




in the context of geography and environmental psychology, Jonathan Flatley calls our “range of 
intentions, beliefs, desires, moods, and affective attachments” that we carry and shape our social 
environments— affective mapping.461 “These emotional valences,” Flatley writes, cohere to 
geographical spaces whether they are experienced personally or not.462 For example, Flately 
describes living in Detroit and getting the sense that: 
some people in the suburbs who have not crossed over the city limits for years carry  
around with them a map on which Detroit is a large, hazily defined space, but a space 
clearly marked by some mixture of fear, anxiety, sorrow, and nostalgia. They avoid 
Detroit not because of poor urban planning or a lack of landmarks but because of the 
emotions they have associated with the city space of Detroit . . . For in all likelihood the 
person from the suburbs of whom I write is white, and Detroit is largely African 
American, and this split is of course overwritten by a class divide, so emotions about 
Detroit as a space are, for these suburban residents, inevitably also emotions about class 
and ‘race’ and racism.463                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Of course, Ahmed would argue whiteness as background affectively shapes all spaces/places, not 
just Detroit or the Gulf Coast, but it is important to follow these lines of social investment, 
examine how we are oriented toward and against others, to trace this affective mapping, in order 
to better understand why environmental scholarship has affinities-with and attachments-to 
certain environments and not others, certain bodies but not others. Working in cultural studies, 
Lawrence Grossberg calls these structures of affective investment mattering maps, an 
organization of affects that “makes possible certain objects of investment (what we can care 
about) and certain modes of investment (how we can care about such things)” determining not 
only our investments but “the very practices of investment.”464 Mattering maps, Grossberg 
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writes, “define not only what sites (practices, effects, structures) matter but how they matter. And 
they construct a lived coherence for those enclosed within their spaces.”465 These formations of 
affiliation: lines of investment, affective mapping, mattering maps, Grossberg argues, are 
cultural apparatuses that “actualize specific configurations of belonging;” affective articulations 
that “actualize value, enabling it to be effective in the lived world.”466 As Ahmed saliently 
illustrates with heterosexuality and whiteness as background, lines of investment function as 
“apparatuses of other-ing” that both unite and divide us by determining the inside and the 
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Affecting Environmental Imaginaries 
 
 
“After my initial journeys back home, following Katrina, I stay away for a long time, though my 
grandmother asked again and again to make the trip. I know I can’t live there anymore, she’d 
say. I just want to see it one more time. For three years I kept putting her off—saying one day—
so that, at ninety-two she could at least hold onto the hope of getting there. I never considered the 
consequences of this tactic, how it might haunt me later. When I started going back more often, it 
was because I had to, and by then it was too late. It occurs to me now that I had been waiting, 
foolishly, for the recovery to be complete. I had wanted to show her the place she’d spent her life 
without the narrative of destruction still inscribed on the landscape.” Natasha Trethewey, Beyond 
Katrina: Meditation on the Mississippi Gulf Coast468 
 
“The fisheries closures continue expanding. Now totaling 88,522 square miles. About 37 perfect 
of the Gulf’s federal waters. Federal waters begin three miles from shore, but most states waters 
are also closed. More than half the Gulf remains open to fishing, but buyers are canceling orders. 
‘I’ve had guys saying, ‘If it’s from the Gulf, we don’t want it,’’ says a New York City seafood 
distributor. The celebrity chef says, “People are really wondering if we’re getting safe fish.’ In 
Chicago and elsewhere, restaurants display signs declaring, ‘Our Seafood Is Not From the Gulf 
of Mexico.’ ‘They believe it’s toxic,’ a New York chef says. ‘So let me be clear,’ says the 
president of the United States. ‘Seafood from the Gulf today is safe to eat.’ The New Orleans 
sales rep who ships fish nationwide says, ‘They’re not ordering anything. Not a one. They know 
we’re not selling tainted fish. But their customers? No way. They don’t want seafood from 
Louisiana at all.’” Carl Safina, A Sea in Flames469  
 
 
In the previous chapter I traced how compulsory heterosexuality/whiteness are the 
backgrounds that determine normative ways of being by facilitating space for some bodies but 
not others, allowing some objects to be desired but not others. However, these are not the only 
affective lines of investment we negotiate. Religious thought and practice function similarly. In 
order to understand new cosmology’s affective investments, it is necessary to understand the 
mattering map of American environmental thought that new cosmologists have inherited and 
pass on. These investments, I argue, shape which places, spaces, bodies, and communities 
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matter, which affinities and attachments seem possible. By examining how fear shapes 
devastated landscapes, in this chapter I draw material feminisms, affect theory, and religion and 
ecology into productive conversation to argue that advocating for awe, wonder, and reverence as 
the ideal affective relationships humans should have with nonhuman others is ignorant of both 
the functions of affect and the histories of inherited racist oppression and environmental injustice 
that shape these landscapes, bodies, and encounters.  
While he does not utilize the language of affect theory nor speak at length about race, I 
read Evan Berry’s text Devoted to Nature: The Religious Roots of American Environmentalism 
to be positioning the whiteness of our inherited American Protestant environmental imaginary as 
a similarly concealed background. First, I will outline some of Berry’s arguments then discuss 
what his work reveals about the affective legacies new cosmology inherits and reproduces. Berry 
argues that “American environmentalism was grounded in a vision that linked nature with 
spiritual redemption,” a “particular approach to human flourishing” that attempted to address the 
increasing exploitation of nonhuman nature yet also “recapitulated the racist and sexist 
ideologies prevalent in turn-of-the-century Protestant America.”470 Furthermore, Berry contends 
that our inherited “mentalities that characterize the environmental imagination have not been 
radically overturned by the articulation of a coherent scientific frame for ecological issues,” 
despite the tendency of scholarship to frame environmental theory in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
and its developing fascinations with evolution, ecology, and outdoor recreation, as increasingly 
secular.471 American environmentalism is better understood, Berry contends, as a “synthesis of 
religious ideas and scientific knowledge,” a fusion of Progressive era Protestant, 
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transcendentalist, and romantic conceptions of nonhuman nature as a potent wellspring for 
redemptive experiences nurtured through “social practices intended to reconnect individuals with 
the forces of nature as a means to moral improvement and spiritual renewal.”472  
Precursors to modern environmental movements, Progressive Era conservation and 
nature organizations like the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and the 
Boy Scouts of America, functioned as conduits “for metaphysical and soteriological ideas about 
the natural world.”473 Anxious about social concerns like urbanization, industrialization, and 
immigration, and influenced by the “romantic insistence on the spiritual benefits of outdoor 
recreation,”474 they “sought to address social ills by yoking the spiritual power of nature,” in the 
hopes that increased exposure to outdoor spaces through healthful recreation475 and public 
planning/landscape architecture476 could “cure the moral decay brought about by the pressures of 
urban life.”477 The nation’s “religious vernacular,” Berry writes, also “borrowed on the 
redemptive capacity of nature,” with a “push toward more muscular expressions of Christian 
faith” practiced through camp meetings and outdoor revivals.478 “Championed by Evangelical 
circuit preachers like Billy Sunday” this vision of Christianity “asserted that America needed 
Christian discipline and a Protestant work ethic in order to rise to the challenge of 
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modernization.”479 Although optimism about the “redemptive power of industriousness” has 
always been a “central tenet of American religious life,” masculine/muscular forms of 
Christianity at the time paid “special attention to the relationship between the individual and 
society,” arguing “the Christian faith could and should be harnessed to effectively manage 
business and social affairs in the face of mounting social pressure,” particularly the “perceived 
decline” of a “predominantly agrarian economy.”480 These organizations, particularly those with 
a youth-focus, championed their ability to provide “wholesome, character building activities,” 
that would “establish lasting institutional structures that engendered the same kinds of 
wholesome character traits as had (the perhaps mythical) life on the farm.”481 These groups laid 
the groundwork, Berry contends, for the “social structures that shape middle-class American 
ideas about childhood (youth sports leagues, playgrounds, summer camp, etc.)” and drew 
“heavily on ideas about the salvific capacities of nature.”482  
As celebrations of agrarian life morphed “into a post-frontier vernacular in which 
uninhabited landscapes, rather than farms, were identified as the source of moral vitality,” 
wilderness replaced nature as the “heart of recreational enterprise” and social ideal.483 Nature had 
been “the intellectual apparatus by which Emerson’s generation and understood the 
transcendental organization of the cosmos,” Berry writes, 
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but by the time John Muir and John Burroughs had become preeminent American authors 
concerned with the preservation of natural beauty, the wilderness ideal had moved to the 
forefront of the American environmental imagination. Wilderness, for this generation of 
thinkers and writers, was not primarily an ecological category, as it would become during 
subsequent decades. It emerged first as a spatial category necessary to the quest for 
spiritual purity in nature: ‘wilderness coalesced first as a social ideal, not the 
environmental ideal that distinguishes it today . . . During the decades that the national 
parks system was built up, neither managers nor bureaucrats made much of an effort to 
‘define what it meant to maintain natural conditions.’ Even as advocates began to agitate 
for more rigorous schemes to protect wilderness areas, the very idea of wilderness 
remained an abstract philosophical concept independent of rigorous scientific scrutiny.484 
 
“Wilderness” captured the “realm of the natural world that embodied radical alterity and 
afforded transcendental experience” focusing more on the “soteriological benefits of nature than 
on the intrinsic value of plants, animals, and ecosystemic functioning.”485 This “decidedly 
anthropocentric” conception of wilderness as a social ideal “oriented a cultic sensibility about 
nature,” emphasizing the “total absence of metropolitan influence,” a necessary counter to “the 
psychic and moral disruptions of ‘mechanization.’”486 Journeys to wilderness, “like the 
multiweek outings organized by the Sierra Club, Mountaineers Club, and Appalachian Trail 
club,” promised to “strip away ‘the veneer of civilization. The rough, hard country, the constant 
nearness of nature, the full dependency on yourself and your meager resources . . . force upon 
you a new feeling which you cannot have elsewhere.’”487 Wilderness as an ideal, in 
“retrospective admiration for frontier experience,” captured many of the “basic virtues cherished 
in particular by Americans,” such as “self-sufficiency, ingenuity, camaraderie, and fortitude.”488 
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It is this “fusion of agrarian sentimentalism, romantic naturalism, and Progressive 
conservationism,” Berry argues, that “is the true genesis of the environmental movement.”489 
 “As the wilderness ideal took shape,” Berry writes, “there were robust debates among its 
exponents,” like Muir, Robert Marshall, and Aldo Leopold, “about whether wilderness was to be 
appreciated for its utility or for its aesthetic and spiritual qualities (and whether these qualities 
were themselves a kind of utility.)”490 These voices were influential in increasing American 
understanding that their environment was becoming rapidly degraded. Muir, Marshall, and 
Leopold argued that to push back “against the mechanism and reductionism of scientific 
forestry” they needed to “put the professionalism and effective techniques of scientific 
conservation to a higher purpose, toward the protection of those landscapes by which Americans 
could continue to cultivate the ‘spirit of the wilderness.’”491  While wilderness preservationists 
were committed to resisting the refrain that American resources, in the form of forests and 
wildlife, were inexhaustible, the movement’s luminaries also shared an “unambiguous 
commitment to the spiritual significance of their cause” describing their love of nature as a 
“spiritual vocation and linked measures to protect outdoor recreation in an economy of spiritual 
goods.”492 “Nature spirituality has no more celebrated figure than John Muir,” Berry writes, and 
while “environmental historians still struggle to classify and describe Muir’s religious views, 
labeling his asystematic writings as ‘secular pantheism,’ ‘transcendentalism,’ and ‘post-
Protestant,’” Berry sees Muir’s reverence of wilderness more in line with his theological 
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contemporaries.493 Muir’s “unique brand of mystical ecospirituality,” Berry writes, utilized 
Christianity as a “springboard” toward harmonizing “theological ethics with a post-Darwinian 
view of the position of human beings in the natural order” threads that will later be taken up by 
Lynn White and the new cosmology movement.494 Berry reads “Muir’s assertion that wildness 
was the fundamental source and site for human redemption,” as drawing directly from Christian 
soteriology, creating a “theological vision in which people in modern societies were afforded—
by the grace of God’s creative magnanimity—natural temples in which to redeem their depraved 
natures. The prophetic message of repentance was straightforwardly transformed into a 
preservationist morality: ‘his writings never lost their message of repentance from the sins of 
over-civilization, baptism in wilderness, and ejection of the money-changers from the mountain 
temples.’”495 Muir, and other preservationists of the period leading up to the Second World War, 
directed humans to know the wilderness and come to love it as they loved it. Spiritual rhetoric 
coupled with wilderness preservation permeated the American spiritual imagination through 
“foresters, policy makers, local activists, journalists, preachers, and professors eagerly” 
discussing how the “nation ought to think about, enjoy, and protect the natural environment,” for 
its “salvific potential,” offer of moral cleansing, and ability to “repair the damages of a life of 
urban industrial alienation.”496 
 Attachment to these particular conceptions of the value and potential of nonhuman nature 
solidified through affinities with particular materials, those natural formations and places that 
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resonated with the grandeur of a salvific narrative. Twentieth century nature writers, drawing 
from and reshaping a “theology of immanence” (divine dwelling or manifestation in the material 
world) reconceived mountains and forests, “once monstrosities of the medieval Christian 
imagination,”497 as “objects of affection and wonder.” 498 “Far from being spaces of 
bewitchment, mountains and forests became key symbols of beauty, healthfulness, and power in 
American environmental thought” and a “robust system of national parks” formed around the 
“protection of mountain landscapes” as reserves for “untrammeled nature for the pleasure of the 
nation.”499 Publications devoted to nature proclaimed mountains and alpine forests as “sacred, 
transformative spaces” that were imbued with “their own intrinsic power500 to affect the lives of 
humans wandering among them” if humans kept an “open heart and an open mind” toward 
“absorbing” their profound benefits.”501 Rhetoric about “the primal impulse of the human spirit 
to journey among mountain wilderness” was prevalent within nature enthusiast writings, as well 
as the what we might now call affective conviction that the deeper meanings hidden within these 
sacred sites “was sometimes too profound for verbal expression.”502 Through 1920’s and ‘30s car 
culture affinity for these places, and attachment to these encounters as personal and social good, 
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became ubiquitous for middle class Americans who were able to drive to and through these 
landscapes.503 This nurtured spirit of wanderlust, cultivated desires for particular experiences 
with nonhuman others as manifestations of the good life (social, spiritual, and healthful goods), 
solidified this “imagined purity of undeveloped landscapes” in our geographic imagination, 
recapitulating Genesis narratives in which “natural splendor is shattered by moral rupture and 
followed by a desire to return to the primordial order.”504  
The irony, as Berry articulates, is that “establishing uninhabited landscapes” as the center 
of the American environmental imaginary was only possible via white settlers “displacing native 
communities and economies with successive waves of development.”505 This material 
displacement was “deeply tied to racialized ideas about the ecological Indian and the noble 
savage, ideas that obscure the real impact of white settlement.”506 Ecofeminist Carolyn Merchant 
and environmental historians Kevin Deluca and Anne Demo point out that while formulating 
wilderness as an ideal, wilderness advocates like Muir and Samuel Bowles denigrated the natives 
they encountered on the land as part of this process of “whitening the wilderness.”507 In his best-
selling 1868 The Parks and Mountains of Colorado: A summer Vacation in the Switzerland of 
America, Bowles justified Indian displacement writing, “we know they are not our equals . . . we 
know that our right to the soil, as a race capable of its superior improvement, is above theirs . . . 
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let us act directly and openly our faith . . . Let us say [to the Indian] . . . you are our ward, our 
child, the victim of our destiny, ours to displace, ours to protect.”508 “At the same time that parks 
and wilderness were being reconstructed as white and pure for the benefit of white tourists,” 
Merchant writes, “Indians were being characterized as dark and dirty.”509 In his My First 
Summer in the Sierra (1911), Muir “wrote disparagingly of the Indians he encountered there, 
equating Indians with unclean animals that did not belong in the wilderness.”510 Encountering a 
“band of Indians from Mono collecting acorns on their way to Yosemite,”511 Muir writes, “they 
were wrapped in blankets made of the skins of sage-rabbits. The dirt on some of their faces 
seemed old enough and thick enough to have a geological significance . . . How glad I was to get 
away from the gray, grim crowd and see them vanish down the trail!”512 While configuring 
national parks as “Edens containing beautiful scenery, rivers, animals, flowering trees, and 
carpets of wildflowers,” Muir513 and others, “continually contrasted Indians with wilderness, 
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writing of them as polar opposites to the pristine lands.”514 Writing on encountering a native 
woman, Muir remarks, “her dress was calico rags, far from clean. In every way she seemed sadly 
unlike Nature’s neat well-dressed animals, though living like them on the bounty of the 
wilderness. Strange that mankind alone is dirty. Had she been clad in fur or cloth woven of grass 
or shreddy bark, she might then have seemed a rightful part of the wilderness; like a good wolf at 
least, or bear.”515 Whether tying them to the land as animals or separating them from awe-
inducing wilderness as too savage, the “myth of pristine wilderness,” DeLuca and Demo write, 
“is founded on the erasure of the humanity, presence, and history of Native Americans.”516  
This vision of American environmentalism revolving around pristine unpeopled 
landscapes “was publicly enshrined in the 1964 Wilderness Act,” as environmental dogma that 
expressed hopes to return the land to its “‘original conditions—as witnessed by the first white 
settlers.’”517 Berry concludes his text by arguing the Christian roots of American 
environmentalism, those lasting arguments “that individuals can and should be brought into 
conformity with an immutable, beneficent natural order” found within a conception of nature as 
“fundamentally good and the reciprocal idea that human beings are inherently ecologically 
destructive,” continue to run deep within contemporary environmental thought. What resonated 
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in the Progressive Era as affectively powerful and beneficial about “nature,” is echoed 
wholeheartedly by new cosmology texts. Attachment to particular portions of nonhuman nature 
as powerful, possessing the ability to strike us with awe and wonder as well as the power to 
reshape our habits if we are really paying attention, is a feature of early environmentalism as 
well as the center of new cosmology thought. Furthermore, we can also see that new 
cosmology’s reliance on sacralized science to provide the kinship links between humans and 
nonhuman others it argues were uncoupled by religious belief is not without precedent but a 
continuation of the ideas that germinated the environmental movement. “Insofar as these ideas 
have dominated American public discourse about the environment,” Berry writes, “theological 
tradition has set a boundary condition for the environmental imagination.”518 The dependence on 
conceptions of nature as removed, ideal, “set apart from humanity” has “impoverished our 
capacity to think about ecosystems as communities inhabited by people.”519 
Our impoverishment, though, is much deeper than Berry conveys. Drawing from what I 
outlined in the previous chapter, it is clear that our dependence on the ontologically 
compartmentalized conception of human/nonhuman others in American Protestant 
environmentalism makes it incredibly difficult to address the blurring necessitated by 
environmental disaster and degradation—how nature is recalcitrant to our desires and can, even 
when we do not desire shaping, shape us materially and affectively. Furthermore, our inherited 
environmental imaginary serves as a troubling line of affective investment that makes possible 
the recognition and preservation of only particular environmental objects: unpeopled landscapes, 
ideal environments, and those creatures/environments with certain affective payoffs. The 
mattering map of American Protestant environmentalism invests in and facilitates upwardly 
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mobile access to particular conceptions of “nature,” wilderness spaces and their nonhuman 
inhabitants, as moral and spiritual goods that can redeem our depravity and reset us via spiritual 
reconnection. For contemporary environmental thinkers, these inheritances affectively shape 
what objects we continue to gravitate toward as well as the “appropriate” ways we should relate 
to and experience them—a persuasive example of this legacy motivates new cosmology’s 
interest in grandiose spaces, those with transcendent potential to invoke awe/wonder/reverence. 
Our habitual gravitation to these particular habitats and nonhuman others, however, comes at the 
expense of those bodies and places that are barred from inclusion in this mattering map.  
Thinking of our American Protestant environmental imagination as a troubling line of 
affective investment becomes even more compelling when paired with the perspectives of those 
who are not inheritors of this line. What Berry actually describes is not the birth of an 
environmental movement that was caught up in the problematic racial politics of the era, I argue, 
but the birth of the environmental movement as a line of white investment520 that is foreclosed to 
the bodies and environmental imaginaries of people of color. In her formative research Black 
Faces, White Spaces: Reimagining the Relationship of African Americans to the Great Outdoors, 
Carolyn Finney argues that the “lack of comprehensive studies addressing the nature of a black 
environmental imaginary” hinders our understandings of how African Americans negotiate a 
“conflicted environmental history and a contemporary environmental experience that appears to 
ignore them.”521 Whiteness as background facilitates American environmentalism with a 
universal narrative, obscuring that many bodies (female, nonwhite, queer, disabled, immigrant) 
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carry alternative environmental histories that shape their encounters and attachments. Finney’s 
work challenges universal narratives arguing we must recognize “our unhealthy relationships 
with the natural environment are intimately linked to our unhealthy relationships with each 
other.”522  
During the period Berry reads as the birth of contemporary environmental thought, a 
significant number of events impacting African Americans shaped a very different black 
environmental imaginary. The Emancipation Proclamation and Homestead Act initially allowed 
“approximately forty thousand freedmen to receive four hundred thousand acres of abandoned 
Confederate land” and the 1865 congressional Freedmen’s Bureau was formed to “supervise and 
manage all abandoned and confiscated land in the South and to assign tracts of land to former 
slaves.”523 In 1866, however, “former white owners of the land, who were pardoned after the 
war, began to pressure President Andrew Johnson to allow their land to be returned to them,” 
fearful that “black landowners and farmers would start to accumulate wealth and power in the 
South.”524 In response to their requests, in 1866 Congress defeated the portion of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau Act that “gave it the authority to assign land to former slaves, and president Johnson 
ordered all land titles rescinded. The freedmen were forced off their newly acquired land, and it 
was returned to former white plantation owners.”525 While Muir was giving influential lectures in 
the 1870s on forest preservation and “revering the ‘pristine-ness’ of nature,” black men and 
women were continually negotiating their relationships with the landscapes they were once 
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forced to cultivate, owned for a brief moment, and then had torn from them.526 In the 1880s, 
while Gifford Pinchot and Muir’s conservation ideologies influenced President Theodore 
Roosevelt to take an interest in forestry and eventually sanction the creation of the National Park 
Service, significant pieces of legislation527 were “enacted to limit both movement and 
accessibility for African Americans, as well as American Indians, Chinese, and other nonwhite 
peoples in the United States.”528 As American environmentalism was forming its orientation, this 
legislation coupled with “numerous race-related massacres of African Americans: two hundred 
in Louisiana in 1868; nine in North Carolina in 1898; and seventy in Colfax, Louisiana in 1873,” 
solidified “nature” as an inappropriate object of desire for black bodies.529  
What lies beneath denying African Americans access to land and nature leisure, however, 
is more insidious than the fear of the social power of black landowners. While “many modern-
day mainstream environmental organizations understandably disavow, dismiss, or even deny any 
connection to the tenets of eugenics that emphasize ‘purification’ of the human gene pool by 
discouraging the reproduction of those with objectionable traits,” these ideas informed 
Roosevelt’s conception of a “‘new nationalism’ that ‘placed the moral issue and patriotic duty of 
conservation into the context of a racial conversation.’”530 The “themes of race, sexuality, 
gender, nation, family, and class have been written into the body of nature in western life 
sciences since the eighteenth century,” and Haraway discusses the positioning of black human 
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bodies, an amalgamation of sex and conquest, as more ape-like: “European culture for centuries 
questioned the humanity of peoples of color and assimilated them to the monkeys and apes in 
jokes, medicine, religious art, sexual beliefs, and zoology.”531 As part of a long history of white 
Europeans positioning black bodies as closer to nonhuman nature, this understanding of race was 
woven within a potent “emerging narrative that defined ‘the Negro’s place in Nature,’” at the 
“bottom of the evolutionary run while reifying whiteness as closest to God, thereby morally 
justifying any act of exclusion from the nation-building project that was foremost in the minds of 
European Americans.”532 Finney sites numerous examples in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries of “how blackness and primitivism were constructed and disseminated in scientific, 
professional, and public venues” including the dehumanization of Saartjie Baartman who was 
publicly displayed and debased in London between 1810 and 1815 and Ota Benga, a human 
abducted from the Congo who was forced in 1906 to be on display in a Bronx Zoo primate 
exhibit as the “evolutionary ‘missing link.’”533 Eugenics theories during the period that birthed 
the environmental movement effectively positioned black bodies as objects of nature, part of its 
wildness not beneficiaries of its salvific potential.  
While wilderness conservationists like Leopold and Muir might disavow these racist 
rhetorics534, if to be fully human means cultivating a particular affective relationship with 
nonhuman nature (a love and respect for uninhabited wilderness as source and site of redemption 
from human depravity) and nonwhite bodies were/are systematically barred from desiring and 
                                                        
531 Haraway, Primate Visions, 154.  
 
532 Finney, 39.  
 
533 Ibid., 40-41.   
 
534 For more on racism and nature advocacy in the early twentieth-century see Donna 
Haraway’s “Teddy Bear Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, New York City, 1908-




cultivating these affinities and attachments, then American Protestant environmentalism 
functions as an affective economy that only allows white bodies their full humanity through the 
extension of white bodies into nature spaces and environmental thought. Furthermore, thinking 
with Ahmed and Fanon, American Protestant environmentalism works as a stopping mechanism 
that further marks black bodies as “unrecruitable” in the cause of spiritual nature conservation, 
shaping black bodies as test cases for the depravity of over-civilization rather than full-
participants in what our environmental legacy (and new cosmology) regards as nature’s grace.   
The stopping mechanisms ingrained within American environmentalism that withhold the 
natural world as an object of desire from black bodies, restricting their entry/cultivation/affective 
engagement with nonhuman nature, were not resolved by civil rights legislation but continue to 
reverberate for contemporary environmental concerns—a legacy that new cosmology writers 
refuse to acknowledge in their insistence that these affective relationships are desirable, or even 
possible, for everyone. The Wilderness Act and the Civil Rights Act may have marked “the use 
of wilderness areas for the public purposes of recreation, scenic viewing, scientific 
understanding, education, conservation, and historic preservation,” but for which public?535 
These histories “have left African Americans at times physically and psychologically exiled from 
their homeland while still in it,” and when we consider “the role that our public lands play in 
determining the national characteristics of this ‘homeland’” we can begin to understand that it is 
“difficult for African Americans to have an ‘uncomplicated union with the natural world.’”536 
Furthermore, whiteness as background for American environmentalism makes it easier to ignore 
how white bodies are shaped by these legacies of dehumanization, particularly the seemingly 
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endless capacity of white bodies to tolerate black pain537 and our continued dedication to forming 
and celebrating conceptions of nature that refuse to recognize these legacies.  
As Lorde, Fanon, and Ahmed detail, emotions do things. The affective habits and the 
lines of investment they carve are the social momentum that draws bodies and communities 
together while separating from others. The affective project that positions the “natural” world as 
salvific potential set-apart from actual human communities and their diverse encounters with 
nonhuman others, both in the cultivation of American white protestant environmentalism and 
new cosmology’s ontoethical ideals, is only possible when these theorists and activists continue 
to ignore which populations, encounters, and bodies were erased to make these narratives 
possible. Awe, wonder, and reverence for nature not only attempt to describe very complex 
relationships with others, but they align us with a particular history oriented around a particular 
environmental imaginary. Our American environmental imaginary is a religious heritage that 
helps us express these feelings but is also built upon the exclusion of so many people and 
environments. Our bodies remember these histories even if academia is loathed to acknowledge 
them. However, if we want to be able to speak to the complexities of our contemporary 
ecological problems, how ecological degradation and climate change will continue pressing on 
bodies in predictably unequal ways, we must recognize that these histories of unhealthy 
relationships with nonhuman nature and human difference are intertwined and timely. Finally, 
maneuvering material feminisms, affect, and ecotheory into conversation can show us how the 
mattering maps of white environmentalism make it easier to turn away from those places, spaces, 
and encounters that are not regarded as valuable, namely toxic concerns, slow violence, damaged 
environments, poisoned nonhuman kin and the humans that live with and love them. Thinking 
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about the affective economies that stick to the Gulf Coast after disaster, which connections are 
lived as the most intense, intimate, and close to the skin, concluding this chapter I push religion 
and ecology to move beyond our attachments to only exploring awe and reverence by sitting 
with the affective politics of fear that shape imaginaries and encounters in devastated landscapes. 
Focusing on emotions outside the comfort zone of new cosmology’s intimacies demonstrates 
how much the specificities of location, culture, embodiment, and location shape our emotional 
connections with human and nonhuman others and how ill-equipped new cosmology’s onto-
ethics are to address these entanglements.   
 
Toxic Inheritance  
 
“You welcome me to the trash heap. Everything has become surreal. You have made me the 
trashman’s helper. You have made me wear a heavy surgical mask to cover my hands with heavy 
duty rubber gloves. I look like an out-of-work actor reader to audition for a minor role in a 
science fiction film. The work is too much for me alone. My friend Dave Brinks lends his 
strength to cut stinking, soggy carpet and haul it to the curb. He is giving me assistance and 
courage. I cannot let Dave see me cry. No tears will stream down my face. They will just have to 
drip into my stomach. He wants me not to open the refrigerator. We do not want to see what 
might be inside. We do not want to inhale the stink. We bind the refrigerator with yards of duct 
tape and angle it out to the sidewalk. Books that dampness and mold have rendered beyond 
salvation are tossed into large trash bags along with shoes and other items of clothing. Although 
my more than two hundred LP albums are ruined, I cannot bear to expel them. Not yet. 
Eventually the lost and damaged contents of 1928 Gentilly Boulevard must go. I don’t have a 
digital camera. Flooding has made my 35mm as useless as my PC. Much of the lost and the 
damaged—can I sell that phrase as the title for a new soap opera series —will sit and wait for the 
flood insurance adjustor to come. Dave has gone, and I have the freedom to cry. I opt not to. Let 
the tears remain in my guts. Use the energy it takes to cry to strengthen your effort to write. Yes, 
Hurricane Katrina violated my house. But that violation was minimal when I recall that many 
people who lived in various sectors of the greater New Orleans area no longer have homes. I 
have been blessed. Because you are in exile, at a distance from your relatives and friends and 
from what remains of the unique cultural gumbos of New Orleans, those social and spiritual 
foods that nourished you, you must write.”  
Jerry W. Ward, Jr. The Katrina Papers538 
 
 
                                                        





Katrina, Rita, and the BP spill are events with particular backgrounds where embodied 
affects ferment within vital encounters. The work I have outlined in chapters three and four 
illuminates some of the sociocultural background that is already there (stewing, pressing, 
sticking) when disasters happen, and unsettling intimacies unfold. This scholarship helps us 
understand how affects are born from embodied encounters with one another and that they orient 
us, align some others with and against other others, within the messiness of the social. 
Recognizing fear as an emotion that is associated with the region,539 concluding this chapter I 
consider environmental disaster, material complexity, and affective power together while 
focusing on the lived experiences of those bodies, creatures, and environments that fail to inherit 
the benefits of white environmental imaginaries.  
 Returning to Ahmed’s model of emotion as affective economy, Ahmed challenges the 
notion that fear has an object.540 For example, Ahmed writes a common refrain contrasts anxiety 
as the “‘tense anticipation of a threatening but vague event,’ or a feeling of ‘uneasy suspense,’ 
while fear is described as an emotional reaction ‘to a threat that is identifiable.’”541 But fear, she 
contends, is really “linked to the ‘passing by’ of the object.”542 Fear works as an economy of 
proximity where we fear coming in close contact with objects of fear and these objects become 
even more fearsome when fear ceases to be contained within any one object. Ahmed 
demonstrates this slippage through her reading of a curious passage from an Aryan Nations 
website positioning white nationalism as acts of love:  
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the depths of Love are rooted and very deep in a real white nationalist’s soul and spirit, 
no form of ‘hate’ could even begin to compare. At least not a hate motivated by 
ungrounded reasoning. It is not hate that makes the average white man look upon a mixed 
race couple with a scowl on his face and loathing in his heart. It is not hate that makes the 
white housewife throw down the daily jewspaper in repulsion and anger after reading of 
yet another child molester or rapist sentenced by corrupt courts to a couple of years in 
prison or on parole. It is not hate that makes the white workingman curse about the latest 
boatload of aliens dumped on our shores to be given job preference over the white citizen 
who built this land. It is not hate that brings rage into the heart of a white Christian 
farmer when he reads of” Ahmed argues it positions a subject, “(the white nationalist, the 
average white man, the white housewife, the white working man, the white citizen, and 
the white Christian farmer when he reads of billions loaned or given away as ‘aid’ to 
foreigners when he can’t get the smallest break from an unmerciful government to save 
his failing farm. No, it’s not hate. It is love.543 
 
We see here, again, how “emotions circulate between bodies and signs” to align the “bodies of 
individual subjects and the body of the nation,” with and against “imagined others whose 
proximity threatens not only to take something away from the subject (jobs, security, wealth), 
but to take the place of the subject.”544 Reading this passage, as well as Fanon and Lorde’s work, 
Ahmed highlights how through the mobilization of affects like hate and fear, the “fantasy” of the 
“ordinary white subject” comes into being.”545 What is ordinary, normative, the good, is what is 
“already under threat by imagined others.”546 These figures described, “the mixed-racial couple, 
the child molester, the rapist, aliens, and foreigners,” come to “embody the threat of loss: lost 
jobs, lost money, lost land.”547 These figures become objects of fear when they “signify the 
danger of impurity,” the violation of “pure bodies,” and such bodies “can only be imagined as 
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pure by the perpetual restaging of this fantasy of violation.”548 Fear, here, “responds to that 
which is approaching rather than already here. It is the futurity of fear, which makes it possible 
that the object of fear, rather than arriving, might pass us by.”549 Fear “both envelops the bodies 
that feel it, as well as constructs those bodies as enveloped, as contained by it, as if it comes from 
outside and moves inward.”550 In the encounters Fanon and Lorde describe, fear works to 
differentiate between white and black bodies by opening up “past histories that stick to the 
present” and “allow the white body to be constructed as apart from the black body” 
reestablishing “distance between bodies whose difference is read off the surface.”551 Past 
histories of association that position black bodies within the white environmental imaginary as 
aggressively animal, corruptible, unrecruitable, unsaved, sticks to black bodies attributing them 
with “emotional value, in this case, as being fearsome.”552 Black bodies become “even more 
threatening,” Ahmed writes, “if he passes by; his proximity is imagined then as the possibility of 
future injury. As such, the economy of fear works to contain the bodies of others, a containment 
whose ‘success’ relies on its failure, as it must keep open the very grounds of fear.”553 Fear does 
not, Ahmed concludes, “involve the defense of borders that already exist; rather, fear makes 
those borders, by establishing objects from which the subject, in fearing, can stand apart.”554 
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It is important to understand the function of fear in order to understand affective 
intimacies in the American south especially after these disasters. Fear coupled with disgust swirls 
within this theme of “invasion” to shape the bodies and environments of devastated 
landscapes.555 In his article “Legitimizing Neglect,” Hemant Shah tracks how conservative news 
media, commentators, and leaders positioned residents of New Orleans after the storm as threats 
to white bodies, communities, and the nation.556 While I have outlined the true complexity of the 
environmental history of the Louisiana coast as well as the compounding environmental 
injustices impacting the area of New Orleans (all the reasons humans were left behind, stranded, 
and forced to fend for themselves without food, water, and shelter) journalists cast white 
citizenry as rationally perplexed by Katrina’s aftermath.557 According to some journalists, 
“Blacks were putting themselves, their city, and by extension, the global image of the entire 
nation at risk by their irrational behavior describing survivors as looting, raping, and murdering 
hordes. In many ways, the news coverage was consistent with the way Whites have viewed non-
Whites for millennia: as a threat to ‘our’ society, to ‘our’ world, to ‘our’ way of life, to ‘our’ way 
of thinking, to modern rationality itself.”558 These foreclosed lines of white investment were 
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particularly cruel for the region’s environmental concerns because they affectively shape New 
Orleans residents as animalistic and socially flawed thus unworthy of environmental 
intervention, protection, and rebuilding. Shah writes New Orleans residents were described as a 
“‘very different breed’ that was engaging in ‘hardcore, armed, violence’ and ‘making it 
impossible to save the city.’”559 A Dallas Morning News article “uncritically reported the views 
of Baton Rouge Mayor Kip Holden who said, ‘we do not want to inherit the looting and the 
foolishness that went on in New Orleans. We do not want to inherit the breed that seeks to prey 
on other people.”560 Columnist Mark Alexander wrote that, “these loathsome creatures [referring 
to Black looters] have filled industrial-size garbage bags with clothes and jewels and floated 
them down the street”561 and Tunku Varadarajan for the Wall Street Journal lamented, “some of 
those who remained on the scene of the disaster have offered a disconcerting form of civic 
theater: And as one who has watched this theater, one has recoiled from the actors’ retreat into a 
primitive state.”562 Finally, commentator Rocco DiPippo concluded “given the fact that during 
the recent crisis there, many of its citizens chose the law of the jungle over the rule of law, it is 
easy to conclude that the restoration of New Orleans’s social fabric will be an impossible 
task.”563 These notions of “primitive violence and lawlessness,”564 mirror what Finney described 
as our American racial inheritance that associates blackness with inferior nonhuman animals; 
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black bodies as objects of nature’s wildness. Furthermore, while side-stepping any of the 
environmental and political causes of the crisis in New Orleans, conservative commentators 
enveloped the ordinary, good, rational white subject as constantly at risk of invasion from the 
threat of black contamination. Working in critical geographies, Rachel Brahinsky, Jade Sasser, 
and Laura-Anne Minkoff-Zern, argue our “ways of thinking and experiencing space, nature, and 
the environment are inextricably linked to race and racialization,” or the “ongoing iterative 
process through which race is defined and applied to people.”565 The legacies of white Protestant 
environmentalism are naturalized by positioning bodies of color as “out of place, or unnaturally 
present,” from wilderness spaces to suburban streets, and racial inequalities are naturalized by 
marking black bodies as innately at home in violent and toxic environments.566 
While disregarding the socio-historical and environmental conditions that contribute to 
New Orleans being an ecologically precarious city with a high population of African American 
citizens in poverty, conservative news media positioned New Orleans residents as a test case for 
the unrecruitability of black communities in the moral cause of American white futurity. 
Commentator Tony Sailer wrote, “what you won’t hear, except from me, is that ‘Let the good 
times roll’ is an especially risky message for African-Americans. The plain fact is that they tend 
to possess poorer native judgement than members of better-educated groups. Thus, they need 
stricter moral guidance from society.”567 Jesse Lee Peterson commented, “when 75 percent of 
residents had left the city, it was primarily immoral welfare-dependent Blacks that stayed behind 
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and waited for government to bail them out.”568 Fred Pinkney for the Arizona Republic wrote, 
“the facts are irrefutable. Black Americans in New Orleans proved gullible people duped into 
social dependency will surely experience social disaster and failure.”569 Conservative 
commentators singled out the black male body, inheritors (they claim) of a long line of irrational 
and irresponsible behavior from the absence of their black fathers, as particularly responsible for 
the behaviors (often completely fabricated) they deemed socially corrupt. Pat Buchanan wrote, 
“no sooner had Katrina passed by and the 17th Street levee broke than hundreds of young men 
who should have taken charge in helping the aged, the sick and the women with babies to safety 
took to the streets to shoot, loot and rape.”570 Jonah Goldberg for the National Review positions 
black people, regardless of occupation, as predisposed to lawlessness writing, a “sizable majority 
of blacks—including police—behaved reprehensibly in the aftermath, shooting at rescue 
workers, raping, killing and, yes looting (though no cannibalism.)”571 Finally, commentators like 
Bill O’Reilly positioned the crisis in New Orleans as a warning to all black bodies in America if 
they did not turn away from their (inherently) irrational ways saying “connect the dots and wise 
up. Educate yourself, work hard and be honest. If you don’t the odds are you will be desperately 
standing on a symbolic rooftop someday yourself.”572 Through rhetoric like this, conservative 
talking-points define what it means to be human in ways that echo our American Protestant 
environmental inheritance as a line of white investment. To be human here, is to be rationally in 
                                                        
568 Ibid., 10.  
  
569 Ibid.  
 
570 Shah, 10.  
 
571 Ibid., 11.   
 





control of one’s emotions and a welcoming recipient of the grace normative American behavior 
offers as a respite from the depravity of urbanity. This commentary positions black bodies as 
inhuman, incapable of fulfilling American norms and expectations, their shortcomings 
unsurprising because this (imagined) behavior is to be expected as animalistic black bodies 
cannot be trusted to participate accordingly.  
These disturbing ontologies further demonstrate how fear as an affective economy 
repulses the white nation and naturalizes whiteness, regards poor communities of color with 
disgust as acceptable losses, positions their communities as sacrifice zones, and considers them 
unworthy of protection from environmental degradation. Following the storm, Shah argues, 
“conservative commentary often acknowledged that those stuck in the flood-waters of New 
Orleans were victims of neglect and incompetence in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane. 
But even so, these victims were apparently unworthy of sympathy.”573 David Brooks for the New 
York Times wrote, “most of the ambitious and organized people abandoned inner-city areas of 
New Orleans long ago,” implying those who “chose” to “remain behind are victims of their own 
irrational decision-making and behavior.”574 Commentator Jon Dougherty insinuated that victims 
of Hurricane Katrina were hardly victims writing, “not all ‘victims’ wanted to be rescued 
because they were looting anything and everything they could carry.”575 Political leaders like 
Arizona Sen. John Kyl de-legitimized black survivors by asking, “if people know year after year 
that natural disasters occur in a particular place and if people continue to build there and want to 
live there, should they bear the responsibility of buying insurance or should everyone else bear 
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the responsibility?”576 O’Reilly furthered these sentiments on his show with a clear “racial spin 
on the topic: ‘The White American taxpayers are saying: ‘How much more do we have to give 
here?’”577 Sen. Rick Santorum suggested instituting “tough penalties” for those who “decide to 
ride it out,” suggesting their “choice” to remain in hazardous conditions risks the bodies of more 
rational citizens.578 Finally, House Speaker Dennis Hastert recommended leveling the city 
entirely commenting, “it makes no sense to spend billions of dollars to rebuild a city that’s 7 feet 
under sea level . . . it looks like a lot of that place could be bulldozed.”579 
 The perception of other humans as “the origin of danger,” the positioning of black bodies 
as objects of fear, “is shaped by histories of racism” in which the presence of black bodies “is 
already read as an invasion of bodily territory as well as the territory of the nation.”580 Fearing 
racial invasion like an ever-approaching toxic substance has always been a part of our American 
racial imaginary but within environmentally depleted portions of the country, this fear mixes 
with material toxins in peculiar ways. Toxicity becomes a product of racial fear but does not 
actualize as concern for the realities that toxic materials are unduly burdened upon nonwhite 
bodies. Exploring racialized toxicity, Mel Chen writes “toxins-toxic figures— populate 
increasing ranges of environmental, social, and political discourses. Indeed, figures of toxicity 
have moved well beyond their specific range of biological attribution, leaking out of nominal and 
literal bounds while retaining their affective ties to vulnerability and repulsion: so an advice 
                                                        
576 Ibid.   
 
577 Ibid.  
 
578 Ibid., 12.  
 
579 Shah, 12.    
 





columnist might write Keep a healthy distance from toxic acquaintances, while a senator up for 
reelection decries the ‘toxic’ political atmosphere.”581 “Given its rapidly multiplying meanings,” 
seeping into discourses on global financial stability, the war on terror, and wellness culture, it is 
unsurprising that American vulnerability to toxic threats holds “persistent allure.”582 While 
material feminisms reveal all bodies are open to the complications of toxicity, undermining “any 
effort to identify a ‘natural’ divide between nature/culture,” 583 toxins within an affective 
economy of fear “take on characteristics well beyond their physical properties,” adhering to 
“ideas of vulnerable sovereignty and xenophobia,” that demands an “elsewhere,” beyond the 
white body, as the origin of toxic threats.584 This fear of toxic exposure marks objects regarded 
as toxic as “untouchable,” “unengageable,” and “perhaps even disabling.”585 Using the mid-
2000s panic over lead exposure from toys imported from China as but one example, Chen argues 
that while the “concrete dangers to living bodies of environmental lead,” are ever more present, 
“lead as a cultural phenomenon” is not confined to its “material and physiomedical character.”586 
In the summer of 2007, Chen writes, a “spate of warnings and recalls of preschool toys, pet food, 
seafood, lunchboxes, and other items began to appear in national and local newspapers and 
television and radio news.”587 These reports, attached to images of the threatening toys being 
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played with by white children, singled out “the dangers of lead intoxication as opposed to other 
toxins,” emphasized the “vulnerability of American children to this toxin,” and pointed to a 
common threat of origin, China, who is a major supplier of consumer products in the U.S.588 This 
fear of invading lead was not paired with any “medical reports of children’s intoxication by lead 
content in the indicated toys,” but the “ensemble of images,” Chen argues, “seemed to accelerate 
the explosive construction of a master toxicity narrative about Chinese products in general . . . 
inanimate pollutants could now ‘invade’ all kinds of consumer products, and other pollutants 
could always climb aboard” to threaten vulnerable white bodies.589 During the same cultural 
moment, however, the “sustained concerns of environmental justice activists” about the “effect 
of lead paint on children in impoverished neighborhoods and the greater levels of lead toxicity 
among black children” were disconnected from the “heightened transnational significance of 
lead,” receiving only “minor media coverage among U.S. liberal interests.”590  
Unsurprisingly, while hoping to protect race and nation through cultivating fear, none of 
these commentators talk about the complexity of ecological health, the impact of our desires and 
consumptions, or the choices we make as a nation that disregard the poor and their habitual 
exposure to environmentally hazardous environments. This should be particularly troubling for 
those of us working in religious ecotheory because this economy of fear coupled with 
longstanding propensities in religious environmentalism to orient toward ideal environments 
with particular affective payoffs, makes it increasingly difficult to one, acknowledge how our 
theory and projects habitually contribute to these economies and two, for us to reorient our 
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conversations toward the importance of centering environmentally devastated regions, 
communities of color, ill and disabled bodies in our scholarship.  
In truth, toxins leach, making trouble for our scholarship. They seep, ooze, and leak 
frustratingly beyond their expected boundaries particularly any conception of the human as 
imperviously in-control of our bodies and environments. In truth, racism shapes our affective 
orientations. Sifting through the silt, shards of homes, muddy beloved objects, and the waste 
from five compromised superfund sites post-Katrina, bodies already made vulnerable by poverty 
and institutionalized racism were implicated together in a “toxic soup” of waste, “prejudgments 
and symbolic imaginaries” that rendered the very city itself an unsalvageable contaminant.591 
“Toxic bodies,” Stacy Alaimo writes, are a “particularly potent site for examining the ethical 
space of trans-corporeality” since “all bodies, human and otherwise, are, to greater or lesser 
degrees, toxic at this point in history. 592 Beginning with material, using toxins as our starting 
point and then following the trail of exposure we come to understand how very weak the 
lingering divisions between nature/culture prove to be: 
the same chemical substance may poison the workers who produce it, the neighborhood 
in which it is produced, and the plants and animals who end up consuming it . . . the 
traffic in toxins may, in fact, render it nearly impossible for humans to imagine that their 
own health and welfare is disconnected from that of the rest of the planet or to imagine 
that it is possible to protect ‘nature’ by merely creating separate, distinct areas in which 
‘it’ is ‘preserved.’ In other words, the ethical space of trans-corporeality is never an 
elsewhere but is always already here, in whatever compromised, ever-catalyzing form.593  
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Toxins move transcorporeally despite whatever resistances we might put in their way 
(nature/culture divisions, conceptions of the sacred, impervious ontologies, racial imaginaries) 
but the question of exposure remains political, an environmental justice issue with certain bodies 
more exposed than others. Toxic exposure has always been a concern for Cancer Alley, always a 
reality for the residents of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast offering a pressing challenge to us in 
ecotheory to draw out the racist ontologies at work affectively and materially that conceal these 
continual dangers, the materialized ignorance that presses sticky toxic legacies only upon the 
flesh of black and brown bodies, and those moments where the background slips a bit and we see 
what has always had the potential to seep through the purity myths in our scholarship. 
 
 
All Together Now  
 
 
“For now, despite two appalling blows, coastal Louisiana is still alive. All signs are that the 
culture, the economy, the people, the very soul of this region, somehow made it up to the attic 
and through the roof just ahead of the roaring flood water. And that’s where things now stand. 
But, as a place, as a society, coastal Louisiana is still on that battered roof, hatchets and axes 
tossed aside, everyone hungry and thirsty and tired and scared, surrounded by perilous flood 
waters, waiting for the rest of the country to help implement a rescue plan long on the drawing 
board but never before tried. The fateful moment so many of us knew would eventually come is 
at last here. Either we are witnessing the death of something truly great in America, or the start 
of something even better, something new and blessedly permanent. There will be no second 
chance to save this coast and we can no longer wait till tomorrow to act. Those old luxuries are 




Habitual affinities/attachments that cultivate an inability to move beyond investing in the 
privileges of an assumed healthy environment or the white freedom to move within it makes it 
impossible for new cosmology to generatively address areas like the Gulf Coast that are mired in 
histories of racist oppression, hateful imaginaries, and environmental destruction. Beginning 
                                                        





with an object, a feeling, or an event and digging into our complex relationships with these 
materials, feminist affect theory and material feminisms offer jumping-off points, alternatives to 
forcing every context and concern to fit within a single ethical narrative. By allowing ethical 
practices, as opposed to ethical principles, to germinate from material realities, these approaches 
address the hopes in religion and ecology to move beyond anthropocentrism by extending our 
concerns to the vital, impactful, presence of nonhuman others but caution that “moving beyond 
the human” requires facing which humans we solidified and celebrated in the first place as their 
legacies continue to haunt our work. Most importantly, in conversation with one another, Chen 
argues that this scholarship offers “alternative means, outside of the strictly political or strictly 
emotional, to identify cross-affiliations-affinities-among groups as diverse as environmentalists, 
people with autism, social justice activists, feminists, religious believers in nature’s stewardship, 
and antiracists, to name just a few” and it refuses “prescriptive closures around the possibility of 
metamorphosis, imaginative or otherwise.”595  
With a more porous sense of the human and a less certain sense of our emotional life, 
what do these relational ontologies free us up to think, collaborate, and imagine? Returning to 
my question from the beginning of chapter three, should religion and ecology continue to 
encourage affinities and attachments within devastated landscapes? Disasterscapes and their 
environmental histories reveal that we are always already intimate with human and nonhuman 
others in so many ways that make us uncomfortable by washing away the “should we” and any 
lingering patina suggesting these intimacies are always pleasant, benevolent, or transformative. 
Asking how we should encourage kinship intimacies with nonhuman others becomes a much 
more provocative and ethically rich quandary when we acknowledge that our (dis)regard for 
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human/nonhuman others is oriented by legacies of racism and that these kin-creatures and 
environments carry toxic inheritances that seep into both our bodies and theory. For many 
scholars in religion and ecology the field serves, in part, as religiopoiesis—crafting a possible 
civic home for those who feel ethical obligations to care for biodiversity.596 Ursula Goodenough, 
and other new cosmology scholars, view this crafting of religion as a “core activity of 
humankind,” the cultivation of a “cosmology of origins and destiny” that guides human belief 
and behaviors.597 For Goodenough, through opening ourselves up to metaphors that advocate 
ecocare in “our traditional religions, those in the poetry and art of past and present times, and 
those that emerge from our articulation of scientific understandings,” we will form such a “rich 
tapestry of meaning that we have no choice but to believe in it.”598 But scholarship in material 
feminisms and feminist affect theory reminds us that all making, as Donna Haraway writes, is 
making-with, sympoiesis, “poesis” to make and “sym” as with or together, as “critters-human 
and not become-with each other, compose and decompose each other, in every scale and register 
of time and stuff in sympoietic tangling, in ecological evolutionary developmental earthly 
worlding and unworlding.”599 Like our ancestors, we continue to use nonhuman others to make, 
build, fear, hope, dream but only some of us can claim this making is apolitical. How might 
religion and ecology make-with disaster and those dispossessed/disregarded by the aftermath?  
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For the remainder of this dissertation I work to answer that question by cultivating 
resources for kinship affinities and attachment that also embrace legacies of abuse, 
disappointment, and estrangement through refusing histories blissfully detached from embodied 
inequalities and their affective resonances. This material, particularly scholarship in disability, 
critical race, and queer studies, offers alternative visions for what it means to love, care for kin, 
and resist that do not assume a background of racial or environmental purity. The Gulf Coast as a 
devastated landscape is one place where the background cracks offering opportunities to refuse 
conducting business as usual in ecotheory. Many communities that are mired in complex 
ecological problems also have long, generative, and inspiring histories of ecological activism 
germinating from their material conditions. While the coast unequally bears the material 
consequences of environmental racism, it also produces voices furthering environmental 
activism. Rethinking kinship ethics in the next two chapters, I craft-with disaster by engaging 




















Late Summer 2016, it is flooding again in Louisiana. “If you don’t live in or around 
Louisiana, you may not know that” writes Sean Illing for Salon, “cable news has mostly ignored 
it . . . among other stupidities, Adele’s admission that she can’t dance was deemed more 
newsworthy than a drowning American state.”600 After Hurricane Katrina, after Rita, after the BP 
oil disaster, perhaps many regard Louisiana as existing in a perpetual state of peril, a lost cause. 
“In Louisiana,” Illing writes, “there’s a gnawing sense that the national media seems uninterested 
in this disaster . . . the historic floods felt like an afterthought, a throwaway segment sandwiched 
between Buick commercials.”601 While media coverage glazed over the destruction, southern and 
central Louisiana experienced unprecedented flooding, with homes mostly uncovered by flood 
insurance being utterly destroyed. In Baton Rouge Parish, one of the areas that experienced a 
significant population spike from dispossessed Hurricane Katrina survivors that were 
systematically denied return to New Orleans, flooding damaged upwards of 60,000 residences. 
Illing, and others, described the aerial footage of the devastation as “apocalyptic.”602 “Should We 
Abandon Louisiana?” Zack Kopplin for Slate Magazine writes, “in some ways, we already 
have.” 603 Critics will use this as “one more reason to give up on the state. And they’ll use the 
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inevitable next disaster too,” but “because we, as a country, have collectively endangered our 
future by overusing fossil fuels, that doesn’t mean Louisiana has sacrificed its right to exist and 
its people should leave. Climate change could sink all of our major coastal cities, but Louisiana 
is being held to a different standard, because we’ve already been hit with so many disasters. 
We’ve suffered so much that people are tired of hearing about us. In fact, we’ve suffered so 
much that people outside of Louisiana assume that we want to leave.”604  
What would it mean for religion and ecology to begin thinking about affinity and 
attachment here, with those “who have no choice but to inhabit intimately, over the long term, 
the physical and environmental fallout”605 of histories of investments, abandonments, and 
erasures that makes loving-life along the Gulf Coast a very complex question? What would 
exploring kinship attachments in devastated landscapes look like? What models can we look to 
for claiming unloved others as our cared-for kin? Much like their habitual use of “sacred,” new 
cosmology conversations do not dig into the deep scholarly roots of kinship language, long 
histories of theorization within anthropology, religious studies, and the social sciences, but 
nevertheless rely on kin and kinship to get at the affective stakes, the “deep, driving feelings,”606 
they feel are at play in both the cultivation and ethical promise of its new orientating narrative. 
Echoing my contentions with their use of sacrality, I argue that new cosmology has a much more 
ethically rich concept in kinship than it appears to realize. Borrowing from Elizabeth Freeman, 
“my point is not that we need a new set of terms, but rather, a different sense of what kinship 
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might be.”607 If we are all part of one sacred family, connected via evolutionary inheritance and 
shared destiny, what is our ethical obligation to those that, thus far, never receive invitations to 
the new cosmology family reunion? What does it mean to love, care for, and desire intimacy 
with those bodies, creatures, communities, and habitats significantly impacted by environmental 
degradation? In her most recent work on “multispecies affinities”608 and environmental thinking 
for trouble times, Donna Haraway advocates “making-with” or “staying with the trouble” of 
environmental degradation in order to resist the “horrors” of the “Anthropocene”—the 
geological epoch characterized by tremendous human transformation of the planet.609 “Neither 
despair nor hope is tuned to the senses,” she writes, “to mindful matter, to material semiotics, to 
mortal earthlings in thick copresence”610 and “we—all of us on Terra—live in disturbing times, 
mixed-up times, troubling and turbid times. The task is to become capable, with each other in all 
of our bumptious kinds, of response.”611 Becoming-capable, the labor of “shaping,” what she 
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terms, “response-abilities,”612 requires making “kin in lines of inventive connection.”613 “Kin,” 
Haraway writes: 
is a wild category that all sorts of people do their best to domesticate. Making kin as 
oddkin rather than, or at least in addition to, godkin and genealogical and biogenetic 
family troubles important matters, like to whom one is actually responsible. Who lives 
and who dies, and how, in this kinship rather than that one? What shape is this kinship, 
where and whom do its lines connect and disconnect, and so what? What must be cut and 
what must be tied if multispecies flourishing on earth, including human and other-than-
human beings in kinship, are to have a chance?614  
 
We have seen some of what domesticated conceptions of kinship like those of new cosmology 
occludes—those places, spaces, and bodies outside its familial confines. To develop response-
abilities within religion and ecology, we will similarly need to consider what must but cut and 
must be tied in order to address uncertain futures. Haraway offers helpful resonances with my 
questions about the limitations of new cosmology’s universal ethics, those shadowed bodies, 
communities, and encounters not considered in its affective project, by not accepting claims 
to/for kinship wholesale. Why this kinship but not that one? Why these kin but not others? 
Furthermore, what sorts of responsibilities do these lines of investment compel us toward (and 
away from which others)? Why does new cosmology invest in evolutionary kinship over any 
other form of kinship? How do we cultivate creative connections that both address the 
disinherited outliers and bleak environmental futures? Before moving in the next chapter toward 
constructing more radical forms of kinship, I first want to think about some of the habitual 
kinship conceptions that religion and ecology should sever and others they should cling-to by 
drawing in discussions from other disciplines that unsettle similar themes. Here, I reiterate new 
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cosmology’s conception of kinship and how it expects it will be a guiding ethic for planetary 
care and then I demonstrate the limitations that need to be addressed within this frame in order 
for kinship to be a vital concept for crisis contexts.  
 
What Must Be Cut 
 New cosmologists use kinship and its affective resonances (affinity, commonality, 
intimacy, empathy, concern, care, connection, love) in two ways. First, to describe their 
transdisciplinary, cross-cultural, and interreligious community of thinkers and activists, what 
Connie Barlow calls “environmentalists of a spiritual bent,” whose traditions may differ but 
nevertheless they share a “love of nature” and “green commitment.”615 And second, to describe 
their affinities and attachments with and to nonhuman others. First, despite, or for some in-spite, 
of religious and cultural differences, new cosmology claims the really-real thing that connects 
humans as kin is our spectacular evolutionary inheritance revealed to us through scientific 
cosmologies. For example, Loyal Rue writes: 
the story of cosmic evolution reveals to us the common origin, nature, and destiny shared 
by all human beings. It documents our essential kinship as no other story can do. This is 
no contrived shamanistic legend; this is not a bit of clever tribal tattooing— it is more 
like the real thing. This story shows us in the deepest possible sense that we are all sisters 
and brothers— fashioned from the same stellar dust, energized by the same star, 
nourished by the same planet, endowed with the same genetic code, and threatened by the 
same evils. This story, more than any other, humbles us before the magnitude and 
complexity of creation. Like no other story it bewilders us with the improbability of our 
existence, astonishes us with the interdependence of all things, and makes us feel grateful 
for the lives we have. And not least of all, it inspires us to express our gratitude to the 
past by accepting a solemn and collective responsibility for the future.616  
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Here, Rue uses kinship to assert the biological unity of all humans. New cosmology’s appeals to 
the “language of metaphor and myth” to shape science—with its “potential to arouse and direct 
the emotional regulators of behavior”—serve as a corrective to what it views are culturally and 
religiously misguided morals that counter green sentiment.617 Consider “examples taken from 
ancient wisdom traditions,” Rue writes: 
 the Hebraic tradition emphasizes the majesty and awesome power of God,  
 the creator of the universe and ultimate judge of human righteousness. Almighty God 
enters into a covenant with Israel, promising viability and prosperity on the condition that 
Israel obey his commands. Blessings if they do, suffering and hardship if they do not. 
God’s people are made to feel humble and awestruck in the presence of absolute power 
and authority. They are made to feel grateful for the undeserved bounty from God, and 
duty-bound to observe his Law. The logic of reciprocity could not be more obvious. The 
imagery of the story activates the social emotions, creating a deficit state that seeks to 
repair in obedient service. Similarly, see how the central images of the Christian story are 
designed to arouse the social emotions. Affection is elicited by images of the infant Jesus, 
mother and child, the caring shepherd; sympathy is aroused by the image of a helpless 
and innocent man suffering on a cross at the hands of merciless authorities; gratitude is 
called forth by the reminder that Jesus’ death was a selfless act undertaken of the sake of 
others; guilt is instilled by the insinuation that it is we who deserve the punishments of 
the cross; resentment or moral outrage is aroused against those, like Judas, who betray 
the altruistic Jesus. By such imagery the emotional effectors are set to work in motivating 
a life of service to Christian virtues.618 
 
Epic retellings of scientific cosmologies have the same affective power as the evocative Jewish 
and Christian narratives in their ability to direct ethical behavior, Rue and others claim, through a 
combination of the best of both science and religion—knowledge that is “authentically real” via 
science with religions’ “rich poetic and mythological language” forming an “integrated story”619 
that taps into our evolutionary need for ethically guiding myths.620 Once we obtain knowledge of 
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these tremendous kinships and give them their appropriate due via feelings of awe, wonder, and 
reverence, life-revering practices will follow. Part of the problem with this perspective is “Rue’s 
fixation with religions as mythic projects” that “effectively ‘trigger’ appropriate feelings and 
behaviors” without any consideration of religions’ other functions nor the continual socio-
cultural production, embodied practices, and normative policing that make them powerful.621  
Furthermore, Rue’s co-option of science to work as an emotional regulator emphasizes “human 
solidarity and kinship” with a particular ahistorical and apolitical conception of “human” in 
mind. 622 “By no means,” Lisa Sideris writes, “does Rue’s emphasis on diversity in biological 
systems translate into an affirmation of cultural diversity.”623 If anything, this assertion flattens 
and homogenizes the notion of “the human” in ways that might threaten an affirmation of 
cultural diversity.  
Furthermore, Sideris points out, “as anyone who has raised a child can attest, people 
seldom feel gratitude simply because they are instructed that they should, in light of certain facts 
about their existence.”624 Sideris is skeptical that new cosmology can shape emotions like 
religions do, but Rue insists evolution is on his side. Rue writes that religious traditions tap into 
the “millions of years of evolution” that: 
have equipped our species with a range of specific emotional systems that were selected 
for their powers to produce adaptive behaviors. Together, these systems may be seen to 
constitute a primitive system of morality. Emotional traits operate according to inherent 
rules—an ‘if-then’ logic—such that if an individual is presented with a stimulus (say, an 
act of generosity by a conspecific), then he or she will be likely to experience gratitude 
and will respond accordingly. The emotional toolkit of humans is much debated, but 
there is something approaching a consensus that it includes sympathy, resentment, 
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gratitude, affection, guilt, disgust, anger, jealousy, and various shades of fear (e.g., awe, 
respect, humility). These are the systems exploited by the ministrations of a religious 
tradition . . . The power of religious traditions to redirect and regulate the social mobile 
rests on their ability to manipulate the emotional toolkit by symbolic means. Consider, 
for example how the image of an innocent man being tortured elicits a sympathetic 
response, or how images of an infant elicit affectionate responses, or how the bounty of 
creation elicits gratitude, or how images of heaven and hell inspire hope and fear.625 
 
Shortly I will consider a conversation on religious emotions and the influence of evolutionary 
biology, and if evolutionary inheritance trumps the sociality of affects as Rue suggests,626 but it 
is important to note that Rue’s reflection on the evolution of religious emotions is completely 
uncited with no mention of the work of his contemporaries in cognitive science of religion nor 
anything in affect studies that might support his trajectory. It is clear, though, that this 
understanding of ethical emotions has no conception of the inherent sociality and historical 
contingency of affect that I discussed at length in the previous chapter. What is most 
problematic, I find, is the expectation that all humans ought to align with one narrative and direct 
their emotional investments accordingly without any recognition of the complexity of emotional 
life. Yes, many people would feel sympathy for the image of a tortured man but, as Sedgwick, 
Tomkins, and Ahmed suggest, it depends on who the man appears to be—if he is “counted” as a 
man who the audience viewing the image deems worthy of sympathy. Or, as Fanon so deftly 
illustrates, if he is considered a man at all. Affects’ peculiar plasticity, its’ surprising ability to 
slip beyond our hopes for encounters revealing influences and desires that are not always 
expected or we might wish to ignore, means any combination of emotions could be expected. 
The pain, loss, and degradation of certain bodies is not always felt or recognized as pain and loss 
by others depending upon the histories of associations and encounters between these bodies.  
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If new cosmology kinship cannot embrace the benevolent conceptions of difference that 
any Kindergartener is taught to socially celebrate (my, what a diverse world it is) it seems unwise 
to expect it to embrace the ramifications of disposability and the complexities of slow violence 
we see unfolding in the national denial of Louisiana’s disaster. Again, seeming to do little to 
address social injustices, counter to Bron Taylor’s hopes that the kinship ethics of new 
cosmology would likely erode supremacist ideologies, kinship in this sense ignores the other 
sedimented affective bonds we share, but share in ways that isolate us from others. This affective 
narrative Rue and others hope will be our ethical guide works best when we pretend we inherit 
nothing but this evolutionary legacy erasing any embodied differences (race, class, gender, 
sexuality, ability) that might impact our experiences. Bodies carrying alternative environmental 
histories, those black, brown, female, and (as I will explore further in chapter seven) queer, and 
disabled bodies that have not inherited the salvific nature of white American investment, nor the 
ability to hold this “nature” as an object of desire, or even the ensured safety to experience its 
pleasures, might understandably bristle at Rue’s reverence and gratitude for a narrative of 
interdependence that so clearly does not reflect their experiences and encounters. If these bodies 
and communities are still our “sisters and brothers,” then how do their experiences, concerns, 
and hopes become part of our scholarship? 
 Second, new cosmology writers use the affective language of kinship to describe their 
connection, or longing for connection, with nonhuman others. For example, Thomas Berry and 
Brian Swimme’s perspectives on our “new view of the universe,” are that “we now have the 
wonder, not merely that we are related to and intimate with everything about us, but that we have 
a cousin relationship with every being in the universe, especially the living beings of the planet 
Earth. We have not descended to a lower level; they have, as it were, been recognized at a higher 




other.”627 Berry and Swimme acknowledge both intimacy and reciprocity within these kinships, 
an exchange of value that hurts both humans and nonhuman others when humans do not 
acknowledge these connections. However, while they do recognize both environmental 
degradation and species erasure as pressing realities,628 new cosmology kinship asserts a 
biological connection with all life but does not consider any radical notions of intimacy or 
reciprocity. It does not question if these pressing realities might seep into and alter our 
conceptions of intimacy and reciprocity themselves. Considering these vulnerabilities however, 
how our scholarship should meet and address the affective intersections of environmental and 
social degradation, I contend is the only way to hold onto environmental kinship as a vital 
concept. Before I move to discuss reshaping our theory around these concerns, I consider some 
of the stakes involved in reconceptualizing kinship. First, I will address and complicate new 
cosmology’s appeal to evolutionary affects. Then, I survey kinship studies to look at reservations 
with and re-articulations of “kinship” in other disciplines that new cosmology habitually does not 
engage.   
One of the reasons new cosmology is able to side-step environmental degradation and its 
uneven consequences for the poor in its conceptions of kinship is new cosmology’s habitual 
tendency to equate nature with science. Its focus on “expert” knowledge about the material world 
over the quotidian realities that continually shape these worlds allows new cosmology to avoid 
addressing multiplicities of experience and be very selective about who does and does not count 
as an “expert.” Furthermore, the “scientific mythmakers” of new cosmology “frequently deploy 
generic and uncritical categories of science” insisting that “modern discoveries in cosmology or 
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evolutionary biology point to some particular or objective meaning, purpose, or value in the 
universe or for human life generally”629 while ignoring all critiques of the social construction of 
scientific knowledge coming from material feminisms, philosophy and history of science, and 
feminist science and technology studies (STS.)  
 Since the early eighties, ongoing work in feminist STS (and other philosophies of 
science) from theorists like Evelyn Fox Keller, Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Helen 
Longino, and Karen Barad, offer three general critiques about the production of scientific 
knowledge that new cosmology authors habitually ignore. First, is the “reminder that science and 
technology are importantly social,” that what humans claim is true or real about our material 
world is only “contingently real” and open to resistance from other scholars and the power 
politics of funding which carry their own gendered and raced implications.630 “Claims do not just 
spring from the subject matter into acceptance, via passive scientists, reviews, and editors. 
Rather, it takes work for them to become important,” funneled through “political, social, legal, 
ethical” and bureaucratic interests. 631 Which bodies are allowed to produce this knowledge, 
which material, communities, ideas, theories are worthy of study, how these “objects” of study 
should be ethically procured or treated, all continue to be political struggles. Furthermore, as 
Helen Longino’s work on the role of values in science makes clear, “what a fact is evidence for 
depends on what background assumptions” we hold socially allowing “people to agree on facts 
and yet disagree about the conclusion to be drawn from them. At the same time, which 
background assumptions people choose, and which ones they choose to question, will be 
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strongly informed by social values” with the most prevalent suspicions and resistances toward 
perspectives from those groups already marginally represented in the sciences.632 Haraway’s 
body of work could, arguably, be described as careful attention to all the ways scientists have 
“carried with them the marks of their own histories and cultures,”633 into their fields of study, 
affinities for creatures, and love-affairs with habitats. However, the science narratives that new 
cosmologists choose to embrace are not regarded as choices because they never locate their 
embrace of science within a contested field with numerous voices, perspectives, biases, and 
desires wrestling with each other for financial, political, and intellectual recognition. New 
cosmology’s “almost hagiographic devotion” to particular scholars, like E. O. Wilson and 
Richard Dawkins, “discourages and deflects critique and critical exchange” and fashions a 
“vision” of science that makes “selective use of particular scientific claims and discoveries, 
carefully arranged and narrated so as to support meanings and messages desired by some,” but 
does not include deep critiques of these scholars either within scientific communities or the 
humanities. 634 Consequently, there is no interrogation of which communities, bodies, and 
habitats these narratives serve or benefit.  
Second, despite assumptions that science reveals the realities of nature, feminist STS 
argues not only that representations and social realities constructed, but many of the things that 
scientists study and work with decidedly not “natural.” Sociologist Karin Knorr Cetina reminds 
us that “nature is not to be found in the laboratory” with the laboratory as a “site of action from 
which ‘nature’ is as much as possible excluded rather than included.”635 For the most part, Sergio 
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Sismondo points out, “the materials used in scientific laboratories are already partly prepared for 
that use before they are subjected to laboratory manipulations. Substances are purified, and 
objects are standardized and even enhanced. Chemical laboratories buy pure reagents, geneticists 
might use established libraries of DNA, and engineered animal models can be invaluable. Once 
these objects are in a laboratory, they are manipulated. They are placed in artificial situations, to 
see how they react” and “the result of these various manipulations is that knowledge derived 
from laboratories is knowledge about things that are distinctly non-natural. These things are 
constructed, by hands-on fully material work.”636 Echoing my arguments in chapter one, new 
cosmology does not regard nature as a social construction, so it pays little attention to the vast 
divide between “nature,” as a lab-created or theoretical ideal, and nonhuman others struggling 
for survival in habitats impacted by humans in so many ways. Thus, they see no need to reshape 
the environmental ethics they claim draw from scientific fact to address a rapidly changing 
planet.  
Third, critiques of scientific knowledge production argue that “science and social order 
are ‘co-produced.”637 Networks and genealogies that are assumed to be orderly and stable are, 
what Sismondo calls a “heterogeneous construction” of “isolated parts of the material and social 
worlds: laboratory equipment, established knowledge, patrons, money, institutions” and where 
“no one piece of a network can determine the shape of the whole” and “not all of whom may be 
immediately compatible.”638 But because the scientific and the social are co-produced, where 
“good” science is shaped by policy concerns, and the criteria for good policy is shaped by what 
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is determined to be “good science” in a “process of ‘mutual construction,’” feminist STS 
scholars question perspectives that separate the two or fail to question the underlying desires and 
motivations of either.639 These realities are not intended to deflect from the agentic capacity of 
our material world, implying that nature is purely a social construct, rather these reminders 
illuminate the contingent and heterogeneous qualities of scientific knowledge production—that 
“science and technology are social, that they are active, and that they do not take nature as it 
comes.”640 New cosmology does not question the desires, values, and ways of being that 
consecrated science validates, celebrates, and rewards. It does not need to consider: the gendered 
or raced implications of any of the scientific material they embrace, the complexities of 
catastrophic events or crisis conditions, or any of the voices wrestling with scientific knowledge 
production when working with such idealized frames. 
Ignoring the cautions of critical science studies and carrying numerous assumptions about 
the scientific and the social into work that conflates “science and religion” or makes “science 
into a religion” as Sideris argues, the “consecrated science” of new cosmology “is not science 
that is obviously in the service of nature and its goods,”641 and its use of biophilic kinship 
functions similarly—support for their ideals about humanity, religion, and science but less 
helpful for contemporary environmental ethical concerns. As I have addressed, while often 
unreferenced new cosmology thinkers draw from a conception of biological kinship that 
extrapolates from Darwin’s life work to emphasize that all life-forms are connected by sharing 
common ancestry. Bron Taylor identifies this conception of kinship as present in many core 
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environmental thinker’s work including John Muir, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson all 
anticipating Wilson’s eventual biophilia hypothesis theorizing that “our affective, aesthetic, and 
moral appreciation of nature, and our sense of kinship with other organisms, can be understood 
as evolutionary outcomes that generally promote environmentally adaptive behaviors.”642 Berry, 
Wilson, Rue, Tucker, Grim, Barlow, and Taylor all put quite a bit of stock in the ethical 
possibilities of this kinship. There “is no obstacle to kinship ethics as a basis for caring about the 
entire web of life,” Taylor writes, an “evolutionary worldview leads quite logically to a 
commitment to discern and pursue social arrangements that promote flourishing and resilient 
biocultural systems.”643 Tucker uses language like heritage, fraternity, relatedness, ancestry, 
belonging, “extending our desires and affections for others,” and “widening our circle of 
compassion”644 beyond the human but she (and others) does not go much beyond wonder at and 
or for the scientific knowledge of these evolutionary connections.645 The persistence of 
tremendous diversity, both human and nonhuman, and its benefits seems to be enough of an 
ethical gesture for many of these authors. However, I find this use of kinship as a nod toward 
ethical concerns lacking complexity making it difficult to find resonance for devastated 
landscapes.  
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How strong are these biophilic tendencies and do they do all the work that is needed for 
robust affective kinship ties? We should remain skeptical as numerous voices, including Sideris, 
Donovan Schaefer, Karen Barad, and Stephen Jay Gould, frequently unsettle easy correlations 
between evolutionary inheritance and ethical guidance. In his integration of evolutionary biology 
and affect theory into religious studies in Religious Affects, Schaefer allies with Gould and 
Richard Lewontin to resist claims that evolutionary biology rationally explains bodies and 
behavior. The “view that ‘natural selection is so powerful,’” Schaefer writes, “and the constraints 
upon it so few that direct production of adaptation through its operation becomes the primary 
cause of nearly all organic form, function, and behavior,’ is, at best, a selective reading of 
Darwin.”646 Pluralist approaches to Darwinism, like Gould, Lewontin, and Schaefer’s, position 
embodied life as “deeply complicated” and assessing everything “according to what is ‘rational’ 
for a given situation,” or to fit within a narrative of evolutionary legacy “doesn’t get at that 
complexity.”647 Specificities, like history, habitat, culture, and embodied difference all swirl 
within this complexity to shape our affective lives and relationships.  
 For example, as Barad, Jane Bennett, and Schaefer illuminate, while natural selection “is 
and remains a powerful force of evolutionary transformation, it is not the only source.”648 
Landscapes matter and often in unpredictable ways. “Landscapes,” Schaefer writes, “are rogue 
agents, actively impressing themselves into the embodied histories of organisms. In Karen 
Barad’s term, they are intra-active—material forces as upstart actants rather than inert 
background features. Or they are invested with what Jane Bennett calls vital materiality, 
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nonpersonal agents that nonetheless take an active role in conditioning fields of possibility.”649 
Furthermore, organisms do not respond to the shifting material forces of landscapes in real time. 
Instead, “there is play in the system, a lag time in the reorganization of features, as well as the 
intransigence of existing structures.”650 “Rather than sleek, polished, high-functioning 
machines,” Schaefer contends, “bodies are messy, heterogeneous, and archaic, scrap heaps 
advertising contraptions of old, broken, fortuitous parts. Evolution leaves remnants, remainders, 
fixtures jutting out at odd angles” and evolution “as the production of embodied histories is an 
awkward sedimentation of accidents.”651 Responding to the “nature-nurture” question from a 
different perspective, Schaefer argues that affect theory in conversation with evolutionary 
biology emphasizes that embodied life is always a “hybrid system of quickly changing and 
slowly changing forces.”652 Consequently, while evolutionary biology illuminates how and why 
humans might feel affiliation with other creatures, religion and ecology should be less certain 
about how these compulsions play out in real time and more curious about those places, spaces, 
and events where affinities and attachments do not play out as we hoped. While new cosmology 
points toward biophilic remnants as evidence for our capacity for kinship compulsion, it has not 
speculated much about what impact the weight of history or ecological devastation may have on 
these capacities.  
 Furthermore, drawing in my conversation with work in affect theory, humans do not 
come to encounter with nonhuman others blissfully neutral. “Bodies,” Schaefer writes, “are not 
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inert physical objects that choose to enjoy, feel, or experience. They are constituted inside a 
current of affects pulling them into networks of affectively mediated relationships.”653 Affect 
theory “corrects the presupposition that we are angels, that we can dictate to our bodies how to 
feel about our world” and “highlights how animal forces disrupt the abstract prerogative of the 
reasoning, calculating, talkative subject and attach bodies to complex structures of feeling that 
cut against not only external appraisal of the right things for bodies to do, places for them to go, 
ways for them to believe and feel, but the sovereign self’s own assessment of its best course of 
action.”654 Affective economies, Schaefer argues, are “queer economies that are driven by the 
uneven circulation of pleasures and desires rather than a disembodied logos.”655 New cosmology 
hopes for a “clear link between our evolutionary endowments and an environmental ethics,”656 
but as Ahmed and Schaefer illuminate, affects “do not proceed along straight, clear-cut paths 
from objects to subjects, but rather circulate within and between bodies and worlds, intersecting 
at multiple levels and reshaping objects as they swerve.” 657  
I will expand more on the possibilities of queer biophilic intimacies in chapter seven, but 
it is important to recognize what critiques of evolutionary affinities unsettle. Thinking with 
encounters in areas marked by environmental injustice and destruction, any lingering biophilic 
compulsions would meet the push and pull of competing tensions. Affects are not painted onto a 
blank slate but are vibrant in and through the bodies that encounter them and affect others. 
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Bodies may or may not feel awe or reverence for the nonhuman world based on sedimented 
histories of power, the unpredictable encroachment of landscape, and the reverberations of 
environmental racism.658 Despite our ethical intentions, it seems difficult for biophilic 
engagement to work so rationally in these economies. It is also possible biophilic compulsion 
will morph after disaster when the panic, silt, sludge, fear, vitriol, and flashes of hope all settle 
into our bodies in unpredictable ways. While religion and ecology should remain skeptical about 
biophilic tendencies to coalesce rationally into onto-ethical arguments, we might also remain 
open to the possibility for our biophilic remnants to form surprising intimacies.  
In sum, new cosmology writers cultivate an ideal conception of nature, one they argue is 
the really-real revealed to us through scientific marvels, as set-apart from the material 
complexities of daily life in environmentally precarious locations like the encroaching 
complications of pollution, degradation, disaster, and loss. Hence, new cosmology can encourage 
kinship “intimacy” and “reciprocity” with a nature that its authors may not experience, that many 
may never experience, in their daily lives. They profess and encourage a love for a nature they 
claim is true but remains a construction that reflects the needs, interests, desires, and hopes of 
particular populations at the expense of others. Since it explores intimacy and reciprocity solely 
within a nature of its own making, ignoring other encounters and imaginaries, new cosmology 
models for kinship with one another and with nonhuman others cannot map onto intimacies and 
attachments with and to many bodies and environments in their current conditions like the 
nationally denied suffering of Gulf Coast communities. If appeals to evolutionary affects 
function more as thought-experiments than definitive ethical drives, then other constructions of 
kinship can hold as much value for religion and ecology to think about affinities and attachments 
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with nonhuman others. I see no reason to rely solely on evolutionary kinships. Uncertain that 
biophilia works as rationally as new cosmology intends and compelled to regard biophilia more 
for its speculative potential, I advocate for holding onto the obvious resonance kinship concepts 
hold for theorists in religion and ecology but encourage less fidelity to evolutionary kinships via 
opening our use of kinship to the plurality of shapes it takes in other avenues. 
 Questions like the following demonstrate both the provocative power of kin concepts 
and the trouble facing us: do creatures and environments negotiating mutations change our 
conceptions of relatedness or belonging? What does it mean to extend our desires and affections 
toward incredibly damaged environments? What does compassion for eyeless shrimp, clawless 
crabs, oily hermits, and displaced Gulf communities really entail? Responses to these questions 
and the pressing difficulties that meets us in contemporary religious environmental ethics could 
be numerous from the practical to the speculative but considering kinship both as affective 
encounter and ethical directive, I argue that focusing on some of the overlooked complexities of 
kinship models, what might be seen as the murkier elements of intimacy, will help set religion 
and ecology up to cultivate more potent ideas about kinship.  
 
What Must Be Tied 
 Kinship, kinship language, and kinship systems, Patrick McConvell argues, is the 
“bedrock of all human societies that we know,” and of importance to disciplines that study the 
“matrix into which human children are born” like anthropology, sociology, history, linguistics, 
and religion.659 Noting that the systematic study of kinship has fallen out of favor within his own 
field of anthropology, McConvell acknowledges how language and kinship remain significant 
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for cultural studies.660 Loosely defined as “the set of possibilities for social relations in any given 
culture,”661 kinship in state-centered societies, Elizabeth Freeman writes, “consists of the social 
policies that recognize some forms of lived relationality” and “demand certain responsibilities 
between recognized relatives.”662 Kinship theory “is the body of knowledge emerging from 
attempts to abstract the governing principles of relationality” from the “practices of intimacy 
observed in a given culture.”663 In “kinship’s most conservative meanings and functions,” 
however, kinship itself is “fundamentally exclusive, depending as it does upon the distinction 
between those who are kin and those who are not kin.”664 For example, Freeman contends, any 
good study of “gendered and sexualized social life,” should recognize the inherent exclusionary 
functions of much of the “dominate lexicon of kinship.” 665 Critiques of kinship studies primarily 
illuminate, I argue, that human relational life continually exceeds the language and limitations of 
state and religiously sanctioned intimacies. As just two examples that I will consider in this 
chapter, any comprehensive theory of kinship must “answer to the paradox that lesbians and gays 
both inhabit and exceed the matrix of couplehood and reproduction,” as well as the historic and 
contemporary reverberations of the reality that “captive persons of African descent were wrested 
from their kinship structures” and “denied access to the kinship systems of the United States and 
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other imperial powers.”666 Thus kin and its affective resonances are corporeally, historically, and 
politically complex in ways currently unrecognized by religion and ecology.  
While it might seem like these discussions are outside the umbrella of religious 
environmental ethics, wrestling with the criticisms and extensions of kinship theory is important 
for religion and ecology because these conversations are raising concerns that are pivotal to the 
ignored contexts I am addressing in this project. For example, religion and ecology’s hopes to 
nurture kinship with nonhuman others does not respond to the racism shaping encounters 
between bodies and their environments in the American south. Religion and ecology has not 
considered what it means to cultivate kinship with and between abject bodies. Drawing from 
critiques of kinship arguments in other arenas can help us to unsettle our habitual kinship 
appeals.   
 Carving a small slice of the lengthy and contentious legacy of kinship studies,667 “kinship 
was foundational for ethnographic study of social structures and cultural practices throughout 
                                                        
666 Ibid., 302. 
 
667 For more on the study of/critiques of kinship studies see: Sara Bamford and James 
Leach, eds. Kinship and Beyond: The Genealogical Method Reconsidered (New York: 
Berghahn, 2009); Elise Berman, “Holding On: Adoption, Kinship Tensions, and Pregnancy in 
the Marshall Islands,” American Anthropologist 116, no. 3 (2014): 578-590; Mary Bouquet, 
“Family Trees and Their Affinities: The Visual Imperative of the Genealogical Method,” Man 2, 
no. 1 (1996): 43-66; Janet Carsten, After Kinship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); James D. Faubion, “Kinship is Dead. Long Live Kinship: A Review Article,” 
Comparative Study of Society and History 38, no. 1 (1996): 67-91; Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge A. M. Sheridan, trans. (London: Routledge, 1969); Clifford Geertz, 
The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic, 1973); Thomas Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Claude Lévi-
Strauss, Structural Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1963); The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship (New York: Basic Books, 1969);Dwight Reed, “Kinship Theory: A Paradigm Shift,” 
Ethnology 46, no. 4 (2007): 329-364; Marshall Sahlin, “What Kinship is (Part One),” Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute 17, no. 1 (2011): 2-19; “What Kinship is (Part Two),” 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 17, no 2 (2011): 227-242; What Kinship Is—And 
Is Not (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013);  David Schneider, American Kinship: A 
Cultural Account (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Ludwig Wittgenstein, 




much of the 20th century,” Robert A. Wilson summarizes, but “conceptualized as distinctively 
biological, genealogical, or reproductive (or bio-essentialist.)”668 In a fundamental shift, David 
Schneider’s 1984 A Critique of the Study of Kinship asked “whether kinship itself is in fact a 
modern Western paradigm,”669 by contending kinship studies of the past, even when they 
expanded beyond consanguineous connections, translated all “putative kinship terminologies via 
a biological-genealogical-reproductive grid” conceptualizing “kinship bio-essentially in any 
ethnographic context.”670 This narrative, Schneider argues, was an “ethnocentric projection,” 
imposing a “peculiarly American-European conception of kinship onto other cultures” without 
questioning if these intimacies challenged or fundamentally resisted Western paradigms.671 
Following Schneider’s critique was what Wilson calls a “dumbfounded lull in work on kinships 
(especially in North America.)”672 More contemporary kinship theory, responding to Schneider’s 
work and integrating scholarship from Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault, drifts from the 
language of “kin and kinship” toward “relatives and relatedness,” or “relationships of intimacy,” 
focusing on the “performativity and lived experience of kinship” opening kinship theory to a 
“novel array of topics—reproductive technologies, chosen families, autoethnography, gay and 
lesbian intimacy, invented communities, the body and personhood, artificial life, Internet dating, 
identity politics, disability activism, ethnicity, and adoption practices.”673  
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 Particularly productive for my concerns is how scholarship in feminist and queer 
studies674 challenges these frameworks by taking up relatedness and the “concept of intimacy 
both as a subject and as an analytic rubric.”675 Some queer and feminist scholars argue kinships’ 
historical “lack of ‘extendability’ has often meant that sexual minorities are stranded between 
individualist notions of identity on the one hand and on the other a romanticized notion of 
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community” encouraging the position that “any genuinely democratic culture needs to abandon 
the notion.” 676 Elizabeth Freeman, however, compellingly argues that sexual and racial 
minorities should pay attention to kinship as a “process by which small-scale relationships 
become thinkable, meaningful, and/or the basis for larger social formations” and the possibilities 
for “non-procreative contributions of the body itself to such a process, are of crucial interest.”677 
Kinship matters for queer theory, Freeman writes, “in the way that Judith Butler reminds us that 
‘bodies matter’”: 
(1) a culture’s repetition of particular practices actually produces what seem to be the 
material facts that supposedly ground those practices in the first place, and (2) when 
those repetitions are governed by a norm, other possibilities are literally unthinkable 
and impossible. Heterosexual gender norms therefore ‘make’ kin relations, in that 
they regulate human behavior toward procreation while appearing to be the result of 
some primal need to propagate the species. Meanwhile, whatever connections forged 
by queer gender performances and other embodied behaviors ‘make’ remains 
unintelligible as kinship.678 
 
Linking kinship with queer theory, Freeman suggests three modalities, or queer readings, of 
kinship that both resist normative limitations and prove useful for thinking intimacies both with 
abject bodies and the weight of racist histories. The first, considers kinship as embodied practice. 
The second, thinks about kinship as cultural, rather than just genetic, futurity. And the third, 
regards kinship as kinetic relationship or continual activity between subjects in relation. First,  
Freeman contends, thinking of kinship as embodied practice, we must recognize it as “resolutely 
corporeal.” Freeman continues:  
its meanings and functions draw from a repertoire of understandings about the body, from 
a set of strategies oriented around the body’s limitations and possibilities . . . And if 
kinship is anything at all—if it marks a terrain that cannot be fully subsumed by other 
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institutions such as religion, politics, or economics—this terrain lies in its status as a set 
of representational and practical strategies for accommodating all the possible ways one 
human being’s body can be vulnerable and hence dependent upon that of another, and for 
mobilizing all the possible resources one has for taking care of another.679  
 
Thinking about kinship as corporeal practice, as things we do with and between bodies, helps us 
recognize our fundamental vulnerabilities as material beings and “marks out a certain terrain” for 
studying corporeal dependency.680  Queer activists have historically negotiated how American 
culture obfuscates the reality that kinship often functions as “private, unevenly distributed social 
security” relieving the government of “the burden of caretaking onto kin as if this caretaking 
were a natural expression of preexisting biological ties.”681 Queer intimacies simultaneously 
exceed heteronormative assumptions about these care roles, illuminate “unequally 
institutionalized” forms of care, and demonstrate that care can come in many different forms 
beyond “the dominant kinship grid.”682 
Second, Freeman argues that kinship as embodied practice not only recognizes modalities 
of dependence but also functions as a “technique of renewal,” the “process by which bodies and 
the potential for physical and emotional attachment are created, transformed, and sustained over 
time.”683 Furthermore, this reading of kinship as technique of renewal illuminates how queer and 
black communities continue to be denied kinship recognitions. The most “systematized example 
of kinship as a technique of renewal, of course, is the domestic labor that women are expected to 
do to transform the raw material of a worker’s wages into what he needs to labor for another day: 
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a bed, food, clean clothes, etc.”684 But kinship also “reproduces the cultural” recreating and 
recharging “bodies towards ends other than labor, such as play, love, and even violence.”685 
While Freeman recognizes the vocabulary is yet to be fully explored, “queer life” reproduces the 
cultural.686 Even as “lesbian and gay activism demands that we continue to fight for access to 
fully institutionalized systems of social reproduction such as churches, hospitals, the military, 
and so on, queer theory needs,” she writes, “theories of how our renewal happens on a 
microsocial level. Especially, it needs to continually identify practices of renewal that exceed the 
state’s major form of ‘recognition’ and collateral entitlements.”687 Thinking about kinship as a 
technique of renewal from the perspectives of queer and black experiences demonstrates both 
kinship’s inherent relationship to time (the governance of past, present, and future concerns) and 
the positioning of queer and black bodies outside the normative frameworks of extension and 
inheritance. “Queer belonging,” Freeman argues, “names more than the longing to be and to be 
connected” it also “names the longing to ‘be long,’ to endure in corporeal form over time, 
beyond procreation” encompassing desires to “preserve relationships that will invariably end, but 
also to have something queer exceed its own time, even to imagine that excess as queer in ways 
that getting married or having children might not be.”688 Drawing from Hortense Spillers, 
Freeman reminds us that the U.S. racial caste system was “coextensive with the denial of kinship 
rights,” by “destroying indigenous African kin networks,” refusing “any legal standing to the 
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intimate associations that African Americans did form, and turning enslavement into a stigmatic, 
quasi-biological ‘property’ passed on by the mother.”689 Under the slavery system, Freeman 
writes: 
racialization also depended upon kinship in ways that are crucially different from the 
system of gender. Rather than naturalizing bodies for the marriage market, race slavery 
destroyed, distorted, and misrecognized indigenous regimes of alliance and descent to 
produce bodies that, by virtue of seeming without kin, were marketable, and that by 
virtue of being marketable, seemed bereft of kin. And even while slave owners 
accomplished this, they justified their actions with another familial discourse, 
paternalistically claiming that their slaves were children who could not survive without 
them.690 
 
Black people were “dispersed into a kind of horizontal relatedness and hence into ‘certain ethical 
and sentimental features’ that have both defined and connected African Americans across space 
and through time.”691 Given all this, bodies have been central to “conceptualizing the renewal of 
African American individuals and collectivities beyond the dominant kinship grid.”692 A 
“powerful example,” Freeman highlights, is “Toni Morrison’s sense of historical ‘re-
membering,’”693 that takes up this “legacy of bodily stigma unwillingly endowed over time” as 
“grounds for imagining African American futurity in terms of new corporeal potentialities. The 
very term ‘re-membering’ suggests that the knitting together of individual bodies that have been 
ideologically and physically objectified, fragmented, or shattered is linked to the renewal of 
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collective life. Again, it suggests an embodied but not procreative model of kinship” with 
powerful resonances.694 
 Third, drawing from Corinne Hayden, Judith Butler, Claire Riley, and Kath Weston’s 
abiding Families We Choose (1991), Freeman suggests thinking of queer kinships as “kinetic” 
rather than “genetic,” to recognize in lesbian parental care models that birth mothers may gestate 
but “co-mothers generate.”695 Hayden’s phrase “‘kinetic kinship’ resonates with Butler’s 
eventual call for a theory that could make good on David Schneider’s 1984 statement that 
kinship consists of ‘doing’ rather than ‘being.’ The crux of the issue for queer theory,” Freeman 
writes, “might be this: what would it mean to ‘do kinship?’ How could that be separated from 
hetero-procreation without losing sex, eroticism, and other bodily modes of belonging, exchange, 
and attachment?”696 Thinking of kinship as dynamic, active, practical, as a “set of acts that may 
or may not follow the officially recognized lines of alliance and descent” might speak to a “way 
of thinking about queer belongings in a temporal as well as a spatial sense: as modes of duration 
not only for otherwise mortal bodies, but between bodies separated in time.”697 
It seems invaluable to think about kinship intimacies698 in and with the Gulf Coast in 
conversation with these kinship critiques since this area has failed to inherit the benefits of 
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evolutionary kinships while being abandoned to carry discrimination, dispossession, and erasure. 
Indeed, the Gulf offers a paradigm for negotiations (queer resistances) with the dominant lexicon 
of kinship taken-on by queer and black communities. Black and queer communities continue to 
participate in kinship networks denied to them revealing further how human emotional life 
always exceeds the dominant language and recognitions of normative kinship. Thinking with a 
landscape ripe with historical significance, changed by destruction, and facing uncertain futures, 
we need to conceptualize kinship within devastated landscapes similarly. Kinships along the 
Gulf exist outside the horizons of normative environmental kinship while exposing normative 
kinship’s inherent limitations.  
Paying attention to both historicity and futurity, embodied but not necessarily procreative 
in the tidiest or conservative sense, to think queer kinship in the Gulf’s devastated landscapes is 
to think outside of normative intimacies in ways that are, that feel, queer in the sense Mel Chen 
engages where queerness does not “merely indicate embodied sexual contact among subjects 
identified as gay and lesbian,” but rather “social and cultural formations of ‘improper affiliation,’ 
so that queerness might well describe an array of subjectivities, intimacies, beings, and spaces 
located outside of the heteronormative.”699 Affinity and attachment with or to bodies (human and 
                                                        
weighty associations that adhere in concepts of kinship. The ethnographic use of intimacy 
resonates with the concept of relatedness parlayed by new kinship studies. The use of relatedness 
‘in opposition to, or alongside, ‘kinship’ flags an intent to discover, rather than assume, which 
modes of relatedness given peoples find salient and to displace the biological’/social binary of 
kinship concepts… For now, intimacy allows analysts to look at relational life—including the 
feelings and acts that comprise it, in relation to political and economic regimes—in conventional 
sociological terms and to consider both micro and macro levels, although of course the critical 
study of intimacy eschews this neat division. The term intimacy is intended to resist ideological 
reifications of family, sexuality, or community—that is, to avoid recreating forms of knowledge 
that perpetuate global inequality. As a placeholder, intimacy allows critical accounts of colonial 
empire or capitalist modernity because it is a flexible, provisional reference that emphasized 
linkages across what are understood to be distinct realms, scales, or bodies.” (48) 
 




nonhuman) that are impacted by environmental degradation are not discussed because they are 
improper affiliations, queer intimacies that trouble more tidy relations. To address these 
abandoned kin, I argue we must pursue impropriety— improper relations to time, to purity, to 
disciplinary fidelity, to love. Cultivating impropriety, sitting-with intimate encounters that 
frustrate seemingly straight-forward conceptions of affinity and attachment, may be biophilic 
love in and through our evolutionary leftovers for these unloved others left behind. 
 
For Multispecies Flourishing 
 The evolutionary kinships of new cosmology have radical hopes. In the sense that new 
cosmology and other conversations in religion and ecology seek to include nonhuman others into 
normative conceptions of kinship, “official” or shared biogenetics, these kinships seem 
somewhat persistent in their extension. It is commonplace within the field to acknowledge 
nonhuman others as evolutionary kin. But in the sense of kinship as corporeal practice in real-
time, of kinetic extension for all bodies, new cosmology falls into the same problems as other 
conservative forms of kinship offering few pathways for unloved others.  New cosmology 
intends for evolutionary kinship to function as a corrective but does not do the labor required for 
this kinship intervention to resonate. To think kinship requires thinking the politics of kinship, or 
who and or what can claim to be family, and it requires dwelling with the weight of heavy affects 
sticking to the disinherited that are the fallout from these politics. As Heather Love writes: 
a central paradox of any transformative criticism is that its dreams for the 
future are founded on a history of suffering, stigma, and violence. Oppositional criticism 
opposes not only existing structures of power but also the very history that gives it 
meaning. Insofar as the losses of the past motivate us and give meaning to our current 
experience, we are bound to memorialize them (‘We will never forget’). But we are 
equally bound to overcome the past, to escape its legacy (‘We will never go back’). For 
groups constituted by historical injury, the challenge is to engage with the past without 
being destroyed by it. Sometimes it seems it would be better to move on— to let, as Marx 




with us, and the desire to forget may itself be a symptom of haunting. The dead can bury 
the dead all day long and still not be done.700  
 
Here, Love articulates two problems we need to continually wrestle with while hoping to 
extend kinship beyond its typical borders. First, extension requires recognizing why kinship was 
and is denied to particular bodies and ways of being in the first place and this subsequently 
requires not just recognition of the existing structures of power that locate particular bodies and 
communities outside kin boundaries, but the very histories that gave normative kinships their 
power. Which desires and intimacies were normalized and rewarded by the process of 
acknowledging this body but not that one, this history but not these, as kin? Looking toward 
communities and discourses that position kinship as an ongoing affective process with political 
implications and material consequences will help us puzzle out our responses. Second, if religion 
and ecology wants to recognize those historically disregarded within the boundaries of kinship 
we would need to acknowledge the affective weight of these histories. New cosmology’s 
“elevation of abstract, expert knowledge above our lived experience of the world,” Sideris 
argues, “cuts us off from the strongest source of our felt connection to the more-than-human 
world. It calls us away from much of what it is to be human: a living, breathing, bodily, 
earthbound—and ultimately death-bound— creature, surrounded by and enmeshed with other 
living and dying beings whose own worlds and realities remain somewhat opaque and 
mysterious to us.”701 It is not just sensorial connection that new cosmology denies, I argue. They 
primarily absolve themselves of having to reckon with “bad” feelings—all the encounters with 
nonhuman nature that do not fit into the tidier emotional relations new cosmology celebrates and 
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what responsibilities we might have to these communities. The turn to “bad” feelings in 
contemporary social-political theory, notably the work of Sara Ahmed (2004; 2010), Lauren 
Berlant (2011), and the embrace of the feminist killjoy figure in feminist theory and the work of 
Jack Halberstam (2011), Lee Edelman (2005), Ann Cvetkovich (2003; 2012), and anti-social 
trajectories in queer theory, provide models for religion and ecology to think about the creative 
possibilities in embracing refusal, disruption, dissatisfaction, indifference, and rage. This 
scholarship, as my attention to Ahmed demonstrates, disturbs the normative affective 
orientations that become ideal for privileged cultural positions by illuminating the communities 
and bodies that are out-of-step with these acceptable affects. Attention to negativity demands 
recognizing “how the internal experience of affect is mediated by different bodies and subject 
positions,”702 revealing that claims to normative emotions “make certain forms of personhood 
valuable”703 by rewarding compliance with, or conformity to these affective norms. Ignoring 
“bad” feelings further stigmatizes these emotions and the communities attached to them, as I’ve 
outlined, but it also closes us off from the wealth of connection “bad” feelings can unfold. So-
called “negative” emotions can be tremendous resources for environmental thought and activism.  
Religion and ecology as a whole encourages folding nonhuman others within our sphere 
of kin concern but offers very few resources for negotiating what it means to care for populations 
on the edge of extinction, all those dead and buried by the weight of history, bodies and 
populations facing precarious futures. In short, religion and ecology asks us to care for 
nonhuman others like kin while ignoring that this kin-love means encountering tremendous 
trauma, grief, and mourning. Kin care that acknowledges the trouble we find ourselves in, both 
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uncertain futures and presents haunted by the ghosts of environmental degradation, will have to 
engage these feelings as part of our response-abilities. One way to remain with the trouble would 
be to ask how our scholarship can develop and articulate better understandings of affects like 
grief, loss, fear, and anguish by weaving environmental degradation and its complex intimacies 
into part of what we do rather than a spectacular exception. We must learn to “grieve-with,” 
Haraway writes, to do the “difficult cultural work of reflection and mourning” that would 
recognize “our dependence on and relationships with those countless others being driven over 
the edge of extinction.”704 Avoiding these emotions means avoiding tremendous environmental 
trouble. “We are in and of this fabric of undoing,” Haraway writes, “without sustained 
remembrance, we cannot learn to live with ghosts and so cannot think.”705 The next two chapters 
outline what it means to craft-with the ghosts of environmental degradation and to stay-with 
damaged habitats, communities in pain, and bodies changed by catastrophe. In chapter six, I will 
cultivate what I call a kinship of remainders which resists new cosmology assumptions that one 
must follow a singular narrative with an orienting awe, wonder, and reverence for the natural 
world in order to find community or to further green sentiment. It is imperative that scholars 
refuse to inherit white environmentalism, and I attempt to contribute to this refusal by 
articulating complex, often deeply painful, emotional relationships with nature that recognize the 
inherent grief attached to long histories of social injustice. I draw on scholars who do not put 
environmentalism at the center of their work, like Ann Cvetkovich, Toni Morrison, Natasha 
Trethewey, Avery Gordon, Jennifer C. James, and Kara Walker, yet I argue they provide better 
pathways for religion and ecology to give attention to the slow erosions of environmental justice 
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and to help articulate an understanding of environmental trauma as historical, embodied, and 
present. Furthermore, moving from experiences of negation—feeling out of place and 
uncomfortable at home—toward collective work, these theorists model how powerful 
counterpublics can form from “negative” affects. Finally, in order to resist the foreclosure of 
possible futures for devastated environments, in chapter seven I explore queer eco-crip 
affinities—scholarship that illuminates how compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory able-
bodiedness and able-mindedness within religion and ecology shape not just our “cultural 
constructions of nature, wilderness and the environment”706 but the nature of desire itself limiting 
what sorts of affinities, attachments, and care are proper or even possible, and thus, what ethical 














                                                        






Kinship of Remainders 
 
THE OLD VANDALS WERE FLOODS AND BOATS 
eroding the banks. The islands that once dotted the bays 
have sunk, disappearing into silverfish grit, thinned 
into algae and filament now being made 
quiet by plumes. Despite ourselves 
we are made quiet. The death of the sea 
a thing we must lower ourselves into 
to imagine. I will stay with you here 
inside the sheen of orange that quickly kills, 
not like the saltwater slowly starving the freshwater- 
marshes and grasses that knit this green-wet 
world together. The two breathless gannets 
found covered in oil are not unlike you, 
at the mercy of a mercy that moves in plumes, 
that insists certain fates remain 
invisible. What existed before the oil arrived 
was delicate and mired, a broom of moonlight 
swept through half-choked waves. I trust you 
if you wish for what it, too, might have been. 
Joanna Klink, excerpt, “Terrebonne Bay,” Excerpts from a Secret Prophecy707 
 
 
“When a ghost appears, it is making contact with you; all its forceful if perplexing enunciations 
are for you. Offer it a hospitable reception we must, but the victorious reckoning with the ghost 
always requires a partiality to the living. Because ultimately haunting is about how to transform a 
shadow of a life into an undiminished life whose shadows touch softly in the spirit of a peaceful 
reconciliation. In this necessarily collective undertaking, the end, which is not an ending at all, 
belongs to everyone.” Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological 
Imagination708  
 
Thus far, I demonstrated how new cosmology’s ontoethical project is an investment in 
white environmentalism—whiteness as a way of knowing becoming “the way of understanding 
our environment” through habitual investments in the normativity of white encounters with 
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nature in representation, rhetoric, and affective economies.709 Carolyn Finney reminds us that 
“stories, or narratives, about our ‘natural environment,’” work to inform “our environmental 
interactions” and shape “the institutions concerned with environmental issues,” but what is 
missing from many environmental narratives is the multitude of encounters “influenced by race, 
gender, class, and other aspects of difference that can determine one’s ability to access spaces of 
power and decision making.” 710 Pivotal for understanding the affective economies of the 
devastated Gulf landscape, what is glaringly absent within new cosmology’s narrative is an 
“African American perspective, a nonessentialized black environmental identity that is grounded 
in the legacy of African American experiences” and “mediated by privilege (both intellectual and 
material).”711 I outlined how the comprehensive common story that new cosmologists hope will 
act as an ethical guide for ecological concerns, the affective reorientation they hope will lead us 
to treat nonhuman others with reverent care as our evolutionary kin, is impervious to concerns 
evoked by quotidian encounters in environmentally degraded regions by articulating how this 
narrative is unable to relate to disaster, toxicity, and environmental racism. I have insisted that in 
order to address suffering and prepare for complex futures, we resist the many privileged 
singularities engrained within new cosmology perspectives: its championing of a single orienting 
narrative, its embrace of uncritical forms of science as really-real knowledge, its reliance on 
“expert” perspectives to trace the true shape of Nature, its investment in one conception of what 
it means to be human, its cultivation of one normative affective relationship with nonhuman 
others, and its insistence on one route toward environmental change. 
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This chapter leans into this resistance through readings of different narratives, altogether 
different relationships with the nonhuman world, that I argue compel us to fundamentally rethink 
our conceptions of environmental intimacy. These narratives are shaped by disaster and 
environmental racism along the Gulf Coast and demonstrate the diverse, rich, ambiguous, 
painful, and frustrating bonds many humans have with their environments in the South. I argue 
they model a kinship of remainders—the shaping of affinities and attachments amongst 
disposable bodies, communities, and habitats through affects other than awe and wonder and 
beyond the prescriptions of new cosmology that give little attention either to the being-long of 
the disinherited and disposable or the reverberations of American racial violence. These 
narratives insist on a historical sense of the land where cultivating kinship with these spaces, 
places, creatures, and communities requires reckoning with the long histories of abuse and 
abandonment that continue to shape intimacies in devastated landscapes. Illuminating the 
realities that marginalized communities “can seldom afford to be single-issue activists”712 or 
single-narrative advocates, these stories move beyond kin as tied solely to evolutionary “ancestry 
or genealogy” and toward cultivating and honoring odd couplings, “ontologically inventive . . . 
care of kinds-as-assemblages” with kinships that recognize historical and contemporary 
environmental trauma.713 These affinities negotiate representations of the material and affective 
changes wrought by the trouble we find ourselves in, what Rosi Braidotti reading Foucault and 
Deleuze might call “creative figurations” or adequate “cartographies” for advanced capitalism.714   
They are kinship figurations that “collect up hopes and fears and show possibilities and dangers” 
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to “guide us to a more livable place,” one Haraway calls an “elsewhere” in their abilities to move 
beyond normative inheritance—“keeping the lineages going, even while defamiliarizing their 
members and turning lines into webs, trees into esplanades, and pedigrees into affinity 
groups.”715 
To help religion and ecology begin to attune to the realities of environmental trauma, first 
I will guide “critical intimacy scholarship” or “cultural studies of the politics of intimacy,”716 on 
trauma and melancholy into conversation with nascent negotiations with environmental trauma 
and loss. Then I will closely attend to the work of two artists and scholars that model thinking 
through the trouble at the intersections of historical and continual anti-black violence717 and 
environmental decline along the Gulf Coast. Natasha Trethewey’s (2010) memoir Beyond 
Katrina: A Meditation on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and Kara Walker’s (2007) “rumination” on 
Hurricane Katrina in her visual essay After the Deluge, both explore complex “aesthetics of 
attachment” voiced by “minoritized subjects,” what Lauren Berlant drawing from Deleuze and 
Guattari calls “minor intimacies,” as occasions to rethink intimacy in ways that do not just reify 
the white, enclosed, rational, sovereign subject of new cosmology.718 
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 Environmental Mourning 
 While there is a “surprising lack of discussion around mourning related to environmental 
loss or dispossession in broader discursive frameworks or public dialogues,”719 there is 
increasing interest in the environmental humanities, with glimmers from religion, in unpacking 
environmental trauma, grief, loss, and mourning.720 These authors interrogate what it means to 
be passionately immersed in the lives of human and nonhuman others in a time of extinctions721 
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or of particular interest to this dissertation, to what the entangled encounters of becoming-with 
might feel like when confronting the loss of species and habitats. Often this material is sparked 
by “personal experiences with deep and profound moments of grief for non-human entities and 
degrading landscapes and ecosystems.”722 Building from Judith Butler’s723 questions regarding 
“what, then, may be gained from ‘tarrying with grief, from remaining exposed to its 
unbearability and not endeavoring to seek a resolution for grief,’” current work on environmental 
grief: asks “what counts as a mournable body (and what does not),” it thinks “beyond the human 
to extend the work of mourning to non-humans to think about other possible futures, other 
possible mournings,” and it recognizes “our shared vulnerabilities to human and non-human 
bodies” embracing “our complicity in the death of these other bodies—however painful that 
process may be.”724  
“To mourn is always an expression and fulfillment of kinship,” Sebastian F. Braun 
writes, “implicit in the practice of mourning” for nonhuman others, he argues, is that:  
we relate to our environment through kinship relations. Mourning is a social activity, 
extended to close friends and relatives. My contention, then, is that people mourn for 
specific parts of their environments because they feel related to them. Judith Butler wrote 
that, in mourning, ‘something about who we are is revealed, something that delineates the 
ties we have to others, that shows us that these ties constitute what we are.’ Mourning for 
the environment, in other words, shows what kinds of kinship relations we create and lose 
with our environments.725 
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Though kinship with nonhuman others is “often perceived as metaphorical, a mere cultural 
invention, a symbolic relation at best,” Braun argues that these relationships are “as real as any 
other kinship relation.”726 Braun, and others like Michael Jackson and Karen Warren,727 
acknowledge that kin relations with nonhuman others do not prevent violence to land or animals 
yet they can shape more sustainable relationships. For example, Braun resists an overly 
romanticized trope of harmonious native peoples by gesturing toward the kinship systems with 
nonhuman others formed by indigenous peoples (Lakota relationships with buffalo in particular) 
that do not prevent the killing of animals for sustenance but presses that these kinship relations 
do “impose obligations” such as responsibility for what and how much is “sacrificed,” rituals of 
thanks for sacrifice that resist detached slaughtering of nonhumans, and mourning for population 
losses.728 While Braun is skeptical that mourning for the environment would “necessarily 
indicate a greater respect for life,” mourning “as a social practice,” he argues, reveals that 
“environmental relations are social relations and, therefore” if “we want to create more positive 
relations with our environments we cannot do so in isolation from other social relations.”729  
Thinking of mourning along with other social relations, mourning nonhuman others as 
kin comes in different forms. For example, Sarah M. Pike’s work on radical environmental and 
animal rights activists’ feelings of loss and grief for species and habitat extinction positions grief 
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as both a “central motivating factor in conversion and commitment to activism” for members of 
these groups but also as forms of resistance through ongoing processes of “remembering the 
dead and disappearing” as intimates.730  Mourning old growth trees and animal species, these 
“rites of mourning” function, Pike argues, as “both an expression of deeply felt kinship bonds 
with others species and a significant factor in creating those bonds” by illuminating losses that 
are ignored and generating fuel for their continued activism through “speaking to their beloved 
dead, keeping them present.”731 As another example, in her essay “Climate Change as the Work 
of Mourning,” Ashlee Cunsolo describes both her grief for her Inuit colleagues and friends 
across Canada’s North and their grief for the progressive losses of land and sea ice that is 
threatening the “basis for their livelihoods, culture, and survival.”732 In conversation, her Inuit 
colleagues described “the land as a close intimate, a mother figure and spiritual entity capable of 
response and reciprocity,” and expressed “intense feelings of sadness, disorientation, grief, loss, 
and lament for a rapidly changing land.”733 Furthermore, these colleagues also “shared a sense of 
anticipatory grieving for losses expected to come, but not yet arrived,” lamentation for their 
beloveds and communities as these conditions “will most likely worsen in severity and 
impact.”734 These examples demonstrate that feelings of loss related to environmental 
degradation are complex but, echoing Kay Milton’s work, they also reveal that while our 
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scholarship is not catching up, many humans already do cultivate these emotional ties regarding 
nonhuman others as kin and are actively negotiating how environmental decline is impacting 
these relationships.  
 There is much to admire in these nascent explorations of emotional responses to 
ecological degradation and loss, not least the labor of working through how our time is one of 
mourning. What is not theorized, however, is the tricky kind of mourning I want to sit with here 
that is still tied to species and habitat loss and mutation but is truly a mourning for what might 
have been but never was—a relationship with the land and nonhuman others that is free from 
oppression, toxicity, and fear. While puzzling through mourning for lost species and habitats is a 
growing interest, what is not explored is loss and mourning in relation to the racial violence that 
is endemic to environmental emotions in America—a mourning for the potentiality of the places 
and communities that is continually stopped by violence and toxic investments.735 Reiterating 
Carolyn Finney’s arguments, we must:  
challenge the universality that denies the differences in our collective experiences of 
nature in the United States . . .  how key moments in U.S. history that in many ways have 
come to define human/environment interaction in the United States bump up against 
collective experiences of black people navigating the social, cultural, and psychological 
minefields of slavery and segregation . . . What is the emotional and psychological 
‘trickle down’ effect of the way in which these movements/ideas impacted black people 
over the long term? How do we challenge, to paraphrase Haraway, a nature that seems 
innocent of black history?”736  
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concerning. As Haraway’s work reminds on numerous occasions, issues of species are almost 
always entanglements with race/racism so even though these authors are considering mourning 
beyond the human, I still question which “humans” and species they will regard as grievable. 
 





Dorceta Taylor, Carolyn Merchant, and Kevin DeLuca’s scholarship737 reminds us about 
all the ways nature is violently reinforced as a “‘white’ space and a white concern” illuminating 
how “African Americans have historically undergone repeated cultural interrogations regarding 
their status as humans within the larger society. The legacy of these cultural constructions 
reveals a thinly veiled contempt for black people that continues to be expressed in intellectual, 
political, and cultural sites.”738 There are “many complexities involved in African American 
attitudes toward the natural world” including ambiguous feelings connected to the denial of 
“comparable access to those locations celebrated by nature writers,” and negotiations with 
“oppressive poverty and the threat of physical violence” that “historically worked in tandem to 
create the sense that nature is off-limits and the purview of a distant culture in a distant 
landscape.”739 Kimberly N. Ruffin writes that often “the force of oppression in the social world 
has left African Americans so limited as ecological agents that relationships with nonhuman 
nature becomes unfathomable, undesirable, or impossible.”740 While conceptualizing and or 
negotiating these relationships is complex, that what is or seems possible is limited conceptually 
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and materially through violent reinforcement, to deny or ignore that African Americans have 
always had emotional attachments with American land conveniently sidesteps addressing the 
continual discriminations that shape these attachments. Finney highlights how universal 
narratives about our collective experiences of nature ignore both the violence and erasure pressed 
on black bodies (historical realties for black Americans during the birth of environmentalism and 
their reverberating legacies for more contemporary events like Katrina) and that these same 
bodies have always had intimate relationships with American landscapes through material and 
political labor. While “African Americans were barred from contributing to the larger narrative 
of American progress, what cannot be denied is the physical labor and mental ingenuity of 
African Americans, both those whose backbreaking work in the fields propelled the nation’s 
economy forward, and those whose deep-seated belief in civic engagement changed our political 
and social landscapes.”741 In truth, “representations and racialization inform the way we 
approach the ‘business,’ the ‘science,’ and the ‘conservation’ of the natural world,” Finney 
argues, and they “affect the way these spaces and places are constructed and the institutions that 
maintain these constructions.”742 By excluding black environmental experiences, black 
environmental imaginaries, either “(implicitly or explicitly), corporate, academic, and 
environmental institutions” like new cosmology, “legitimate the invisibility” of African 
Americans “in all spaces that inform, shape, and control the way we know and interact with the 
environment in the United States.”743 As I have demonstrated, if to be human is to be intimate 
with nature in only the affective frames of white environmentalism—to feel the appropriate awe, 
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wonder, and reverence while ignoring sorrow, anger, fear, loss, and frustration—then new 
cosmology’s affective prescriptions dangerously weave into and legitimize the environmental 
histories that dehumanize black Americans.  
 It is important, however, to recognize that as we consider how environmental trauma 
impacts the affective orientations of black communities we must resist two racist misdirects. 
First, is the persistent myth that people of color are not concerned with environmental issues 
because they are alienated from the environment post-slavery and Jim Crow encounters or that 
they are only concerned with social equality. Covering two decades of sociological data, Robert 
Emmet Jones’, “Black Concern for the Environment: Myth Versus Reality” clearly demonstrates 
how normative media, academia, and policy makers continue to position black communities as 
unconcerned about the environment despite research that points to this being a complete 
fabrication.744 On the whole, blacks and whites maintain a similar level of interest in 
environmental concerns with, at times, concerns about different environmental problems.745 
There is some evidence that “people of color,” Jones writes, “appear to be more concerned about 
the safety and health effects associated with nuclear power and solid, toxic, and nuclear wastes, 
whereas whites appear to be more concerned about ozone depletion and global warming,” and 
with good reason.746 Echoing Robert Bullard and Giovanna Di Chiro’s long work in 
environmental justice, the habitual restriction by myopic environmental policy makers and 
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theorists to limit “environmental concern” solely to matters of “environmental impacts related to 
air, water, land, and species other than Homo sapiens” tends to ignore the “critical impacts to 
sociostructural and cultural systems” that people of color facing environmental racism must 
negotiate. Furthermore, it obscures and erases how these communities often engage in 
environmental action positioning black Americans as unconcerned about the environment while 
conveniently side-stepping their environmental concerns through further entrenching problematic 
nature-culture divides within our theory.747 To resist this fallacy we must continually question 
who gets to decide what is an “environmental concern” while advocating for recognition of 
racism as a pervasive issue.   
 Second, particularly worrisome for a project like this one, are the insidious possibilities 
that discussions of environmental trauma and toxicity can be used to further support arguments 
championing the unrecruitability of black people in the moral cause of American white futurity. 
Much like racist talking-points post-Katrina that mark black communities as socially corrupt and 
thus unworthy of environmental intervention or incapable of articulating environmental 
concerns, I can see my efforts to further address toxicity and environmental trauma being co-
opted to position black and disabled bodies as inhuman, damaged animals, symptoms and 
victims of the depravity of urbanity in need of “benevolent” paternal intervention. 748 We must 
pay attention to how the toxic fall-out from long histories of environmental racism is further used 
to position bodies of color as fundamentally flawed objects of fear. These traps are so easy to fall 
into for religion and ecology if we do not keep a pulse on the histories of how “nature” and 
nature-care have been constructed and normalized particularly within forms of religious 
environmentalism that refuse to decouple from an ontological reliance on universal narratives 
                                                        





and continue to cultivate an “authentic” encounter between humans and nonhuman others that 
we must “get-back to.”  
One example of how this is already happening in circles that share similar archives is the 
disturbing lack of critique of the racist and ableist implications in “nature-deficit disorder” 
theories particularly in their popular culture forms. Drawing from Wilson’s biophilia hypothesis, 
conversations in ecopsychology, and popular material on attention deficit disorder (ADD) and  
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Richard Louv’s (2005) national bestseller Last 
Child in the Woods: Saving Our Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder is one of many 
contemporary discourses (like new cosmology) that position humans as alienated from nature 
resulting in a number of health and social-ills, and it advocates for returning to a pre-WWII 
childhood model with more free-range nature encounter.749 Nestled within interdisciplinary 
conversations750 about “child-nature relationships and disconnection,” Louv contends that 
nature-deficit disorder (NDD) is a metaphor rather than medical diagnosis (though the pop 
culture interest in his work habitually translates it as a diagnosis) but nevertheless argues that 
contemporary children have “detached from nature and pay a heavy” emotional and material 
“price” particularly “dulled senses, behavioral difficulties, obesity, stress, declining academic 
performance, and decreased emotional and physical well-being.”751 For Louv, NDD “stems from 
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and is contextualized by ADD/ADHD” and he promotes teaching children science and advocates 
“nature therapy— ‘nature’s Ritalin’” to reduce ADHD symptoms and other NDD problems.752 
While the compassionate focus on children’s environments and the interest in play-based 
therapies are commendable, Elizabeth Dickson argues, in one of the few critiques of NDD, that 
in the absence of deeper cultural criticism, NDD and other conversations like it is an incredibly 
problematic environmental discourse. Louv “idealized Muir, Leopold, Roosevelt, Darwin, 
Thoreau, D. H. Lawrence, Davy Crockett, and Woody Guthrie” and while “these men are 
admired environmental advocates,” Dickinson writes, “they offer predominately White, male, 
and Western perspectives. The desire, then, appears to be to return to a ‘normal,’ particularly 
White, middle-class, male, heterosexual cultural past that obscures race, class, and gender 
politics.”753 “Human-nature estrangement is exceptionally complex and involves underlying 
issues of power that result in environmental destruction, classism, racism, sexism, and 
homophobia,” Dickinson argues, yet this scholarship mainly ignores these issues and largely 
speaks “for and to affluent white audiences.”754 Consequently, Louv and educators “prescribe 
returning to nature mainly through physical activities, such as hiking, camping, fishing, hunting, 
and bird watching” but fail to recognize both that “these activities do not automatically create 
connection, affect, or emotional attachment” and that they “may pose challenges and obscure 
environmental issues” via the “mindset and assumptions that undergird them.”755 For example, as 
Dickinson and others remind, “spending time in the outdoors in the way Louv and educators 
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propose typically requires transportation, time, money, consumption, and a particular lifestyle 
and mindset.”756 For “single, financially constrained, and geographically (and often racially) 
segregated families, taking children outside or traveling to designated nature areas can be 
difficult.”757 Moreover, these activities “frequently require an element of physical and social 
access; even if one does have the resources, people of color, women,” queers, and “youth may 
not have the same kind of safety in their access” and by “focusing on certain activities and 
assumptions, adults ignore deep ecologists, ecofeminists, environmental justice activists, 
American Indian/Native American advocacy groups, and others who work tirelessly to expose 
environmental degradation, racism, sexism, and classism.”758 Finally, one element overlooked by 
Dickinson that I will explore more in the last chapter, by ignoring how these activities also pose 
immense accessibility issues for disabled bodies this discourse positions disabled and ill bodies 
as an environmental problem, victims or collateral damage within environmental and social 
degradation, thus resisting any efforts by disabled and ill persons to determine their own 
relationships to nonhuman others and their own conceptions of embodied differences that may or 
may not be the result of environmental degradation. Consequently, it is not difficult to see how 
NDD fuels into the same mindsets that position black youth, particularly ill and disabled youth, 
as difficult to educate, plagued by attention and discipline problems, easier to incarcerate, easier 
to ignore in disaster protection and environmental restoration.  
Keeping these complications in mind, I argue it is possible to talk about environmental 
trauma and toxicity without positioning it as detrimentally foundational if we recognize both that 
ideal reciprocity with the environment is a continually cultivated myth fueled and enjoyed by 
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only particular interests, and the reality that we are all politically entangled and negotiating what 
it means to live within environmental degradation. One way to stay-with this trouble, therefore, 
is to resist universal narratives and their role in structural racism by looking toward narratives 
addressing the complexity of environmental experience. While there is “no monolithic African 
American environmental experience,” Finney writes, and “it is important not to confuse or 
conflate the historical need of African Americans to privilege race in order to address major 
issues (e.g., segregation) with the belief that all African Americans experience day-to-day life in 
much the same way,” when people responded to Finney’s questions about frustrations with the 
“practices of environmental organizations” and their involvement, “commonalities in their 
responses outweighed their differences.”759 “While it was tempting, for example, to fall back on 
the rural/urban dichotomy to frame their responses,” Finney writes: 
what became exceedingly clear was that the experience of being black  
trumped any place-based assertions related to environmental engagement. For many 
African Americans I spoke with, their economic mobility status was fluid; they may have 
grown up on a farm, but lived in a city as an adult. They may have raised their kids in a 
suburb, but retired to a rural area. But no matter where they found themselves, they were 
always black. And while the meaning of blackness in all of its complexity and real-life 
manifestations has arguably shifted over time, the collective historical experience of 
being black in America has not. These similarities in attitudes and perceptions drawn 
from a collective history and consciousness that is reinforced and remembered through 
media, textual representation, and experience. ‘The collective experience of pain and 
hardship, suffering and sacrifice has given African Americans a unique perspective from 
which our consciousness has been forged.’ In addition, regardless of where one stands in 
the race debate, the history of white supremacy in the United States and how it has been 
articulated on the landscape is difficult to dispute, though some charge that ‘historical 
amnesia’ does make it easier to deny or forget.760 
 
It is this collective affective experience, continually reiterated through space, place, and 
encounter, that environmental movements (including much of religion and ecology) continue to 
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either treat as “special topics” or outright ignore. Finney’s African American interlocutors 
describe patterns of behavior within environmental movements that demonstrate resistance to 
talking about racism, or to “provide continued financial support for diversity programs.”761 
Furthermore, for those that work within environmental organizations (despite a “lot of lip service 
about diversity,”) they usually find themselves as the sole black person within the group.762 “One 
of the biggest challenges for individuals whose work is considered ‘environmental,’” Finney 
writes, “is how quickly anything related to African Americans and the environment gets 
designated as an ‘environmental justice’ concern: 
There is usually no discussion about the particulars—just the mere fact that  
‘race’ or ‘black people’ are involved usually relegates African American environmental 
interactions to a particular point on the environment spectrum—environmental justice. In 
fact, the field of environmental justice has done a stellar job at highlighting the 
complexity in framing any EJ discussion by drawing attention to three key debates within 
the EJ literature: whether environmental injustice is cause primarily by racism or 
capitalism; the value and importance of layperson knowledge vs. ‘expert knowledge’; and 
the ‘different ways to make the particular legible in reference to the abstract and the 
abstract accessible with reference to the particular.’ However, my concern is with the 
assumption that the best framework to understand any environmental issue or experience 
had by African Americans is an environmental justice framework. Is EJ the best way to 
frame the black environmental experience? Is it the only way? What are some of the 
limitations of always using an EJ framework? Are we ‘shrinking our ledge’? What kinds 
of questions are we not asking as a result of always using EJ?763 
 
One of the limitations of designating any intersection of race and environment as an 
environmental justice concern, the “kinds of questions we are not asking,” is the resulting failure 
to recognize how the collective experience of race in America unsettles the foundational values, 
concerns, keywords within environmental theory itself. What is overlooked, particularly by 
religion and ecology, is how much of our conceptions of nature, human, relationship, kinship, 
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intimacy, reciprocity, and love are rooted in the continual negation of black experience in what 
remains a racist nation. Amnesia about this collective experience within religion and ecology 
makes it easier to advocate for an uncomplicated kinship with nonhuman others by ignoring 
voices that disturb these normative emotions. Insisting that all environmental issues are 
environmental justice issues can help us rethink these habitual terms.  
Finney highlights two affective elements within her interviews that I find particularly 
important to recognize in the context of devastated landscapes. First, what Finney settles on 
calling “fatigue,” (that is, like any emotion, a combination of other emotions like frustration and 
anger) or a weariness, exhaustion, and resistance to being the sole black voice, always being 
positioned as having to represent black voices, habitually having to explain to “white folks” 
about black experiences, and continually experiencing the erasure and avoidance of black 
environmental concerns as either not “environmental” nor informed by “expert” knowledge.764 
Second, is the amalgamation of fear and complex mourning African Americans describe when 
talking about environmental encounters. “Many African Americans who work with community 
members felt that many of their constituents were afraid of two things,” Finney relays, “the 
unknown (primarily wildlife) and white people: 
while both wildlife and white people provoke fear in some constituents, the basis for, and 
the subsequent responses to, these fears are decidedly different. Wildlife is largely an 
unknown—many urban-dwelling African Americans have never had any real contact 
with wild animals outside of the zoo or dealings with raccoons or rabbits. Anything they 
have learned about wildlife they acquired from mass media or books. When visiting an 
area touted to have ‘wildlife,’ people tend to rely on those more knowledgeable (like park 
rangers) to guide them through the experience. On the other hand, most African 
Americans have had lifelong contact with white people. Fears about such contact are 
based on something that has happened to them, their family, their friends, or someone in 
their neighborhood. In addition, living with the knowledge of slavery, lynching, and 
racial profiling has meant that African Americans have had to develop survival skills in 
order to confront potentially life-threatening situations. They do not need to turn to an 
expert in order to deal with any given situation; they are the experts. While trust is 
                                                        





needed to convince someone that they will be protected and secure while experiencing 
the outdoors, it is arguably more difficult to gain that trust in relation to fears held about 
white people than it is concerning fears about wild animals.765 
 
While white Americans revere the landscapes that environmental movements are particularly 
fond of, like areas of natural beauty, we should remember that “these places are overlaid with 
histories seen and unseen; geographies of fear that can make a ‘natural’ place suspect to an 
African American. The experience is further enhanced by other aspects of difference, including 
gender, age, sexual orientation, geography, and experience” and the lack of wider recognition of 
these realities generates feelings of ambivalence, fatigue, and frustration.766 “Fear and mistrust” 
of “forests and other green spaces,” Finney writes, reveal a “fear and mistrust of what these 
spaces represent in the eyes of a black person hobbled by repressive rules, cultural norms, racist 
propaganda, and the possibility of death.”767 Like the song “Strange Fruit,” made famous by 
Billie Holiday and Nina Simone demonstrates, the southern tree “becomes a symbol for the 
violence done to black bodies, manifest as ‘strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees. The 
significance of this symbol—the tree as a harbinger of death for black people—persists in 
contemporary culture whether in song, imagery, or as part of the news of the day.”768 
In “Black Women and the Wilderness,” Evelyn C. White’s (1998) moving experiences in 
the foothills of Oregon’s Cascade Mountains further describe these complex emotions. Invited to 
a women’s writing workshop in this picturesque location, White writes, “I wasn’t fully aware of 
my troubled feelings about nature,” until she experienced the fear of going out and joining the 
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other women in nature.769 “I wanted to sit outside and listen to the roar of the ocean,” she writes, 
“but I was afraid. I wanted to walk through the redwoods, but I was afraid. I wanted to glide in a 
kayak and feel the cool water splash in my face, but I was afraid.”770 “For me, the fear is like a 
heartbeat, always present, while at the same time, intangible, elusive, and difficult to define. So 
pervasive, so much a part of me, that I hardly knew it was there . . . While the river’s roar gave 
me a certain comfort and my heart warmed when I gazed at the sun-dappled trees out of a 
classroom window,” she writes, 
I didn’t want to get closer. I was certain that if I ventured outside to admire a meadow or 
to feel the cool ripples in a stream, I’d be taunted, attacked, raped, maybe even murdered 
because of the color of my skin. I believe the fear I experience in the outdoors is shared 
by many African-American women and that it limits the way we move through the world 
and colors the decisions we make about our lives. For instance, for several years now, 
I’ve been thinking about moving out of the city to a wooded, vineyard-laden area in 
Northern California. It is there, among the birds, creeks, and trees that I long to settle 
down and make a home. Each house-hunting trip I’ve made to the countryside has been 
fraught with two emotions: elation at the prospect of living closer to nature and a sense of 
absolute doom about what might befall me in the backwoods. My genetic memory of 
ancestors hunted down and preyed upon in rural setting counters my fervent hopes of 
finding peace in the wilderness. Instead of the solace and comfort I seek, I imagine 
myself in the country as my forebears were—exposed, vulnerable, and unprotected—a 
target of cruelty and hate.771  
 
The fear White describes “was largely informed by a collective history of violence against 
African Americans at the hands of white people,”772 particularly how thoughts of the images of 
Emmett Till and the deaths of Denise McNair, Addie Mae Collins, Cynthia Wesley, and Carol 
Robertson at the Sixteenth Street Church in Birmingham, Alabama left her “speechless and 
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paralyzed” with “heart-stopping fear” whenever she visited the outdoors.773 Emmett Till’s death 
particularly “seemed to be summed up in the prophetic warning of writer Alice Walker, herself a 
native of rural Georgia: ‘Never be the only one, except, possibly, in your own house.’”774 White 
also conveys a sadness about what she loses in and to these fears, how they determine particular 
paths for her life despite her frustrations, and she writes about actively engaging these feelings to 
wrestle out a different relationship with the environment. “I concealed my pained feelings about 
the outdoors,” she writes, “until I could no longer reconcile my silence with my mandate to my 
students to face their fears. They found the courage to write openly about incest, poverty, and 
other ills that had constricted their lives: How could I turn away from my fears about being in 
nature?”775  
The re-membering process she describes I read as doing environmental kinship by not 
ignoring these “negative” emotions or the affective power of her cultural memories nor 
conceding that the natural beauty or her love for the land overpowers this pain. Instead White 
remains-with these feelings, however painful remaining proves to be, by embracing this history 
to negotiate her fears and desires. “In an effort to contain my fears,” she writes: 
 I forced myself to revisit the encounter and to reexamine my childhood  
wounds from the Birmingham bombing and the lynching of Emmett Till. I touched the 
terror of my Ibo and Ashanti ancestors as they were dragged from Africa and enslaved on 
southern plantations. I conjured bloodhounds, burning crosses, and white-robed 
Klansmen hunting down people who looked just like me. I imagined myself being 
captured in a swampy backwater, my back ripped open and bloodied by the whip’s lash. I 
cradled an ancestral mother, broken and keening as her baby was snatched from her arms 
and sold down the river . . . Determined to reconnect myself to the comfort my African 
ancestors felt in the rift valleys of Kenya and on the shores of Sierra Leone, I eventually 
decided to go on a rafting trip. Familiar with my feelings about nature, Judith, a dear 
friend and workshop founder, offered to be one of my raftmates. With her sturdy, gentle 
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and wise body as my anchor, I lowered myself into a raft at the bank of the river. As we 
pushed off into the current, I felt myself make an unsure but authentic shift from my 
painful past . . . About an hour into the trip, in a magnificently still moment, I looked up 
into the heavens and heard the voice of black poet Langston Hughes: ‘I’ve known rivers 
ancient as the world and older than the flow of human blood in human veins. I bathed in 
the Euphrates when dawns were young. I built my hut near the Congo and it lulled me to 
sleep. I looked upon the Nile and raised the pyramids above it. My soul has grown deep 
like the rivers.’ Soaking wet and shivering with emotion, I felt tears welling in my eyes as 
I stepped out of the raft onto solid ground. Like my African forebears who survived the 
Middle Passage, I was stronger at journey’s end. Since that voyage, I’ve stayed at country 
farms, napped on secluded beaches, and taken wilderness treks all in an effort to find 
peace in the outdoors. No matter where I travel, I will always carry Emmett Till and the 
four black girls whose deaths affect me so. But comforted by our tribal ancestors—
herders, gatherers, and fishers all—I am less fearful, ready to come home.776 
  
What White offers us here is a very complex encounter. She knits together the traumas and loses 
from the past in order to understand her emotions in the present, negotiating with the fear that 
shapes the course of her future, resisting the sedimented histories of violence that make nature 
encounters so very terrifying for her by invoking other pasts and possible futures where 
landscapes carry different affective encounters for black bodies. It is important to recognize that 
she identifies these traumas as something she “will always carry,” a shouldering of the violence 
that reverberates. It is not something she just gets over. What White works out is a complicated 
kinship of remainders by wrestling with the weight of inheritance, remembering lost bodies, 
families, ways of being, and cultivating a tentatively-raw embracing of both the nonhuman and 
the memories. The kinship of remainders White models is dynamically present via working in 
and through her affective everyday encounters in her environment as well as resolutely corporeal 
in her struggle to listen to the historical and present fears her body feels in her desire to take to 
the water. Sitting with the kinship White offers us, I want to think more about the negotiation of 
past and present fears, pain, trauma, environmental degradation, and alternative paths to consider 
                                                        





environmental agency, care, creativity, and futurity along the Gulf Coast. First, I will look at 
some resources working through cultural memory and trauma and loss and then Natasha 
Trethewey and Kara Walker’s work that take up these elements in devastated landscapes. 
 
Trauma, Haunting, and Melancholic Kin 
 Exploring affinities and attachments in devastated landscapes is, unavoidably, an 
encounter with trauma and loss. How religion and ecology will theoretically negotiate these 
realities is a pressing open question.777 The response-abilities we will need to develop are 
numerous. For example, as Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands asks, “how does one mourn in the 
midst of a culture that finds it almost impossible to recognize the value of what has been lost?”778 
How do we talk about trauma, loss, and feelings of mourning when what has been lost is difficult 
to articulate? How do we think about environmental trauma experienced by diverse groups of 
people in different ways? Furthermore, in relation to the contexts I am addressing here, we will 
need to puzzle out how to encourage recognition of emotional investments like mourning the loss 
of homes, communities, and histories as environmental concerns particularly when these 
beloveds are urban, damaged, degraded, toxic, “minor” histories, sacrifice zones, and 
dispossessed communities.  
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I find tremendous value for environmental theory in scholarship that defines trauma 
“culturally rather than clinically,” where trauma “becomes a central category for looking at the 
intersections of emotional and social processes along with the intersections of memory and 
history” with a particular focus on how “trauma digs itself in at the level of the everyday.”779 
Ann Cvetkovich’s work in affect, queer, and cultural studies, An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, 
Sexuality and Lesbian Public Cultures (2003) and Depression: A Public Feeling (2012), and 
Avery Gordon’s work in affect and sociology, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological 
Imagination (1997) resist assumptions that “good politics can only emerge from good 
feelings”780 by thinking about how “abusive systems of power make themselves known and their 
impacts felt in everyday life, especially when they are supposedly over and done with (slavery, 
for instance) or when their oppressive nature is denied (as in free labor or national security.)”781 
For the most part, Cvetkovich argues, “sociocultural approaches to trauma have been 
overshadowed by psychoanalytic and psychiatric discourse,” and “more recently, the 
development of PTSD as a clinical diagnosis.”782 Cvetkovich, and others like Cathy Caruth, 
Marita Sturken, Mark Seltzer, read trauma “instead as a social and cultural discourse that 
emerges in response to the demands of grappling with the psychic consequence of historical 
events.”783 “Defined culturally rather than clinically,” Cvetkovich writes, “trauma studies 
becomes an interdisciplinary field for exploring the public cultures created around traumatic 
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events. Trauma becomes a central category along with the intersections of memory and history; 
it gives rise to what Marita Sturken and others have called ‘cultural memory.’”784 What has 
become trauma studies, especially in response to Caruth’s work, points out trauma’s peculiar 
paradoxes emphasizing that “trauma discourse is important: 
precisely because it challenges distinctions between the mental and physical, the psychic 
and social, and the internal and external as locations or sources of pain. Discourses of 
trauma serve as a vehicle for sorting through the relation between these categories rather 
than resolving them in a definition. When trauma becomes too exclusively psychologized 
or medicalized, its capacity to problematize conceptual schemes, the exploration of which 
is one of cultural theory’s contributions to trauma studies, is lost.785 
 
Cvetkovich writes that she takes a “certain distance from Caruth’s universalizing form of 
theorizing about trauma” because it tends to both be too abstract and overly focused on 
“catastrophic event rather than on everyday trauma.”786 By “consistently stressing questions of 
epistemology and trauma as structurally unknowable,” Cvetkovich writes, Caruth787 “flattens out 
the specificities of trauma in a given historical and political context,” and Cvetkovich wants to 
“remain alert to the historical locations out of which theories of trauma arise.”788 Without 
“rejecting the emphasis that Caruth and others place on trauma’s unrepresentability,” Cvetkovich 
argues that what she offers is ways to “think about trauma as part of the affective language that 
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describes life under capitalism.”789 “I’m interested in how shock and injury are made socially 
meaningful,” she writes, “paradigmatic even, within cultural experience. I want to focus on how 
traumatic events refract outward to produce all kinds of affective responses and not just clinical 
symptoms. Moreover, in contrast to the individualist approaches of clinical psychology, I’m 
concerned with trauma as a collective experience that generates collective responses. I am 
compelled by historical understandings of trauma as a way of describing how we live, and 
especially how we live affectively.”790 Working with the intersections of feminist, critical race, 
Marxist, and queer theory, “each of which offers contributions to and problems for theories of 
trauma,” Cvetkovich advocates for a “sense of trauma” that is every day, inherited, part of a 
“social history of sensation,” and resistant to “pathologizing approaches to trauma” as well as 
conceptions of trauma as “catastrophic or extreme”:  
from feminism comes an interest in bridging the sometimes missing intersections 
between sexual and national traumas, and the sense of trauma as everyday; from critical 
race theory, especially African American studies, comes an understanding of trauma as 
foundational to national histories and passed down through multiple generations; from 
Marxism comes a dialectical approach to the intersection of lived experience and 
systemic social structures and to trauma’s place in the social history of sensation; and 
from queer theory comes a critique of pathologizing approaches to trauma and an archive 
of examples from lesbian public cultures. 791   
 
Here, Cvetkovich offers a wealth of possibilities for thinking about environmental trauma 
particularly in her attention to the collective and inherited particularities of trauma. Thinking 
about pain and loss along the Gulf Coast I am going to focus particularly on her helpful readings 
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of insidious and collective trauma, queer resistances to the pathologization of trauma, and queer 
reclamation of traumas’ affects.  
  Cvetkovich argues that feminist interest in the “contested status of sexual trauma,” 
revealed some of the shortcomings of past conceptions of trauma.792 While the experiences of 
Vietnam War veterans led to the establishment of post-traumatic stress disorder being added in 
the 1980s to the third edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, sexual 
trauma seemed “to be in danger of invisibility, especially due to the gendered divide between 
private and public spheres.”793 Judith Herman’s influential work illuminated that, “not until the 
women’s liberation movement of the 1970s was it recognized that the most common post-
traumatic stress disorders are those not of men in war but of women in civilian life. The real 
conditions of women’s lives are hidden in the sphere of the personal, in private life.”794 “The 
hysteria of women and the combat neurosis of men,” Herman writes, “are one. Recognizing the 
commonality of affliction may even make it possible at times to transcend the immense Gulf that 
separates the public sphere of war and politics—the world of men—and the private sphere of 
domestic life—the world of women.”795 Even when it included women’s experiences with 
trauma, most of the scholarship in the 1990s and much contemporary trauma work (including 
Herman’s) engages a “search for the core symptoms of PTSD,” an essence to trauma, reflecting 
the “tendency of clinical psychology to medicalized psychic pain, another exemplary care of 
which,” Cvetkovich argues, “is the contemporary zeal for pharmacological treatment of 
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depression.”796 Cvetkovich describes her interests in trauma as a rejection first of a “universal 
model of trauma because it runs the risk of erasing essential differences between traumatic 
experiences, differences of historical context and geopolitical location as well as the specificities 
of individual experience that can be lost in a diagnosis that finds the same symptoms 
everywhere.”797 Second, Cvetkovich rejects conceptions of separate spheres by “looking instead 
to the public dimensions of sexual trauma,” writing with and into the feminist and queer Public 
Feelings project that thinks about the ongoing impact of identity politics by looking to places 
where the “public/private divide warrants reconceptualization.” 798 It is “no longer useful,” she 
writes, “to presume that sexuality, intimacy, affect, and other categories of experience typically 
assigned to the private sphere do not also pervade public life.”799 
 Part of the feminist and queer reconceptualization of public life Cvetkovich champions is 
“the focus on trauma as everyday that unravels definitions of the term.”800 She gestures to Laura 
Brown’s “crucial formulation of ‘insidious’ trauma to describe the everyday experiences of 
sexism that add to the effects of more punctual traumatic experiences, such as rape, forges 
connections between trauma and more systemic forms of oppression.”801 The diagnostic 
“stipulation that trauma must be ‘an event outside the range of human experience’” Brown 
argues, “excludes insidious forms of trauma that are all too often persistent and normalized.”802 
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Furthermore, Cvetkovich argues, “insidious or everyday forms of trauma, especially those 
emerging from systemic forms of oppression, ultimately demand an understanding of trauma that 
moves beyond medicalized constructions of PTSD.” “The challenge of insidious trauma,” she 
argues: 
 or chronic PTSD (although this category may contain it again in the confines 
of a diagnosis) is that it resists the melodramatic structure of an easily identifiable origin 
of trauma. Once the causes of trauma become more diffuse, so too do the cures, opening 
up the need to change social structures more broadly rather than just fix individual 
people. Yet as the links between sexual abuse and sexism show, event trauma can play a 
prominent role in drawing attention to more insidious forms of trauma . . . experiences 
that are connected to trauma but may not necessarily themselves be traumatic—such as 
sex acts, immigration, activism, and caretaking.803 
 
Focusing on insidious or collective forms of trauma, Cvetkovich’s work contends, challenges 
trauma studies to “participate in the large and interdisciplinary project of producing revisionist 
and critical counterhistories.”804 There are “many forgotten histories that have yet to receive full 
attention within trauma studies,” she writes, “a necessary agenda for the intersection of trauma 
studies and American studies is a fuller examination of racialized histories of genocide, 
colonization, slavery, and migration that are part of the violences of modernity, and whose 
multigenerational legacies require new vocabularies of trauma.”805 Opening up trauma studies to  
intersections with race and ethnic studies necessitates “investigations of the impact of cultural 
loss and the suppression of cultural memory in the work of building culture in the present.”806 
For American contexts, exploring collective trauma requires “tracking how contemporary 
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experiences of racism rest on the foundation of traumatic events such as slavery, lynching, and 
harassment.”807 Influential work that examines the “history of slavery within contemporary 
culture” as insidious trauma, particularly Cvetkovich recognizes the literature of Toni Morrison 
and Octavia Butler as well as the essays of Patricia Williams, demands “models that can explain 
the links between trauma and everyday experiences, the intergenerational transmission from past 
to present, and the cultural memory of trauma as central to the formation of identities and 
politics.”808 “To return to the traumatic history of slavery and African diaspora as an explanatory 
context for contemporary racisms and antiracisms is to acknowledge that this history continues 
to have a legacy in the present,” Cvetkovich writes, “and to grapple also with an equally 
powerful legacy of its forgetting.”809 This “traumatic history,” and its missing archive that is 
“systematically undocumented given restrictions on literacy for slaves, and governed 
subsequently by racisms that have suppressed subaltern knowledges,” demands “unusual 
strategies of representation.”810 Cvetkovich points directly to the influential work of Avery 
Gordon on the concept of haunting as one such strategy. Gordon’s haunting as a trauma archive 
“offers a compelling account of how the past remains simultaneously hidden and present in both 
material practices and the psyche, in both invisible and visible places.”811 
 Gordon’s Ghostly Matters works to “understand modern forms of dispossession, 
exploitation, repression, and their concrete impacts on the people most affected by them and on 
                                                        
807 Ibid., 38. 
 
808 Ibid., 38. 
 









our shared conditions of living” by developing “language for identifying hauntings and for 
writing with the ghosts any haunting inevitably throws up.”812 Haunting, Gordon writes, 
describes how: 
that which appears to be not there is often a seething presence, acting on and often 
meddling with taken-for-granted realties, the ghost is just the sign, or the empirical 
evidence if you like, that tells you a haunting is taking place. The ghost is not simply a 
dead or missing person, but a social figure, and investigating it can lead to that dense site 
where history and subjectivity make social life. The ghost or the apparition is one form 
by which something lost, or barely visible, or seemingly not there to our supposedly well-
trained eyes, makes itself known or apparent to us, in its own way, of course. The way of 
the ghost is haunting, and haunting is a very particular way of knowing what has 
happened or is happening. Being haunted draws us affectively, sometimes against our 
will and always a bit magically, into the structure of feeling of a reality we come to 
experience, not as cold knowledge, but as a transformative recognition.813 
 
Haunting is “one way in which abusive systems of power make themselves known and their 
impacts felt in everyday life.”814 It is not the same as being “exploited, traumatized, or 
oppressed, although it usually involves these experiences or is produced by them. What’s 
distinctive about haunting is that it is an animated state in which a repressed or unresolved social 
violence is making itself known.”815 Gordon uses Raymond Williams’ “structure of feeling,” to 
best describe haunting as an “emergent,” social experience articulating “‘presence’ as the tangled 
exchange of noisy silences and seething absences” those “‘experiences to which the fixed forms 
do not speak at all, which . . . they do not recognize.’”816 Sometimes the appearance of the ghost 
is oblique (“a dead women was not at a conference she was supposed to attend”)817 and other 
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times they grab with their manifestations (“Beloved’s appearance, the breathing presence of this 
beautiful ghost whose sparse talk is like a series of picture books, bears out this theory of 
memory as haunting . . . the terrifying intimacies” of antebellum slavery “waiting for you.”)818 
Regardless of form, to write about ghosts and to follow where they lead, Gordon argues, 
“requires attention to what is not seen, but is nonetheless powerfully real; requires attention to 
what appears dead, but is nonetheless powerfully alive, requires attention to what appears to be 
in the past, but is nonetheless powerfully present.”819 
 Much of Gordon’s text is a lush close reading of Toni Morrison’s unfathomably profound 
1985 novel Beloved as Morrison’s Beloved is, Gordon writes, one of the most significant 
contributions to the understanding of haunting. Inspired by the 1856 American Baptist 
newspaper story, “A Visit to the Slave Mother Who Killed Her Child,” on Margaret Garner, the 
fleeing “slave mother, who killed her child rather than see it taken back to slavery,” Morrison’s 
Beloved “remembers” the “anonymous people called slaves . . . these people who don’t know 
they’re in an era of historical interest. They just know they have to get through the day.”820 A 
slave woman Sethe, “runs from Kentucky across the frozen Ohio River, giving birth along the 
way to a daughter named Denver” and spends twenty-eight days outside Cincinnati “with her 
three other children, her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, and the community before her owners 
attempt to capture and return her to Sweet Home.” 821  Faced with this prospect, she attempts to 
kill all her children and successfully kills one. Beloved then sits with the haunted kin that remain 
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at 124 Bluestone Road. In Beloved, “the ghost enters, all fleshy and real,” (Beloved. She my 
daughter. She mine. See. She come back to me of her own free will and I don’t have to explain a 
thing. I don’t have to explain before because it had to be done quick. Quick. She had to be safe 
and I put her where she would be)822 “with wants, and a fierce hunger, and she speaks, barely, of 
course, and in pictures and a coded language. This ghost, Beloved, forces a reckoning: she makes 
those who have contact with her, who love and need her, confront an event in their past that 
loiters in the present. But Beloved, the ghost, is haunted too, and therein lies the challenge 
Morrison poses.”823 To follow the ghost where it leads, in Morrison and Gordon’s work, is to 
attempt to track not only what comes to be unintelligible but the reasons why we cannot 
coherently speak about these exclusions. Beloved spotlights the weight of inheritance, perhaps 
obscured by generation, but no less a haunting asking “what is too much? What is too much self 
(pride) when you were not supposed to have one? What is too much to remember when there is 
yet more? What is too much violence (infanticide) when you are already living with too much 
violence (slavery)? What is too much to tell, to pass one, when ‘remembering seem[s] unwise 
(Beloved 274), but necessary? The double voice of the ghost will do its work, but it passes itself 
on as our haunting burden.”824  
Beloved, “the ghostly rememory of Sethe’s Medean action,” is the “classic gothic trope 
of the past haunting the present. She is the literal return of the repressed; the uncanny incarnation 
of trauma’s trace” in the “physical form of her dead child;” she is a “demonic rememory who 
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enables the ‘disremembering’ of a traumatic past and allows the unspeakable to be spoken.”825 
But “the work and the power of the story,” Gordon writes, “lie in giving reasons why the reasons 
are never quite enough;” why “haunting rather than ‘history’ (or historicism) best captures the 
constellation of connections that charges any ‘time of the now’ with the debts of the past and the 
expense of the present, why one woman killed her child and another was haunted by the 
event.”826 “I started out wanting to write a story about . . . the clipping about Margaret Garner 
stuck in my head,” Morrison writes, “I had to deal with this nurturing instinct that expressed 
itself in murder.”827 What the ghost “cannot or will not say,” Morrison’s characters:  
fill in with their simultaneously grand and subtle projections; from bits and pieces, 
fragments and portentous signs, they all make Beloved their beloved.  You are mine You 
are mine You are mine (Beloved, 217). Yet, what they see or think they see can never 
quite grasp what Toni Morrison asks us as readers today to comprehend: that Beloved the 
ghost herself barely possesses a story of loss, which structures the very possibility of 
enslavement, emancipation, and freedom in which the Reconstructive history of Beloved 
traffics. And thus, Beloved the ghost’s double voice speaks not only of Sethe’s dead child 
but also of an unnamed African girl lost at sea, not yet become an African-American.828 
 
Haunted by “the debts of the past and the expense of the present,” Morrison’s novel is 
“avowedly fiction; it is not written in the traditional autobiographical voice; it is not sponsored 
by nor is it testimony vouchsafed by a white authority;” as many of the authorized slave 
narratives were via filtering through lay abolitionist readers determining who was allowed to 
bear witness and it “begins in 1873; well after Emancipation . . . But it does retell the story of 
Margaret Garner . . . claiming its continuous relation to the history (slavery) and form (narrative) 
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of the origins, in the most general sense, of African American writing in the United States. As is 
retells one story and in this way summons another, it remembers some of what the slave 
narrative forgot, creating a palimpsest, a document that has been inscribed several times, where 
the remnants of earlier, imperfectly erased scripting is still detectable.”829 
For Morrison, Gordon writes, this palimpsest of social memory “is not just history, but 
haunting, not just context, but animated wordliness; not just the hard ground of infrastructural 
matters, but the shadowy grip of ghostly matters:  
the possibility of a collectively animated worldly memory is articulated here  
in that extraordinary moment in which you—who never was there in that real place—can 
bump into a rememory that belongs to somebody else . . . You have bumped into 
somebody else’s memory; you have encountered haunting and the picture of it the ghost 
imprints. Not only because this memory that is sociality is out there in the world, playing 
havoc with the normal security historical contexts provides, but because it will happen 
again; it will be there for you. It is waiting for you. We were expected . . . In order to 
manage this ‘remembering which seems unwise,’ it will be necessary to broach carefully 
and cautiously the desires of the ghost itself. The ghost’s desires? Yes, because the ghost 
is not just the return of the past or the dead. The ghostly matter is that always ‘waiting for 
you,’ and its motivations, desires, and interventions are remarkable only for being 
current.830  
 
Furthermore, Morrison’s “resolution of the struggle between Sethe and Beloved helps us to see 
that haunting as a way of life, or as a method of analysis, or as a type of political consciousness, 
must be passed on or through.”831 Morrison “provides a stunning example” Gordon writes:  
of how to hospitably and delicately talk to ghosts and through hauntings,  
which we must do . . . The ghost not other or alterity as such, ever. It is (like Beloved) 
pregnant with unfulfilled possibility, with the something to be done that the wavering 
present is demanding. This something to be done is not a return to the past but a 
reckoning with its repression in the present, a reckoning with that which we have lost, but 
never had . . . A woman walked out of the water thirsty and breathing hard and within the 
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gap between more memories than seem tolerable and there being still more, we are 
reminded of haunting’s affliction and its yearning for something that must be done.832 
 
 Resisting “investment in ontologies of disassociation,” histories of denial, erasure, and 
dispossession, Gordon writes that Ghostly Matters was motivated by her “desire to find a method 
of knowledge production and a way of writing that could represent the damage and the haunting 
of the historical alternatives and thus richly conjure, describe, narrate, and explain the liens, the 
costs, the forfeits, and the losses of modern systems of abusive power and their immediacy and 
worldly significance.”833 While haunting “is a frightening experience” as it “always registers the 
harm inflicted or the loss sustained by social violence done in the past or in the present,” 
haunting, unlike trauma, “is distinctive for producing a something-to-be-done.”834 “To be 
haunted and to write from that location,” like Morrison and Gordon do, is: 
to take on the condition of what you study, is not a methodology or a  
consciousness you can simply adopt or adapt as a set of rules or an identity; it produces 
its own insights and blindness. Following the ghosts is about making a contact that 
changes you and refashions the social relations in which you are located. It is about 
putting life back in where only a vague memory or a bare trace was visible to those who 
bothered to look. It is sometimes about writing ghost stories, stories that not only repair 
representational mistakes, but also strive to understand the conditions under which a 
memory was produced in the first place, toward a countermemory, for the future.835 
 
For those of us interested in transformative criticism, Gordon’s work on haunting suggests 
radical political change will come about “only when new forms of subjectivity and sociality can 
be forged by thinking beyond the limits of what is already comprehensible” and this is possible 
only when a “sense of what has been lost or of what we never had can be brought back from 
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exile and articulated fully as a form of longing in this world . . . we must seek to revivify our 
collective capacity to imagine a future radically other to the one ideologically charted out.”836  
There is so much for religion and ecology to explore in Gordon and Cvetkovich’s work 
on trauma and haunting. What is vital, I argue, for understanding the affective economies of 
devastated landscapes and their marginalization within environmental scholarship is taking heed 
of Cvetkovich and Gordon’s warnings that transformation is only possible when we embrace the 
ghosts and welcome their ability to refashion what matters in their illumination of forgotten 
bodies, places, events, histories, and narratives. New cosmology may not acknowledge the 
embodied power of past histories, environmental theory as a whole may not recognize ghostly 
matters in its conceptions of mourning, but the desires for what could have been but never was 
and the poison of historical violence and its continual iterations that limit what seems possible 
still seethe here whether they are acknowledged or not. Any environmental theory that hopes for 
transformation for the Gulf Coast will not find it in longing for a return to what it once was, 
which was truly a promise for some and horror for others. Nor will we find it in calls to move 
past all this violence without interrogating how our environmental thought and practice has 
powerfully fueled these forgettings.   
 Reckoning with the ghosts that abound along the Gulf Coast, I read poet Natasha 
Trethewey’s work as a model for environmental scholarship of ways to address ecological 
decline without side-stepping social and historical pain and erasure. Trethewey provides ways to 
articulate distress over eroding coastlines without ignoring the traumatic encounters of its 
inhabitants as well as examples for how to archive all these elements while they are washing 
away with the tide. Through memoir, personal letters, poetry, and photographs, Trethewey’s 
                                                        





Beyond Katrina: Meditation on the Mississippi Gulf Coast unsettles problematic narratives of 
recovery by “engaging in the contest of the public memory of Hurricane Katrina within 
mainstream representations on a national and local scale.”837 Trethewey particularly resists 
discourses that only focus on New Orleans or what might be deemed “successful” recovery 
narratives, by “presenting a more complicated and extensive account of recovery along the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast—one that will shape our memory of Katrina’s legacy.”838 While 
Trethewey’s work bears witness to the “complex structures that surround the politics of 
recovery,”839 as well as what histories of wetland development and increasing economic 
dependency on casinos has done to the region, Beyond Katrina is primarily a narrative about 
haunted kin. It is about how Trethewey and her beloveds negotiate historical and pressing 
traumas, erasures, memory, and rememory along a rapidly changing landscape.  
 Trethewey and her family are connected to North Gulfport, Mississippi, a historically 
African-American community settled along the Gulf after emancipation that “remained 
unincorporated until 1994,” and faced the threats of lack of infrastructure for most of its history 
including frequent flooding and polluted water.840 Mirroring the palimpsest of social memory in 
Morrison and Gordon’s ghostly matters, Trethewey weaves together the memories of her 
grandparents who have lived to see the incredible changes on the coast along with her and her 
brother Joe’s childhood memories and more contemporary narratives witnessing to events in a 
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devastated landscape. “With the destruction of the landscape lies the possibility that this local 
history will be lost,” is being lost, which “matters because despite desegregation, the fact that 
North Gulfport remained marginal to the city as a whole until 1994 implies that race and class 
ruptures continue to be a significant part of the story of the coast, and consequently, part of the 
story of Hurricane Katrina.”841 Following the “explosion of casino building, the cost of living 
dramatically increased, making life more difficult for the working-classes”842 and ensuring that 
some stories of recovery from the storm, narratives of minority communities’ attachments to this 
coastline, are lost, subverted, and exiled.  
After Katrina, caring for exiled family and returning to visit those who remain, 
Trethewey is bombarded by memories: hers, her beloveds’, and unnamed voices that pull at her 
for address. Visiting her grandmother who is ninety-one and asking what she remembers, “my 
grandmother conflates” Hurricane’s Camille and Katrina, she writes, “a woman who has spent 
most of her life in the same place, she knows she lives in Atlanta now, where I do, because she 
had to evacuate after Katrina, but she thinks she was at home during landfall, not lying on a cot 
in a classroom at the public school up the road from her house. Examined by a doctor after 
evacuating Gulfport, she was disoriented. She hadn’t eaten for weeks, even though the shelter 
provided MREs . . . the doctor spoke of trauma and depression, prescribed medication.”843 “She 
recalls how very young I was during Camille and how my parents moved my crib from room to 
room all night trying to avoid water pouring in through the roof. When I say, ‘no, Nana—
Katrina: 
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she looks at me, her eyes glassy with confusion, her lips pressed hard together, her brow 
deeply furrowed, as she tries to piece together the events of the previous two years. She 
has layered on the old story of Camille the new story of Katrina. Between the two, there 
is the suggestion of both a narrative and a metanarrative—the way she both remembers 
and forgets, the erasures, and bow intricately intertwined memory and forgetting always 
are. This too is a story about a story—how it will be inscribed on the physical landscape 
as well as on the landscape of our cultural memory. I wonder at the competing narratives: 
What will be remembered, what forgotten? What dominant narrative is now emerging?844 
 
Like Gordon describes with haunting, “those singular and yet repetitive instances when home 
becomes unfamiliar, when your bearings on the world lose direction, when things are animated, 
when the over and done with comes alive, when the blind field comes into view, when your own 
or another’s shadow shines brightly,”845 Trethewey tries to get her bearings while facing a 
rapidly changing landscape and communities shaped by trauma. “People carry with them the 
blueprints of memory for a place,” she writes: 
it is not uncommon to hear directions given in terms of landmarks that are no longer 
there: ‘turn right at the corner where the fruit stand used to be,’ or ‘across the street from 
the lot where Miss Mary used to live.’ There are no recognizable landmarks along the 
coast anymore, no way to get my bearings, no way to feel at home, familiar with the 
landscape. In time, the landmarks of destruction and rebuilding will overlap and intersect 
the memory of what was there—narrative and meta-narrative—the pentimento of the 
former landscape shown only through the shifting memories of the people who carry it 
with them.846 
 
The landscape and its memories hold Trethewey and her beloveds in-between slipping away and 
emerging narratives. All along the coast, “evidence of rebuilding marks the wild, devastated 
landscape,” she writes, “a little more than a year before, much debris still littered the ground: 
crumbled buildings, great piles of concrete and rebar twisted into strange shapes, bridges lifting a 
path to nowhere. Now new condominium developments rise about the shoreline . . . here and 
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there are signs of what’s still to come: posters reading ‘South Beach,’ and ‘Beachfront living 
only better.’”847 But the reality of what “rebuilding” means for the displaced and dispossessed, 
the stories that are forgotten about longing for what was lost but never really existed, is the 
trauma archive Trethewey wants to trace.  
 What Trethewey offers, “the something to be done that the wavering present is 
demanding,”848 is a love letter, liturgy, dirge to the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Trethewey says she’s 
“surprised now that so much of my thinking comes to me in the language of ceremony. But then, 
when I look up the word liturgy, I find that in the original Greek it meant, simply, one’s public 
duty . . . I am not a religious woman. This is my liturgy to the Mississippi Gulf Coast: 
 To the displaced, living in trailers along the coast, 
 beside the highway, 
 in vacant lots and open fields; to everyone who stayed 
 on the coast, 
 who came back—or cannot—to the coast; 
 
 To those who died on the coast. 
  
 This is a memory of the coast: to each his own 
 recollections, her reclamations, their 
 restorations, the return of the coast.  
 
 This is a time capsule for the coast: words of the people 
—don’t forget us— 
the sound of wind, waves, the silence of graves,  
the muffled voice of history, bulldozed and buried 
under sand poured on the eroding coast, 
the concrete slabs of rebuilding the coast.  
 
This is a love letter to the Gulf Coast, a praise song, a dirge, 
invocation and benediction, a requiem for the Gulf Coast. 
 
This cannot rebuild the coast; it is an indictment, 
a complaint, 
my logos—argument and discourse—with the coast. 
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This is my nostos—my pilgrimage to the coast, my memory, 
my reckoning— 
 
native daughter: I am the Gulf Coast.849  
 
While Trethewey knows she cannot rebuild the coast, she offers a resistance to what is being 
inscribed on the landscape both in construction and national memory, by sitting with the ghosts 
and speaking about what has been made invisible (a needed sourness—in complaint, in 
indictment) witnessing to the memories of beloveds who lived on this coastline for decades who 
were displaced from their homes and systematically denied recovery and return.  
Pushing us to think more deeply about intimacy and attachment in a devastated 
landscape, Trethewey’s kinship of remainders witnesses to long histories of environmental and 
social injustice particularly through one ghostly figure, a beloved who should be there but is not, 
her brother Joe. Joe, who like many of the other residents that were not eligible for the 
government funds that helped corporations and wealthier residents rebuild, was arrested and 
imprisoned for transporting cocaine to fund the taxes to hold onto the now vacant land he 
inherited: 
 there was still the possibility of a life he imagined—prosperous, stable,  
perhaps even emotionally rewarding, as it had been when he was first renovating those 
houses. And it must have been in sight, reflected in the images of the ‘good life’ plastered 
on casino billboards up and down Interstate 10 and down Highway 49 toward the beach: 
attractive people, in elegant clothes, laughing into cocktail glasses poised above plates of 
beautiful, abundant food. The casinos were among the first to rebuild and recover, and 
they broadcast their message of affluence above the heads of people struggling to 
reconstruct their lives from remnants.850 
 
Trethewey’s trauma archive (ghost stories and environmental mourning) weaves in letters from 
Joe in prison, her despair and numbness at his circumstances, and ultimately witnessing to Joe’s 
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story not being an extraordinary account but one of many in the uneven struggle for survival 
along the coast. Braiding in a narrative like Joe’s along with histories of eroding wetlands and 
impending storms, I argue Trethewey demands that we regard these landscapes with complexity, 
resisting separating out one element as an environmental fix. Ghostly matters along the coast 
illuminate that these populations have troubled but deep attachments to these landscapes and 
their communities. Their trauma calls out for address, could be a wellspring of and for 
environmental knowledge, but is buried by “rebuilding” in the same inequalities and violent 
erasures that seethed before. The kinship of remainders Trethewey brilliantly traces are the 
pained explorations of attachments to everything rapidly slipping away and the bodies, 
communities, and habitats that remain to puzzle through and negotiate these changes. 
Trethewey’s narratives should encourage us to continually ask: recovery and restoration for 
whom? To what ends? At what cost? My conception of kinship remainders helps us see what 
recovery looks like when we pay attention to what is seething outside the frame. The queer 
connections of life to object and place, those displaced by environmental crisis, reframe a notion 
of kinship around remainders and the haunting of those who cannot return. Kinship remainders 
are the bodies, objects, and lives of those who remain and carry these inheritances in their 
affinities and attachments. 
 
Unspeakable Muck and Queer Melancholy 
 
Reshaping our theory around kinship remainders on the Gulf Coast requires we leave 
behind awe, wonder, and reverence as normative affective attachments and wrestle with bad 
feelings. Drawing from queer theory’s critiques of affective normativity, particularly Leo 
Bersani, Michael Warner, and Biddy Martin, Cvetkovich contends that part of the critique of 




emotional attachments, pleasures, fascinations, and curiosities that do not necessarily produce, 
reflect, or line up neatly with political ideologies or oppositional movements.’”851 For example, 
as Eve Sedgwick and others have noted, the “reclamation of shame constitutes an alternative to 
the model of gay pride, carving out new possibilities for claiming queer, gay, and lesbian 
identities that don’t involve a repudiation of the affects brought into being by homophobia.”852 In 
her work to depathologize trauma, Cvetkovich attaches to these queer reclamations to “open up 
possibilities for understanding traumatic feelings not as a medical problem in search of a cure but 
as felt experiences that can be mobilized in a range of directions, including the construction of 
cultures and publics.”853 By not presuming “in advance a particular affective experience 
associated with trauma,” but rather considering trauma as a “category that embraces a range of 
affects, including not just loss and mourning but also anger, shame, humor, sentimentality, and 
more,” Cvetkovich opens up ways to examine “historical and social experience in affective 
terms” through developing “queer approaches to trauma” that “can appreciate the creative ways 
in which people respond to it.”854 “Catalyzed in part by the AIDS crisis,” she writes, “queer 
scholars have also investigated the nexus of mourning and melancholy” producing 
“understandings of collective affective formations that break through the presumptively 
privatized nature of affective experience” and offering “reconsiderations of melancholy as a form 
of mourning that should not be pathologized.”855 Public recognition of traumatic experience has 
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often only been “achieved through cultural struggle,” which is one way Cvetkovich argues that 
we can view 1980s AIDS activism, as “the demand for such recognition.”856 That “battle has 
involved combating” not only oppression and homophobia but negotiations with the “persistence 
of mourning,” particularly how mourning and melancholy become critical parts of activism.857 
Particularly in Eng and Muñoz’s work, explorations of melancholy articulate how affective 
experience is shaped by race, sex, and gender. Muñoz writes “about melancholy in works by 
African American gay men as a ‘depathologized structure of feeling,’ suggesting that 
ambivalences of disidentification, far from disabling cultural production, are a rich resource.”858 
Cvetkovich highlights Douglas Crimp’s (1989) essay “Mourning and Militancy,” as canonical 
for trauma archive research in his argument that “militancy cannot ease every psychic burden 
and that the persistence of mourning, if not also melancholy, must be reckoned with in the 
context of activism.”859 Crimp’s essay articulates how insidious trauma invades the everyday and  
how trauma’s “effects are mediated through forms of oppression such as homophobia,”860 by 
claiming safe sex within persistent homophobia itself constitutes a loss: “alongside the dismal 
toll of death, what many of us have lost is a culture of sexual possibility . . . now our untamed 
impulses are either proscribed once again or shielded from us by latex . . . for many men of the 
Stonewall generation, who have also been the gay population thus far hardest hit by AIDS, safe 
sex may seem less like defiance than resignation, less like accomplished mourning than 
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melancholia.”861 Gay men living with the everyday specter of AIDS must negotiate trauma that’s 
unspeakable, ungrievable, and rendered ghostly. Crimp writes: 
through the turmoil imposed by illness and death, the rest of society offers  
little support or even acknowledgment. On the contrary, we are blamed, belittled, 
excluded, derided. We are discriminated against, lose our housing and jobs, and are 
denied medical and life insurance. Every public agency whose job it is to combat the 
epidemic has been slow to act, failed entirely, or been deliberately counterproductive. We 
have therefore had to provide our won centers for support, care, and education and even 
to fund and conduct our won treatment research. We have had to rebuild our devastated 
community and culture, reconstruct our sexual relationships, reinvent our sexual pleasure. 
Despite great achievements in so short a time and under such adversity, the dominant 
media still pictures us only as wasting deathbed victims; we have therefore had to wage a 
war of representation, too. Frustration, anger, rage, and outrage, anxiety, fear, and terror, 
shame and guilt, sadness and despair—it is not surprising that we feel these things; what 
is surprising is that we often don’t. For those who feel only a deadening numbness or 
constant depression, militant rage may well be unimaginable, as again it might be for 
those who are paralyzed with fear, filled with remorse, or overcome with guilt. To decry 
these responses—our own form of moralism—is to deny the extent of the violence we 
have all endured; even more importantly, it is to deny a fundamental fact of psychic life: 
violence is also self-inflicted.862 
 
Crimp articulates that the war on representation, how minor communities respond to normativity 
and disinheritance, can themselves result in deep loses by positioning those out-of- step desires, 
affects, and kin deemed unruly outside the frame thus purging the community of “‘fringe’ gay 
groups,’—drag queens, radical fairies, pederasts, bull dykes, and other assorted scum.”863 
Furthermore, Crimp “emphasizes the ways in which putatively normal practices of mourning are 
foreclosed for gay men—because they are faced with the prospect of their own deaths, because 
gay identities are erased at funerals organized by families, because they have been at too many 
funerals.”864 Crimp, too, seems to be asking, what is too much? What is too much self (pride) 
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when you were not supposed to have one? What is too much to remember when there is yet 
more? What is too much violence when you are already living with too much violence? For 
religion and ecology, this scholarship in queer, feminist, and critical race responses to trauma 
and mourning should make us: hesitant about universal environmental narratives, resistant to 
limiting our affective engagements by following these models that recognize those bodies, 
identities, places, and creatures rendered ghostly by our environmental hopes, and cautious about 
which subjects and affects we deem “appropriate” to fuel environmental change.  
Thinking with the ghosts (the collateral damage, the acceptable losses, those bodies that 
have been living out complex and precarious relationships with their environments for some 
time) by embracing affects eschewed by universal environmental narratives like new cosmology, 
Jennifer James and Catriona Sandilands bring the melancholic affinities of queer trauma archives 
into environmental thinking through considering ecomelancholia for our troubled times. 
Sandilands and James join Cvetkovich, Butler, Muñoz, and Eng in wishing to “rethink Freud’s 
definition of melancholia as an inherently debilitating, pathological condition, who choose to 
read persistent mourning as missives from politically aggrieved and emotionally bereaved 
communities.”865 For Freud, James argues, “mourning is a necessary but temporary process of 
grieving which, in his words, ‘spontaneously’ ends after an unspecified period of time . . . Once 
the ego has successfully ‘renounced everything that has been lost,’ the mourner can ‘once more 
[be] free to replace the lost objects by fresh ones equally or still more precious . . . In proper 
mourning, grieving occurs, then dissipates after the object is relinquished” but for the 
“melancholic subject, however, mourning is seemingly unending. Undone by the experience of 
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loss, incomplete, the ego’s libidinal energy scouts for new love objects for the ego before it has 
fully restored itself.”866 If we “take the ‘love object’ as the natural world,” James writes, 
“ecomelancholia can be thought of as the inability or unwillingness to ‘stop mourning’ 
ecological loss and losses associated with ‘the land’ in a present where loss continues.”867 
“Ecomelancholia disavows mourning’s ‘renewable’ economy and the attendant theory that 
scarcity mitigates loss,” James argues, “ the recovery of lost love objects disappearing lands, 
species, finite natural resources, ways of life—would prove impossible in many instances. There 
will be no ‘fresh’ objects to replace the natural world, and none ‘more precious.’”868 To read 
“African American literature ecocritically,” James writes, to explore black environmental 
imaginaries, “is to encounter black loss,” “black collective trauma,” and the systematic denial of 
black communities from articulating their own complex affective relationships with the more-
than-human world.869 While these losses continue unrecognized, both in our more-than-human 
relationships and marginalized negotiations with grief, it “will fall to the ecomelancholics,” she 
writes, “those ‘cursed with long memory,’ to remind us of the disastrous consequences of 
forgetting.”870 “How do we navigate the place of black grief,” James asks, “especially if we are 
black women for whom that affect poses professional risks? My answer (at least today) is that we 
accept the unleashing of historical mourning as part of what we do, as a natural consequence of 
black historical looking.”871 Ecomelancholia’s “historical and memorial disposition defends 
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against mourning’s call to prematurely forget. It responds to the cumulative losses of nature, 
land, resources, and to traumas tied to those losses, such as death, deracination, and 
dispossession; it is activated by ongoing and interrelated social and political violence, including 
the catastrophes of war, genocide, and poverty.”872 
Working in queer ecologies, interdisciplinary scholarship that considers the joint 
construction of sexuality and nature by further unsettling nature-culture divides, Catriona 
Mortimer-Sandilands and others like Bruce Erickson, Giovanna Di Chiro, and Katie Hogan 
consider “environmentally inflected moral regulation,” and other ways “in which historical and 
contemporary formations of natural space have been organized by changing understandings and 
agendas related to sexuality.”873  Scholarship in queer ecologies asks: 
what does it mean that ideas, spaces, and practices designated as ‘nature’ are often so 
vigorously defended against queers in a society in which that very nature is increasingly 
degraded and exploited? What do queer interrogations of science, politics, and desire then 
offer to environmental understanding? And how might a clearer attention to issues of 
nature and environment—as discourse, as space, as ideal, as practice, as relationship, as 
potential—inform and enrich queer theory, lgbtq politics, and research into sexuality and 
society?874 
 
Recognizing the “absence of a societal and personal story of loss and grief in which to place 
environmental understanding,” Mortimer-Sandilands draws from the “political potential of a 
queer rewriting of loss and melancholia” in memoirs tracing “intimate and world-changing 
relationships with AIDS and death.”875 Mortimer-Sandilands emphasizes that if we do not yet 
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have social recognition of immense ecological loss, particularly in those places and communities 
far from center, nor cultural expressions to mourn together, at what point is it clear, “that the 
subject will not,” she argues, “simply, ‘substitute’ one object for another.”876 Melancholia 
suggests a “present that is not only haunted but constituted by the past— literally built of ruins 
and rejections.”877 In a context in which certain lives are considered ungrievable, ecomelancholia 
as resistance “represents a holding-on to loss in defiance” of “imperatives to forget, move on, 
and transfer attention to a new relationship.”878 Mortimer-Sandilands offers “queer ecological 
activists a language in which to resist a commodification of nature that removes the specificity of 
nature, including the possibility of grieving for individual elements and instances of nature.”879 
What might it mean “to consider the preservation of a public record of environmental loss,” she 
writes, “an ‘archive of ecological trauma’—made up of the kinds of art, literature, film, ritual, 
performance, and other memorials and interrogations that have characterized so many cultural 
responses to AIDS—as part of an environmental ethics or politics?”880 Furthermore, instead of 
“fetishizing the about-to-be-absences of a more ‘pristine’ nature,”881 Mortimer-Sandilands 
advocates for the value of devastated landscapes by asking us to dwell with what has been lost 
and examine how trauma and loss can become a part of everyday environmental relationships.  
“What would it mean to consider seriously the environmental present,” she asks, “as a pile of 
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environmental wreckage, constituted and haunted by multiple, personal, and deeply traumatic 
losses? . . . In short, what might it look like to take seriously the fact that nature is currently 
ungrievable, and that the melancholy natures with which we are surrounded are a desperate 
attempt to hold onto something that we don’t even know how to talk about grieving?”882 
Cultivating an ecomelancholia that is sensitive to social inequalities, I argue, would 
require more thinking about the timescapes of environmental degradation— the sedimented 
complexities that shape our encounters and intimacies. It must resist the passive habits of white 
environmentalism that require ignoring intensifying devastation and its historical and ongoing 
effects on non-white bodies as part of loving the earth again. We must orient ourselves not 
toward one evolutionary narrative, one grand story, but the multiplicity of ignored or forgotten 
archives carried by the bodies and habitats of kinship remainders. Importantly, we must also 
shoulder the complicated emotions environmental activists will face within precarious futures—a 
willingness to sit with unpleasant emotions and an openness to creative responses to the kinds of 
trauma and pain that impact trouble-kin. Concluding this chapter, I look at two images from Kara 
Walker’s After the Deluge that experiment with time, material, and embodiment to further help 
us to think through uncomfortable emotions at the intersections of racial and environmental 
trauma along the Gulf Coast. Walker’s evocative images and prose serve, as I read them, as an 
ecomelancholic archive883—a preservation of the complex affective encounters avoided by 
universal narratives like new cosmology.  
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Kara Walker’s (1969-) work is provocative in all the affective ways that word resonates. 
Whether critics find her projects ultimately helpful or harmful, what they are is stimulating, 
unsettling, disconcerting, shocking. They illicit visceral response. Best known for her cut paper 
silhouettes that often depict graphic violence, sexual assault, and degradation, Gwendolyn 
DuBois Shaw writes that Walker’s “use of silhouettes and profiles to image race and ‘otherness’ 
. . . confronts and addresses the ongoing battle to counteract negative images of the African 
American body in Western visual culture and in the United States in particular.”884 Walker taps 
into “both the latent and the virulent racist icons of the visual and textual past,” Shaw argues, “in 
order to make her audience ‘see the unspeakable.’”885 Furthermore, Shaw writes, “the disturbing 
and often melancholic tone of Walker’s art reflects, and offers up for critique, the problem of the 
broader culture’s inability to come to terms with the past.”886 Like Morrison and Gordon’s 
trauma archives, Walker’s work sits with ghostly matters to listen for “a discourse made up of 
the horrific accounts of physical, mental, and sexual abuse that were left unspoken by former 
slaves as they related their narratives, the nasty and unfathomable bits of detritus that have been 
left out of familiar histories of American race relations.”887 This “unclaimed discourse of the 
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unspeakable continues to impact the ability of many European Americans and many African 
Americans to confront the terrible impression that the legacy of slavery continues to have on our 
individual and collective psyches,” Shaw contends, and Walker’s work picks at the “deeply 
embedded gothic culture of denial and repression at the core of contemporary society.”888  
The provocative cut paper form Walker uses in many of her pieces forces the viewer to 
wrestle with unsettling ambiguities. The silhouettes trace black cut-outs but are not necessarily 
black bodies, they are open for interpretation, eliciting a squirming discomfort from the viewer 
about what is and is not projected onto the images. Through her research “into the history of 
silhouettes and race in American visual culture,” Shaw argues that the “artistic practice of Kara 
Walker is important not only for the ruckus that it stirred up, but also for the profound way that it 
redraws issues of race through the nostalgic and deceptively innocent form of the silhouette.”889 
Walker subverts and rewrites “the white voice of the nineteenth-century sentimental novel, the 
mediated voice of the slave narrative, and the twentieth-century historical romance novel, as well 
as assorted libertine pornography of the previous two centuries,” through these silhouettes.890 
“By rendering all of her characters black ciphers,” Shaw argues, Walker “is able to incarnate the 
‘master, mistress, overseer, pickaninny, and buck,’ and elucidate the way power relations and the 
sexual exchange of raced and gendered bodies occurs within our varied cultural fantasies of race 
and representation.”891  
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Of course, work this evocative faces detractions and sincere critiques about whether 
Walker entrenches troubling representations further into American imaginaries, but I am 
compelled by the power of Walker’s work and its insistence that we cannot confront the present 
without conjuring up the past. Echoing J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Shaw argues that 
Walker’s work ultimately raises the question of “what it meant for a nation’s collective identity 
that certain Americans embraced slavery’s culture of torture and death.”892 Crevecoeur’s 18th 
century writings lamented “the state of a youthful self-styled southern gentry that was already 
decayed from its core, as gangrenous and putrescent as the bodies of the African slaves that it 
tortured to maintain its own dominance.”893 Crevecoeur’s question “of what such malfeasance 
meant for a collective American consciousness” still lies “unanswered in the beginning of the 
twenty-first” century and Walker’s pieces address that gaping need for address.894 Using 
nineteenth-and twentieth-century source material “to visualized unspeakable experiences and to 
produce psychologically disruptive, gothic silhouette ‘pageants,’” Walker’s “paper silhouettes, 
prints, and drawings: 
have shown themselves to be the shadows of similar sightless ‘specters,’  
monstrous ghosts haunting the American imago. Her images present themselves to the 
contemporary spectator as challenges to the politeness of middle-class and liberal society. 
The abject state of the work cannot be dismissed as merely the product of their creator’s 
self-loathing, social contempt, and subversive vision; rather it is linked to a pervasive 
culture of subsumed abjection . . . Their power lies in the way they make people feel 
uncomfortable by visualizing their sublimated fears and desires . . . Regardless of 
whether it is the guilt of having benefited from racism or of having been a victim of it, or 
of having harbored interracial, homosexual, bestial, sadomasochistic, or pederastic sexual 
desire, it is the guilt of never having owned up to any of it that will bother spectators as 
they experience Walker’s work. ‘It is not what you’ve done to me that menaces you,’ 
                                                        









declared James Baldwin during a taped discussion with writer Frank Shatz about slavery 
and abolitionists. ‘It’s what you’ve done to you that menaces you.’895 
 
 After the Deluge is what Walker calls a “visual essay,” a short text and a collection of 
Walker’s own works and some of other artists into a “rumination on a fear of the deep and the 
problem of the shallow—skin deep.”896 Walker writes she “created this book because I was tired 
of seeing news images of (Black) people suffering presented as though it were a fresh, new 
thrilling subject.”897 “The book is the result of thinking like a Black Woman,” she writes, 
“perhaps absurdedly so, because to be ‘Black’ in the context of the book means broad sweeps of 
types of representation: stereotypical, archetypal, Negro, African, the color of nighttime, the 
color of cut paper, the feeling of engulfment, the sense of humor, the style of outrage.”898 For 
After the Deluge, “the story that has interested me is the story of Muck,” Walker writes: 
 at this book’s inception the narrative of Hurricane Katrina has shifted  
precariously away from the hyperreal horror show presented to the outside world as live 
coverage of a frightened and helpless populace (relayed by equally frightened and 
helpless reporters) to a more assimilable legend. Lately, the narrative of the disaster has 
turned to ‘security failures,’ or ‘the question of race and poverty,’ or ‘rebirth.’ I’ve heard 
harrowing anecdotes of survival and humorous tales of rancid refrigerators. And always 
at the end of these tales, reported on the news, in newspapers, and by word of mouth, 
always there is a puddle—a murky, unnavigable space that is overcrowded with 
intangibles: shame, remorse, vanity, morbidity, silence.899 
 
Staying with the Muck, the visual essay that flows out is a collection of her own pieces along 
with some nineteenth century art and more contemporary images that I read as positioning 
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Katrina as an event,900 as per Ahmed, with a particular background and the visual essay details 
the “conditions of emergence,” for a disaster that Walker writes is misguidedly positioned as 
“new.”901 The collection overflows with fluids: ocean waves, river flows, blood pools, breastmilk 
drips, oil spills. The fluid cannot be contained despite its unspeakability. “We tell stories of 
events to allude to the unspeakable,” Walker writes: 
 rumors and jokes fill in the uncomfortable, antisocial gaps. Vulnerability,  
failure, panic tell of themselves through careful observation of things like body language 
and eye contact. I’ve seen music, dance, and Mardi Gras celebrations activate damaged, 
closed-off psychic spaces; they provide hope. But what role can the visual arts play in 
reexamining one of America’s greatest social failures? ‘Not much’ is the pessimistic 
conclusion I came to, followed by a close examination of a line of thinking familiar to 
Blacks, as expressed to my grandmother: ‘All you have to do in this world is stay Black 
and die.’ This phrase sums up multilayered experiences of suppression, resentment, and 
rage. I have asked the objects in this book to do one more thing. Instead of sitting very 
still, ‘staying Black,’ and waiting to die, I have asked each one to take a step beyond its 
own borders to connect a series of thoughts together related to fluidity and the failure of 
containment.902 
 
What fails to remain contained is not just the flood waters of Katrina but the Muck. The Muck is 
what Gordon might call the “seething absence” of an unspeakable presence that “investment in 
ontologies of disassociation” renders ghostly.903 Or what Christina Sharpe calls “monstrous 
intimacies,” those “subjectivities constituted from transatlantic slavery onward and connected, 
then as now, by the everyday mundane horrors that aren’t acknowledged to be horrors . . . 
slavery’s inherited and reproduced spaces of shame, confinement, intimacy, desire, violence, and 
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terror.”904 “This book is not simply about New Orleans or Katrina or waterborne disaster,” 
Walker writes: 
it is an attempt to understand the subconscious narratives at work when we talk about 
such an event . . . Black life, urban and rural Southern life, is often related as if it were an 
entity with a shadowy beginning and a potentially heroic future, but with a soul that is 
crippled by racist psychosis. One theme in my artwork is the idea that a Black subject in 
the present tense is a container for specific pathologies from the past and is continually 
growing and feeding off those maladies. Racist pathology is the Muck, aforementioned. 
In this book’s analogy, murky, toxic waters become the amniotic fluid of a potentially 
new and difficult birth, flushing out of a coherent and stubborn body long-held fears and 
suspicions.905 
 
The Muck, seething, and monstrous intimacies are the binding inheritances, not consanguineous 
lineage or evolutionary inheritance, that only advocating for a kinship of remainders can begin to 
help us understand.    
 Many of the images in the collection call out for an environmental reading but two 
images I find particularly moving. The first is one of the opening images of After the Deluge, a 
familiar one to those that write about Katrina, an AP image taken by Bill Haber. The full-page 
color photo shows a large black woman in a white tank top slowly moving through chest-high 
water.906 She carries a small bag, assumedly filled with whatever she could leave with, and a 
pack of bottled water. In full sun, around her the ripples in the water are a rainbow sheen— the 
chest-high flooding full of oil and other toxic substances from the multiple hazardous breaches in 
the storms wake. The image was and is jarring for many reasons the least of which is the painful 
juxtaposition of the toxic floods and bottled water. The title for the quilted collection, After the 
Deluge, stitches it into the context of biblical flooding. Reading this image, queer ecocriticism 
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scholar Michael P. Bibler finds that “the undrinkable toxic soup” and its oil-slick sheen “in 
which the woman swims” collapses “Noah, disaster and promise . . . into a single frame” and 
“relocated from the sky to the water itself, the toxic rainbow becomes a symbol of the 
‘potentially new and difficult birth’ . . . Walker’s discussion of muck’s fertile possibilities 
repaints this colorful sludge as a potential source of transformation, maybe even salvation, in and 
of itself.”907 Salvation for whom, of course, is an open question. Bibler reads the image as “the 
promise of new life” for the woman in the “flood itself, rather than something far away in the 
sky,” her “salvation” lying in her “ability to negotiate the muck, to keep swimming.”908 I am 
more inclined to read the inclusion of this image and its fertile possibilities as directed toward the 
viewer. Whatever promise that could be made that would birth something new would be a 
promise to attend to the Muck. Whatever we make in the future carries her and the waters with 
us as a birthing of oddkin— a melancholic kinship of remainders that doesn’t forget. Reading it 
in connection with Walker’s commitment to staying-with the trouble suggests a way to think of 
queer love for mutated landscapes as a wading through the muck-that-binds bodies, beings, and 
habitats together in complex futures; no longer invested in disassociation but wedded in its 
intimacies. 
 The second image is one of Walker’s untitled silhouettes from 1996 that is included 
toward the end of the collection.909 It depicts a barefooted woman in an apron holding up a 
creature that is half-girl, half-alligator to the gaze of small more elegantly dressed male figure 
that stands to the right sweeping off his top hat in some form of address. Guided by Giorgio 
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Agamben, Holly Cade Brown reads this image as a “blurred human-animal hybrid” indicating 
that “the politics of distinction between the human and the animal that Agamben describes have 
historically been utilized and exploited in order to exclude and marginalize racialized subjects;” 
the “indelicate manner in which the female figure holds the monstrous child, indicates that the 
child is being held up in order to be inspected by a fully human form” and, judged inadequate, 
rendered disposable.910 Any number of interpretations can be drawn from this image and 
Brown’s is compelling. However, the placement of the image toward the conclusion of the visual 
essay (After the Deluge is importantly sandwiched between these two images of rainbow 
promises and oddkin birthings) leads me to connect it to a birthing from toxicity. We can think of 
the gator-girl as the fruits of the tangled histories and toxic sediments Walker wades us through. 
Holding her up by a braid for inspection replaces the swinging strange fruit of southern trees 
with a different kind of strangeness—a mutation via the rot of slow violence, the embodied 
implications of histories of toxicity and racialized violence in the swampy south that are rendered 
ghostly by environmental theory.911 Again, I read the image less as commentary on the 
disposition of the female figure and more as call to viewer, what do we make of all this now? 
Take a look at what you’ve done. Whatever our interpretation, there is an intimacy here: a 
kinship of those left behind seeping into each other, a seething unleashed that unsettles our 
conceptions of intimacy and reciprocity. Can we create an environmental theory that would reach 
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out and take up that gatorbaby and cradle her to our breast? What could religion and ecology 
accomplish by claiming her as beloved kin? 
 For kinship to be provocative for the future, for devastated landscapes and precarious 
others, what kind of kinship do we want to cultivate? The kinship of remainders I have traced 
here (those who remain in devastated environments, who remain with trouble-kin, who are the 
remainders outside of normative kinship’s embrace) model how to do kinship rather than just be 
kin. They project kinship as an active process of remembering and forward desire, the desire to 
be-long into the future even for the disinherited. Staying with the trouble—the ghosts, the muck, 
the monstrous—these stories tell us about intimacy and attachment by resisting universal 
narratives like new cosmology’s to articulate how complex emotional relationships really are, 
how trauma and grief can be motivating for environmental thinking, and how affinity and 
attachment mean different things here—not easy reciprocity but a twisting braid that is often 
horrifying but nonetheless intimate. These intimacies push us to ask, how do we reckon with 
what religion and ecology has rendered ghostly? We must cultivate “the willingness to follow 
ghosts, neither to memorialize nor to slay,” Gordon writes, but to “follow where they lead, in the 
present, head turned backwards and forwards at the same time. To be haunted in the name of the 
will to heal is to allow the ghost to help you imagine what was lost that never even existed, 










                                                        









Late summer 2017, it is flooding in Texas. Harvey came to my city, Houston, and 
reshaped how I feel about it. Moving up the Texas coast, Harvey chewed up and spit out the 
coastline then sat for a spell saturating the Bayou city with an unfathomable amount of rain. We 
evacuated shoving two kids, my mother, four dogs, and two guinea pigs into the car and drove 
practically blind deeper into Houston on a disturbingly abandoned freeway because all other 
roads were already underwater. I grabbed my laptop, books, and some framed pictures on the 
way out but forgot dry pants. County dump trucks came to evacuate one of my sisters and her 
children. My other sister, a teacher in a rural district, joined other teachers in pickup trucks 
moving house-to-house checking on students and helping to clear away dead livestock. 
Returning after some of the flood water receded, we did the agonizing wait of seeing how high 
the Brazos river would crest. We stood on the levee separating the wet from the dry turning our 
neighborhood into an island while all the other homes across the street started filling up and 
gratitude started feeling like a shameful twist in my guts. Conversations with strangers and 
friends start with identifying whether you were part of the wet or the dry, and then move to 
describing panicked evacuations, frustrating waits on FEMA funds, and an uncomfortable 
gratitude (we know we should be thankful) for what remains. Late summer 2017, Irma and Maria 
destroyed the islands and California and Montana caught on fire. Recovering from 2017, many 
of us are (understandably) more intimate with apocalyptic thinking. It is difficult to find media 
about the storms that does not use “apocalyptic” to try and describe the damage.  
What has not changed, except for perhaps my sense of urgency, is what I want to 
advocate for here at The End which is resistance to our apocalyptic habits through crafting 




what kinship might be, concluding I want to think on futurity for trouble-kin. What future is 
there for damaged habitats, disabled, ill, and mutating bodies? Why stay with devastated 
landscapes when those who claim common sense have moved-on? How might we resist both 
Edenic pasts and apocalyptic futures by staying with the trouble of environmental disaster?913 
Concluding, I consider hopes for flourishing in troubled times by cultivating desires to be-long 
for abject human and nonhuman bodies both within our theory and our environments. Further 
engaging Carolyn Finney’s argument that our problematic relationships with the natural 
environment are intimately linked to our problematic relationships with each other, I contend the 
lack of engagement with the human and nonhuman creatures and habitats changed by 
devastation is the result of environmental theory’s fundamental discomfort with desire and 
futurity for ill, disabled, and abject bodies.  
Another response to the trouble of creatively addressing environmental degradation is 
working through the compulsory able-bodied and able-mindedness within new cosmology’s 
conceptions of kinship, within most steams of environmental thought, while illuminating how it 
contributes to aversion to damaged creatures, ecosystems, and communities. The discomfort, 
disgust, and paternalism scholars like Alison Kafer, Stacy Alaimo, Mel Chen, Kelly Fritsch, and 
Sarah Jaquette Ray spotlight as habitually directed toward porous disabled and ill bodies 
affectively maps onto ill and disabled creatures, environments, and the human communities that 
experience them intimately. Tracing a conversation between scholarship in crip and queer theory 
on cultivating futures that embrace abject bodies—imagining disability, desire, and intimacy 
differently—I conclude by offering alternative mappings of affinity and futurity through 
challenging religion and ecology to push beyond a reliance on simplistic readings of biological 
                                                        




kinship to explore: what is desired in “nature”? And, what does “nature” desire? Furthermore, 
what does it mean to desire nature when this “nature” is devastated? 
Understandably, environmental thinking within religion and ecology can tend toward 
apocalyptic thinking.914 Moderately comfortable with apocalyptic narratives in American religio-
cultural landscapes, religion scholarship on environmental concerns often uses apocalyptic tones 
to convey urgency and “wake-up” scholarship. Though, resonating with the hesitancy in Timothy 
Morton (2010, 2013) Lisa Sideris (2013, 2015), Catherine Keller (1996), and Whitney Bauman’s 
(2014, 2015) work on ecoapocalyptic themes, I similarly question what apocalypticism 
accomplishes, occludes, and protects.915 Keller and Bauman recognize that apocalyptic narratives 
“can be a source of violence towards human and earth ‘others’” particularly those “norm of the 
center—dark bodies, poor bodies, multiply abled bodies, queer bodies, and animal bodies,” 
which are considered “acceptable losses in disasters” like BP and climate change fueled 
storms.916 Futurity for bodies beyond grieving, those bodies occluded by apocalyptic fantasies, 
are my concerns here “at the end” of this project. Building on the attention to quotidian 
encounters in previous chapters, I inquire about those creatures and vital materialities absented 
by speculative futurities that erase multiplicities of environmental encounter.  
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Haraway argues that staying with the trouble resists two frequent responses to the 
“horrors” of the “Anthropocene”—the geological epoch characterized by tremendous human 
transformation of the planet.917 The first, is a “comic faith in technofixes” or 
“technoapocalypses;” “whether secular or religious: technology will somehow come to the 
rescue of its naughty but very clever children, or what amounts to the same thing, God will come 
to the rescue of his disobedient but ever hopeful children” however destructive this rescue may 
prove to be.918 The second response, a perhaps more destructive bitter cynicism Haraway argues, 
is the “position that the game is over, it’s too late, there’s no sense trying to make anything any 
better, or at least no sense having any active trust in each other in working and playing for a 
resurgent world.”919 While this attitude makes sense, she says, in our current environmental 
distress, the futurisms in both of these common responses ignore the tangle of our material and 
social realities and can be discouraging to potential odd-couplings, working together in 
surprising combinations for change. 
As I have outlined, in areas of ecological collapse habitat and species erasure are 
quotidian realities offering religious ecotheory numerous affective quandaries. Renewed or 
continued existence for diverse naturecultures is precarious so hopes for a return to wholeness 
are painfully inappropriate and hopes for the future are complex. In these times, understandably, 
public sentiment and environmental thinking within religion and ecology can tend toward 
apocalyptic affects. However, apocalyptic affects can obscure the fact that some bodies and 
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communities are habitually regarded as environmentally disposable, their losses rarely registered 
as loss, and in times of crisis most often abandoned. While we cannot avoid apocalyptic thinking 
in a culture saturated by it, apocalyptic tendencies should give us pause as Haraway and Marilyn 
Strathern suggest, “it matters what matters we use to think other matters with . . . it matters what 
stories make worlds, what worlds make stories.”920  
 While some ecoapocalypticism wrestles directly with Jewish and Christian texts, what is 
more pervasive within what Catherine Keller calls our “apocalyptic imaginary,” is a “wider 
matrix of unconscious tendencies, an apocalypse habit,” that simmers under a “colloquial idiom” 
just “spectacular enough to bring to the surface the totalizing threat which lurks just beneath 
mass consciousness.”921 This “apocalypse pattern,” she writes, “always adjacent to suffering, 
rests upon an either/or morality: a proclivity to think and feel in polarities of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’; 
to identify with the good and to purge the evil from oneself and one’s world once and for all, 
demanding undivided unity before ‘the enemy’” and “expect some cataclysmic showdown in 
which, despite tremendous collateral damage (the destruction of the world as we know it), good 
must triumph in the near future with the help of some transcendent power and live forever after 
in a fundamentally new world.”922 The apocalypse pattern, Keller argues, is “neither good nor 
evil, sometimes very good and sometimes very evil” with some feminist and critical race 
theorists drawing-out revolutionary counter-readings of the apocalyptic script but most habitual 
tracings following a tendency “to get active, to get enraged, and then to give up, surrendering to 
the lull of the comforts and conveniences extracted from the tribulations of the rest of the 
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planet.” 923  “We think that we must ‘save the earth,’” Keller writes, but “who can carry this? In 
other words, to the extent that we get uncritically hooked on apocalypse—not merely the 
situation but the habit— we contribute to it.”924 This habit, “whatever the anti-imperialist merits 
of the original metaphors may be,” is destructive, “and perhaps first of all self-destructive.”925 
“We wish for messianic solutions,” Keller writes, “and end up doing nothing, for we get locked 
into a particularly apocalyptic either/or logic—if we can’t save the world, then to hell with it. 
Either salvation or damnation.”926  
 “Because disaster tales are intertwined” with “critical processes of meaning-making,” 
Julia Watts Belser writes, “the stories we tell about disaster are never ethically neutral.”927 In the 
more sinister forms of our apocalypse habit, Belser argues, “the stories we tell about crisis and 
catastrophe often intensify structural violence, augmenting existing dynamics of racism, sexism, 
classism, and ableism.” The apocalypse habit resonates in many ways with Ahmed’s 
phenomenological reading of whiteness as a bad habit, tendencies that we socially inherit that 
“allow some bodies to take up space by restricting the mobility of others.”928 White able-bodies 
might not think to ask: whose nature is lost? What kind of nature is in peril? But this inherited 
obfuscation carries histories of investments made over time that shape spaces and encounters. As 
I have outlined, our inherited American protestant environmental imaginary allows for only a 
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particular conception of nature, one that comes at the expense of marginalized bodies, to be both 
reified and continually in peril. This form of nature, through simultaneous influences of 
eugenics, primitivism, and muscular Christianities, has been systematically and affectively 
denied to so many bodies (black, brown, immigrant, queer, disabled) and so unable to address 
damage, disablement, and difference that it is, as Tim Morton argues, a nature that never existed 
in the first place. “Ecoapocalypse is always for someone,” Morton writes, “it presupposes an 
audience. What kinds of sadistic ‘you asked for it’ fantasies does it promote.”929 While 
apocalyptic can affectively capture so many of the feelings sticking to these contexts, the 
anticipation, fear, and the uncertainty in the aftermath, our apocalyptic habits direct attention 
away from entrenched inequality, the slow violence at play in the impact of these storms, the 
continual and compounding precarity shaping so many human and nonhuman encounters. It side-
steps the thick ongoingness of environmental degradation. Should we abandon Louisiana? The 
Gulf Coast? The challenge now to is to become capable of responses that illuminate all the ways 
we already have and collectively resists moving on—come hell and high water.           
 
Disability, Illness, and Environment 
 Thus far I have considered affinity and attachment within communities shaped by long 
histories of environmental racism, trauma, and dispossession. Here, I want to think more on the 
material changes shaping this kinship of remainders particularly environmental illness and 
disability. Attempting to think fecundity for all, what do we make of futurity for the eyeless 
shrimp, clawless crabs, fish with oozing sores, undocumented and imprisoned clean-up crews, 
                                                        







bodies breathing toxic air and wading through toxic waste, bodies that are becoming something-
other that make us uncomfortable? “We carry our most intimate view of nature,” Sharon Betcher 
argues, “within our pictures of health.”930 In a culture with a “monopolizing preoccupation” with 
health, striving for it, “seems so inherently natural that religious communities, including eco-
spiritual movements, appear unconscious of the politics” or the image of nature involved.931 
Disability and environmental illnesses often surface in religious ecotheory as “failed health”—
compelling traces of the toll chemical pesticides, landfills, poor air quality, and other toxins have 
on our “unevenly polluted biosphere.”932 Julia Watts Belser suggests that disability and illness 
function in these contexts as both “a tangible, corporeal demonstration of harm done and a potent 
goad that might yet compel a reluctant populace to self-interested action on behalf of the 
biosphere.”933 Caring for nonhuman nature is preached as for our own good—ensuring a happy, 
healthy species. However, critical disability studies questions the “implications of these 
evocations of disability” as “cultural trope(s)” that use disability “to signify human suffering, to 
evoke pity, and to embody tragedy, limitation, dejection, and loss.”934 This reliance on the 
“tragic cripple” trope leads Betcher to ask, “can disabilities be within ecological discourse 
something more than a metaphorical and statistical scare tactic to catalyze persons’ 
environmental best practice?”935 Since ill and disabled bodies never appear in new cosmology 
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narratives, and are rarely invited into broader conversations in religion and ecology, our field has 
not cultivated a response to Betcher’s lament.  
Functioning as one response936 to this question; however, and helpful for thinking about 
affinity and attachment with bodies and environments impacted by environmental degradation, is 
working to challenge environmental conceptualizations of nature that tend to “assume that 
everyone accesses nature in the same way” enforcing that it is “this presumption that colors 
environmental political visions.”937 Alison Kafer’s Feminist, Queer, Crip asks “whose 
experiences of nature are taken as the norm within environmental discourses,” and “what do 
these discourses assume about nature, the body/mind, and the relationship between humans and 
nature?”938 Within these boundaries, “nonnormative approaches to nature and the limitations of 
the body are erased” and “able-bodiedness becomes a prerequisite for imagining environmental 
futures” thus binding environmental theory to a “very particular kind of body.”939 This body 
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might have meaningful, spiritual, transformative experiences in nature, but this body is also in 
control of these encounters—who, when, and how much it engages, when and where to pull-in 
close, and when to disengage. Disabilities, however, challenge (sometimes visibly) the 
“dominant assumption that bodies are neatly bounded powerhouses of capacity. Disabled bodies 
belie conventional conceptions of the body as secure, enclosed, and sovereign.”940 The “disabled 
body is not alone in this respect,” Belser writes, “stigmas of permeability and contagion,” like we 
see in the rhetoric advocating abandonment of New Orleans and its residents after Katrina, shape 
“prevailing discourses of race and class-marked bodies, just as they characterize negative 
conceptions of feminine and queer corporealities. Yet disability,” can display “the vulnerability 
of the human body in a particularly concrete way, forcing an acknowledgement that human being 
is radically affected as flesh meets world. Dominant culture recognizes—and recoils from—the 
trans-corporeality of the disabled body.”941  
Of course, it is not just new cosmology and other forms of contemporary environmental 
thought that are committed to able-bodied environmental imaginaries. Eco-crip scholars remind 
us that our inherited American environmental imaginary linking nature with spiritual redemption, 
moral improvement, and affective renewal also relies on able-bodiedness. Disabled and ill 
bodies, like female, queer, black, and brown bodies, are not inheritors of the American Protestant 
environmental imagination as a line of investment. The white, affluent, male ideal that can leave 
the crowded city and explore restorative nature is also what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls 
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the “normate”942 body, or what Sarah Jaquette Ray terms the “wilderness body ideal.”943 Ray’s 
article, “Risking Bodies in the Wild: The ‘Corporeal Unconscious’ of American Adventure 
Culture,” addresses the “extent to which environmentalism,” the wilderness movement as an 
essential part, “and the ideal of American identity developed” together “in opposition to a 
fundamental category of ‘otherness’—disability.”944 
Reading the same time period as Evan Berry, Ray argues the “corporeal unconscious,” 
that characterizes U.S. environmentalism “prizes the ‘fit’ body—able, muscular, young, and 
male.”945 “Extending Progressive Era links between the body, social hygiene, and the wilderness 
encounter,” through this fit body environmental thought simultaneously solidified “social notions 
of purity and fitness” and gave meaning to the disabled American body as socially, politically 
and culturally unfit, unproductive, and unrecruitable.946 Ray argues there is a “material, 
constitutive relationship between disability and American environmental thought and practice” 
as environmental thoughts’ genesis in the wilderness movement imbued the “fit body with values 
of independence, self-reliance, genetic superiority, and willpower,” and then provided wilderness 
as the setting to “rehearse these values” by living out their salvific potential.947 Through coding 
“certain bodies as (already) morally good and pure,” unfit bodies (those racialized, female, poor, 
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and disabled bodies) in their unrecruitability became not just a threat to American identity but to 
“Nature itself”948 in their incongruity with ideal visions of reciprocal or harmonious relationships 
between humans and nature. This environmental inheritance continues to reverberate both in 
contemporary investments in nature as an adventure sport paradise, the white male pitting 
himself against nature and surviving, and the absence of multiplicities of nature encounters. The 
“disabled body,” Ray writes, “is simultaneously the most absent and the most necessary for 
reifying white bourgeois identity” as the “disabled body is necessary to give risk and adventure 
any meaning, and yet the disabled body must remain invisible. The double bind of risk culture 
becomes evident because risk in fact threatens disablement.”949 
The reverberations of this environmental inheritance that are most detrimental for 
devastated landscapes are investments in maintaining the invisibility of disabled bodies. Still, 
even in this cultural moment, disabled representation in nature encounters is incredibly rare and 
academic conversations on disability, illness, and the environment are nascent. In religion and 
ecology, they continue to be almost wholly absent. While “tales of communities in crisis 
commonly depoliticize disaster” and obscure “the political significance of structural inequalities 
that render people with disabilities more at risk in disaster,” in truth “the disabled body,” Julia 
Watts Belser argues, is inscribed socially and environmentally with a “narrative of ‘natural’ 
vulnerabilities and inevitable suffering” that facilitates their abandonment.950 These well-worn 
routes that contribute to the invisibility of disabled bodies and their environmental experiences 
only feed into the realities of what we saw unfold in Katrina, Rita, and Harvey which is disabled 
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populations were particularly hard-hit by these storms. In Louisiana there was no disaster 
planning for people with disabilities.951 There was no plan for evacuating those that needed 
mobility assistance. There were no translation services for those with sensory disabilities. There 
was no registry to locate residents that were unable to reach safety without assistance. The poor, 
ill, disabled, and elderly were most likely to die during Katrina and people with disabilities were 
left to drown in their mobility devices in their homes, in second-story apartments, sitting in the 
heat in wheelchairs on the highway, in nursing homes and hospitals without power and staff.952  
Complicating this discussion, like the problematic histories facing black and female 
bodies and environmental thinking, is disability studies’ flight from social presumptions of 
people with disabilities as more proximate to nature/nonhuman animals. The strained 
relationship between disability and animality traces back to Darwin’s nineteenth-century 
“paradigm-shifting theory of evolution” that “identified feebleminded and racialized peoples as 
key evidence of human animal origins.”953 Consequently, while there is work in disability studies 
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on how “built environments954 privilege some bodies and minds over others” through focusing 
on accessibility and representation, there is less scholarship on the “specific ways toxic 
environments engender chronic illness and disability, especially for marginalized populations, or 
the ways environmental illnesses, often chronic and invisible, disrupt dominant paradigms for 
recognizing and representing ‘disability.’”955 These concerns have merit as I can easily see, like 
my conversations on trauma and environment, work that considers how environments can be 
disabling (or can debilitate further) being used to dismiss people with disabilities as without 
future, purpose, or hope in a rapidly changing environment. I understand hesitancy with 
investing in environmental thought from voices in disability studies that argue not all people with 
disabilities desire “fixing” or normative conceptions of health, especially since the true 
impediments are access and representation not difference, because most narratives discussing 
disability and environmental decline champion only normative conceptions of health.  
One source of these tensions, Kelly Fritsch argues, is the “material-discursive production 
of disability” that intimately links “forms of neoliberal biocapitalism” together with 
“consequences for how we think toxicity and disability together.”956 As I have mentioned, the 
U.S. has “sorely lacking standards and laws regulating chemical production and distribution,” 
and the risk of environmental exposure “can debilitate certain populations more than others,” the 
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production of disability in America shapes disability as “an individually economically 
quantifiable toxic condition.”957 Contemporary panic about the dangers of exposing fetuses and 
children to toxins in the environment, Fritsch and Mel Chen argue, resonate only when white 
children and white legacies are at risk while “black children are ‘assumed to be toxic’”958 and 
without kinship lineages that require financial investments. While, as Chen, Alaimo, and Fritsch 
demonstrate, we live in increasingly toxically-threatening planet (with politics not inherent 
difference determining levels of exposure) “discourses representing disability as the failure of the 
body to meet some normative standards” have not disappeared; “people still want a ‘healthy 
baby’ to such an extent that disability deeply disturbs this desire.”959 Kafer, in a crip reading of 
Haraway’s feminist cyborg figure, argues this compulsory reproduction of able-bodies is driven 
by “ideologies of wholeness,”960 that are so pervasive that speaking into this context and calling 
for futures that desire disability is disturbingly improper in its rejection of normative kinship 
networks and the cause of American futurity.  
These are sticky dialogues. I think they are worth having; however, because crip 
materialities offer incredibly valuable insights for environmental ethics. Considering precarious 
futures, it is critical that we wrestle with the realities that people with disabilities (disabled 
bodies, encounters, and imaginaries) continue to be absented in our theory and policy and this 
lack of representation, like missing nonessentialized black environmental identities, contributes 
to people with illnesses and disabilities being last in consideration for rescue, policy 
interventions, restoration, and rebuilding efforts post-disaster. Furthermore, considering new 
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cosmology’s ethical argument for the future, the erasure of disabled bodies and toxic 
environments can be understood as not incidental to these strains of religious ecotheory but 
fundamental in order to maintain new cosmology’s affective investments. Disabled bodies, with 
complex encounters and material needs, with potentially ambivalent feelings about a nature 
constructed either in their absence or as evidence of their inhumanity, and with potentially 
visible testaments to the realities of our porosity and the impacts of toxic immersion, unsettle so 
many of the ontological and ethical commitments new cosmology tightly clutches. Primarily, I 
argue the side-stepping of environmental degradation and the complete lack of attention to 
people with disabilities is because the presence of ill and disabled bodies and habitats resists the 
speculative futures new cosmology invests in—"hopeful” (in its narrowest conception) futures of 
reciprocal healing for human and nonhuman others if humans choose to invest in evolutionary 
kinships. It is doubtful devastated landscapes and people with illnesses and disabilities can be 
part of these futures so the question remains, how do we explore “wanted, unwanted, and even 
unknowable intimacies with our environments,” in ways that unsettle the desirability of normate 
lives and attend to “the nuances of disabled lives as viable alternatives?”961 Resisting these 
erasures, I argue we need alternative futures, disability futures, within religion and ecology that 
desire embodied difference in our shared precarity. 
 
Desiring Eco-Crip Futurity 
Providing an excellent model for this precarious embrace, Kafer’s Feminist, Queer, Crip 
appeals to methodological alliances between queer and crip theory, particularly pulling from 
queer kinship and temporality, to articulate “crip time,” by wrestling with the “ways in which 
                                                        





‘future’ has been deployed in the service of compulsory able-bodiedness and able-
mindedness.”962 Kafer critiques two problematic framings of crip futurity that are also relevant 
for thinking about futurity for devastated landscapes. First, Kafer highlights that futurity for 
bodies with disabilities is often “framed in curative terms, a time frame that casts disabled people 
(as) out of time, or as obstacles to the arc of progress.”963 Within this frame of “curative time” 
the “only appropriate disabled mind/body is one cured or moving toward cure.”964 Curative time 
cannot allow the persistence of bodies with disabilities because they break this hopeful arc. 
Consequently, crip theory must “engage in the process of articulating other temporalities, other 
approaches to futurity beyond curative ones.”965 I have detailed how Edenic pasts and 
apocalyptic futures do devastated landscapes no favors and how through their sheer absence new 
cosmology and religion and ecology invest in compulsory able-bodiedness/able-mindedness by 
similarly projecting futures without the persistence of disabled bodies. Thus, religion and 
ecology is in the similar position of needing to articulate other temporalities for devastated 
environments cast out of time if it hopes to be relevant for the future.  
Second, in critique of Lee Edelman’s shaping of queer futurity, Kafer argues crip theory 
must be wary of rejecting futurity outright. Edelman highlights the compulsory heterosexuality 
in American politics that is centered around consanguineous kinships and the figure of the child 
as its inevitable telos.966 Provocatively, Edelman argues queers would be better off refusing the 
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future altogether. Resonating with Edelman, Kafer agrees the figure of the child is certainly used 
to “buttress able-bodied/able-minded heteronormativity,” especially through prenatal testing and 
selective abortion.967 Furthermore, Kafer finds commonality with Edelman’s argument that 
compulsory heterosexuality leads to an “ethics of endless deferral,” where focus on a better 
future requires diverting “our attention from the here and now” and the need for political 
interventions for queer communities.968 The framing of disability mirrors compulsory 
heterosexuality, Kafer contends, with this “firm focus on the future” often “expressed in terms of 
cure and rehabilitation, and is thereby bound up in normalizing approaches to the mind/body” 
rather than dedicated to investments in the “needs and experiences of disabled people in the 
present.”969 Within deferred futurity, queerness and disability “cannot appear as anything other 
than failure” in their inability to conform to particular kinship parameters so it is easy, Kafer 
contends, to see clearly “how futurity has been the cause of much violence against disabled 
people, such that ‘fuck the future’ can seem the only viable crip response.”970  
Yet, where she departs from Edelman, Kafer argues it is “these very histories ultimately” 
that “make such refusal untenable.”971 “I do not think the only response to no future,” she writes, 
“—or rather, to futures that depend upon no futures for crips—is a refusal of the future 
altogether. Indeed, ‘fucking the future,’ at least in Edelman’s terms, takes on a different valence 
for those who are not supported in their desires to project themselves (and their children) into the 
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future in the first place.”972 Kafer sides with Heather Love and José Muñoz who contend the 
child of compulsory heterosexuality’s sovereign futurity, that Edelman describes, is ultimately a 
white child. Furthermore, the “always already whiteness” of the future child “is a whiteness 
framed by and understood through regimes of health and hygiene”973 suturing stigmas of 
permeability and contagion to undesirable kinship lineages. “Queer kids, kids of color, street 
kids—all of the kids cast out of reproductive futurism—have been and continue to be framed as 
sick, as pathological, as contagious” conflating race, class, and disability.974 Instead of 
abandoning futurity, Kafer calls for consideration of real complex lives, “critical maps of the 
practices and ideologies that effectively cast disabled people out of time and out of our futures,” 
and careful attention to the ways “incidents of illness and disability” are “inextricably bound, and 
differentially bound, to race/class/gender/nation.”975  
Wholesale abandonment of futures for disasterscapes, as Haraway and Keller highlight, is 
a tempting option. It is a habit that many environmentalists are determined not to break. 
Avoidance and erasure, however, has done little to actually solve the progression of 
environmental degradation and its uneven impacts on the poor. Desiring nature solely as 
wholeness or reciprocity, Haraway drawing from Gayatri Spivak argues, continues to position 
nature as an impossibility— “as that which we cannot not desire. Excruciatingly conscious of 
nature’s discursive constitution as ‘other’ in the histories of colonialism, racism, sexism, and 
class domination of many kinds, we nonetheless find in this problematic, ethno-specific, long-
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lived, and mobile concept something we cannot do without, but can never ‘have.’ We must find 
another relationship to nature besides reification and possession.”976 Refusing futurity for 
devastated landscapes does not do much justice to those bodies, identities, communities, and 
habitats that have always been denied the embrace of nature and American futurity. Questions 
like those Kafer, Love, and Muñoz ask—why do some children have futures and others do not, 
who gets to decide what constitutes hope (which embodiments are worth dreaming), why are 
some bodies allowed to desire the future (be desirable futures) and others not— seem much more 
productive than our apocalypse habit.  
Resisting temporal frameworks that depoliticize disability and position people with 
disabilities as without futures, Kafer advocates for a political/relational model of disability that 
focuses instead on the “political experience of disablement” and sees disability as a “potential 
site for collective reimagining” for the future.977 Disability, she argues, exists not only in 
“relation to able-bodiedness/able-mindedness, such that disabled and abled form a constitutive 
binary,” but also “disability is experienced in and through relationships; it does not occur in 
isolation.”978 These relationships include friends, family, attendant care, objects and spaces, 
procedure and policy. Her concern, she writes, is with framing disability:   
not as a category inherent in certain minds and bodies but as what historian Joan W. Scott 
calls a ‘collective affinity.’ Drawing on the cyborg theory of Donna Haraway, Scott 
describes collective affinities as ‘play[ing] on identifications that have been attributed to 
individuals by their societies, and that have served to exclude them or subordinate them.’ 
Collective affinities in terms of disability could encompass everyone from people with 
learning disabilities to those with chronic illness, from people with mobility impairments 
to those with HIV/AIDS, from people with sensory impairments to those with mental 
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illness. People within each of these categories can all be discussed in terms of disability 
politics, not because of any essential similarities among them, but because all have been 
labeled as disabled or sick and have faced discrimination as a result.979  
These, what Kafer terms “crip affinities,” resonate with work in queer theory that recognizes 
terms like “queer” are fluid sites of collective contestation, and the “experience of illness and 
disability,” she writes, can be understood in “Jasbir Puar’s framework, as an assemblage, where 
‘[c]ategories—race, gender, sexuality [and, I would add, disability]—are considered as events, 
actions, and encounters between bodies, rather than as simply entities and attributes of 
subjects.’”980  
Crip affinities offer “alternative ways of understanding ourselves in relation to the 
environment, understandings which can then generate” new possibilities for “intellectual 
connections and activist coalitions”981 by demonstrating how very much different groups 
negotiating the intersections of social exclusions and environmental decline have to say to one 
another. Like Kimberle Crenshaw articulates with intersectionality, crip affinities offer ways to 
spotlight how forms of power intersect and interlock.982 The stigmas of permeability and 
contagion that affectively position disabled bodies as undesirable, without future, 
environmentally threatening, or inconsequential, are shared by sexual minorities and black 
communities resisting entrenched uses of “nature” to proscribe gender, sexual identities, 
practices, affinities, attachments, kinships, and alternative futures. Following the long histories I 
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outlined of pressing social exclusions into America’s very landscapes, crip affinities can help us 
further puzzle through devastated landscapes—eyeless shrimp, clawless crabs, fish with sores, 
eroding coastlines, oil-slick habitats, superfund seepage, lost-histories, abandoned black, 
disabled, and elderly humans—as complex assemblages made up of the diverse inheritors of 
toxic investments.  
Kafer argues how one “understands disability in the present determines how one 
imagines disability in the future: one’s assumptions about the experience of disability create 
one’s conception of a better future.”983 “I desire crip futures,” she writes: 
futures that embrace disabled people, futures that imagine disability differently, futures 
that support multiple ways of being. I use this language of desire deliberately. I know 
how my heart can catch when I see a body that moves oddly or bears strange scars. I 
know how my body shifts, leans forward, when I hear someone speak with atypical 
pauses or phrasing, or when talk turns to illness and disability. Part of what I am 
describing is a lust born of recognition, a lust to see bodies like my own or like the bodies 
of friends and lovers, as well as a hope that the other finds such recognition in me. 
Perhaps most important to this examination of disability futures, it is a desire born largely 
of absence. We lack such futures in this present, and my desires are practically 
inconceivable in the public sphere. There is no recognition that one could desire 
disability, no move to imagine what such desire could look like.984 
 
Kafer’s desires here, again, resonate with Mel Chen’s conception of queerness as improper 
affiliation. Recognizing that desire always overflows the contours meant to contain it, Kafer, 
Chen, and other queer ecologists recognize cultivating impropriety in kin-care may be our 
hopeful future.985 It seems to be, as Kafer suggests, that without reconsidering our current 
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imaginings of disability that religion and ecology would not be able to speak to relationships 
with damaged environments and creatures in any meaningful way. What sorts of different futures 
might we imagine, what conceptual and activist openings might be possible, if we consider the 
embodied experiences of illness and disabilities as we experience ill and disabled ecosystems? 
What might it mean to religious ecotheory if we not only carved out space for but desired queer 
eco-crip affinities— “bodies with limited, off, or queer movements and orientations”986— and 
asked what these bodies desire for the future, how their encounters, intimacies, and attachments 
reshape what can be said about hope?  Finding our way out of the problem of foreclosed futures 
for devastated landscapes begins with relocating kinship love away from evolutionary 
inheritances that ignore our toxic immersions, and towards relocating future desire within 
kinships of remainders, collective affinities between queer, black, and disabled ways of being, 
and a desire for being-long (in all its different forms) for everyone.  
 
What the Water Gave Me 
I began with detailing how creatures impacted by BP demanded a reshaping in my 
environmental thinking—how I lacked the conceptual tools to puzzle through my feelings. I end 
with the personal and attachment to turtles. During the strange waiting period (uncanny hurricane 
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time) between the Harvey rain waters receding and the river levels rising, standing in long lines 
at the grocery trying to think of what to get out of what was left to sit out being an island for a 
while, I became obsessed with rescuing the displaced turtles (Texas river cooters and western 
painted turtles) confusedly waddling away from all the overfull swamps, ponds, and fountains 
into traffic. Not one to make a spectacle of myself nor even very fond of turtles (their slimy 
mossy-ness and heft makes them particularly difficult to transport in hot traffic) I, nevertheless, 
found myself frantically searching for them while we drove to check on friends and borrow 
medical supplies for my son. I’d yell for my spouse to stop driving and hop out hips-churning in 
humidity-stuck clothes to grab them and take them back to the water. I know nothing about 
turtles. I never had a particular affinity for them before, but I found myself thinking about them 
all the time. I knew as my anxiety increased each time I saw one smashed by cars, and in-spite of 
my awareness that as soon as the Brazos floods came they would all wash out into unsafe places 
again, that this obsession is and is not about wanting to protect the turtles. I did not want to be 
displaced into a shelter despite its professed safety and I wanted to be home to ride out whatever 
was coming. I had not prepped my children for a shelter. I had nowhere near enough medical 
supplies prepared. I felt so stupid for not preparing better. How much preparation is enough? I 
wanted to take those turtles to their homes too, despite how irrational jumping into traffic 
became. I watch for them still, more than a year later scanning curbs and intersections, and I 
have a place to take the injured ones. A queer biophilic encounter perhaps—a noticing, a 
connection, not through their beauty (though they certainly are beautiful) but through a mass of 
fear, anxiety, frustration, and despair. I do not know if moving the turtles gives me hope. Mostly, 
like any environmental thought in our contemporary moment, it feels too little too late, not 




best to live, love, and hope in our labor of forming response-abilities; however, is ours to 
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